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SYMPOSIUM  
OF  
INTERROGATIONS  
AND  
REPORTS  
ON  
GERMAN METHODS  
OF  
STATISTICAL REPORTING

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BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

SYMPOSIUM OF INTERROGATIONS and REPORTS on  
GERMAN METHODS of STATISTICAL REPORTING

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Note: A further report written by Dr. Lauersen, explaining in greater detail the functions of MB, is to be issued later as a supplement to this symposium.

Notes on Reports.

1. Fourth session of a series of interrogations carried out for the exploitation of Reichsminister Speer. This was done on May 29th 1945, by Mr. O. Hoefding of LWD (US).
2. Report based on an examination of the subject on August 4-5th 1945, by Mr. John Selwyn of Foreign Office, German Economic Department.
3. Special Report made by the Mobile Field Interrogation Unit on April 25th 1945, in reply to a SHAEF Brief.
4. Report written for Major Stella of Foreign Office, German Economic Department, at Hamburg on August 31st 1945.
5. Second report for Foreign Office written between 14th and 21st August 1945.
6. Report written for Major Stella, at the same time as above.
7. Interrogation carried out by G-2, Economic Section, SHAEF, on May 4th 1945.
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## INTRODUCTION

Since the cessation of hostilities in Europe, interrogations have been carried out from time to time, as personnel were captured, and as the need arose, on various aspects of German statistical reporting, and particularly on that department of the Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (Armaments and War Production) known as the Maschinelles Berichtswesen (Machine Reporting).

Recently an attempt has been made by specific questioning of some of the German personnel formerly engaged on this work, to obtain a complete picture of the function of the MB, and methods of collating industrial statistics during the war.

The attached symposium is an accumulation of material on these subjects, which is offered without comment, merely in coherent form. (An apology must be made here, if the translations of these component reports at times appear somewhat literal; success in re-moulding sentences is not sure without entirely re-translating, which time does not permit. The remedy therefore has been to edit, where possible without changing the original sense).

Whilst it is being left to readers to draw their own conclusions from the material here presented, it may be of interest to have an outline summary of statistical reporting in Germany before the war and developments therein up to the formation of the Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion in 1942.

Before the war, the main official statistical body was the Statistisches Reichsamt (SRA), with the Reichsgruppe Industrie as a source for industrial statistics, which were processed in a special department of the SRA called Industrielle Produktionsstatistik.

With the war-time need for greater speed than the Statistisches Reichsamt was able to muster in the collection and processing of essential statistics, a Gruppe Zentralstatistik was formed (1940), in the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsstab of OKW, to further the interests of the Wehrmacht in carrying out statistical investigations via-a-vis all non-Wehrmacht Departments.

The Gruppe Zentralstatistik remained part of OKW until 1943, when it was incorporated (with its personnel and sphere of work) into the department Maschinelles Berichtswesen of Speer's Ministry (Rüstung u. Kriegsproduktion). The Maschinelles Berichtswesen had been formed in 1942/3 when the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt of OKW was split up, the Wehrwirtschaftsamt (later Feldwirtschaftsamt), remaining in OKW, and the Rüstungsamt being given into the charge of Reichsminister Speer.

At the same time the Lochkartenabteilung (punched-card department) of the Heereswaffenamt (OKH), which had existed since 1938, was made into a separate department and transferred to Speer as the nucleus of MB. Since then its form has not altered substantially, there being a Head Office (Zentrallamt) in Berlin, and a district office (Bezirksstelle) in each Rüstungsinspektion area.

Given below are a few details on some of the personalities whose reports are included in this collection:

Lauersen 1933-38 Referent of department Industrielle Produktionsstatistik of Statistisches Reichsamt.

1938 Transferred to Gruppe Statistik of OKW, which in 1940 became Gruppe Zentralstatistik, and in 1943 Abteilung IV of MB Zentralstelle.

Bramstedt Also belonged to the Statistisches Reichsamt.

Schroeder Worked under Lauersen in Zentralstatistik OKW, and Abt. IV MB.

Bickert A member of the Reichsgruppe Industrie.

Baudisch Head of the department for Joint Planning of Industrial Requirements in the Planungsamt of the Speer Ministry.

Wagenfür A member of the Institute of Economic Research and chief statistician of the Planungsamt.

- Strebel Employed since 1927 in the Reichsversicherungsamt (Reich Insurance Office), where he had established a Hollerith department. Being unfit for military service, he was placed in the Lochkartenabteilung of MB.
- Schulz Dr. of Agronomics, who had worked on agricultural statistics since 1928. Liaison officer of MB.
- Toejes In charge of section dealing with employers' returns and industrial reports in Lauersen's department of MB.

# PART I

## Section 1

### INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEER, FORMER REICH MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES AND WAR PRODUCTION.

Part of 4th Session - 15:00 to 17.30 hrs. -  
29th May 1945.

Asked to outline his policy and measures in respect of the organization of industrial statistics, SPEER has a familiar account of the situation which he found in this field on taking office - the multiplicity of forms and questionnaires addressed to industrial firms by various control agencies, the lack of co-ordination etc. The Statistischer Zentralausschuss, managed largely by the statistisches Reichsamt, had no administrative powers, and was unable to enforce its intentions of cutting down on statistical reporting. The statistisches Reichsamt itself had no incentive for doing so, being interested in getting as many different data as it could. Apart from state control agencies, many questionnaires were sent out by Party organisations, especially the Labor Front which called for a multiplicity of labor data for its Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut.

SPEER entrusted Staatsrat SCHMEER with carrying out a drastic simplification of this system, but admitted that his ideals of reducing statistics procurement to a very few standard questionnaires were not realised, and that generally his Berichtswesen organisation failed to live up to his expectations and never was very efficient. He attributes this partly to excessive reliance on Hollerith methods, which in his view require careful organisation, training of personnel and evolution of methods. For all this there was not enough time. Hollerith machinery was hastily collected from all occupied countries, and staff was recruited in a haphazard manner. The Maschinelles Berichtswesen, under Col. PASSOW, provided the nucleus. SPEER took it over with the Ruestungsamt from the OKW. After the transfer, the Zentralstelle MB, although administratively entirely under the Speer Ministry, continued to do work for OKW and OKH, as otherwise its mechanical capacity would not have been fully utilised. The weaknesses of the expanded MB organisation as described above resulted in general inefficiency,



involving big time lags (up to two months) between completion of questionnaires and production of results, and sometimes in "appalling inaccuracies" (Ungeheure Fehler). The organization did not stand up at all well to bombing. From mid-1944 it became more and more difficult to obtain up-to-date Reich figures, as some of the raided Gaue would be late with their returns and the previous month's figures or estimates had to be used. Simplified reports (Eilmeldungen) based on returns from relatively few representative plants were increasingly used from that time onwards. SPEER is not familiar with details and technicalities of the statistical reporting system.

As regards evaluation and dissemination of statistical data, SPEER maintained that until fairly recently very little was done by way of producing digested and comprehensive regular statistical summaries for the armaments sector or industry as a whole. The keeping of statistics of output, etc. in each field was entrusted to the Main Committees, who were not required to report them to any central agency for collation in a general review. SPEER himself used to obtain a monthly report on armaments output through SAUR, whose personal referent, FRIESE, would spend a couple of nights on the telephone at the end of every month calling the Sonderausschuss leaders and getting from them figures for their respective products, which by the 1st of the month would be presented to SPEER in a summary. This kind of telephoning became impossible in fall 1944. The figures thus obtained were subsequently confirmed in writing and checked. Production figures coming from industry were also checked against Heereswaffenamt acceptance statistics supplied by Col. JUBSTROW. The procurement of data on A/C production was complicated by the fact that a plane was officially counted as produced only after it has been test-flown and accepted. The average number of planes awaiting test-flight would be around 400, but weather conditions caused seasonal fluctuations and in the winter months the number would rise to 1,200 or so. These fluctuations originally resulted in errors in the monthly production statistics which later on were eliminated by statistical methods.

SPEER explained that statistical terminology was often muddled. He had always wanted to issue a glossary of administrative and production terms with standard definitions but had never got around to it. Thus, various concepts were current for production

schedules. "Sollzahlen" based on reports from industry on prospective production were communicated to the Wehrmacht which used them in making its military plans. In 1942 SPEER was still able to furnish such figures for 1-1½ years in advance, but as from late 1943 the periods for which reliable forecasts of this kind could be made were steadily shortened until finally from mid-1944 onwards they were only able to commit themselves for one month ahead. So-called "Programmzahlen" were used in planning industrial production - placing of orders for products, components, materials etc. These changed frequently according to changes in the stated requirements of the Wehrmacht, who changed their mind too often for SPEER's liking, although he admits that the changes were sometimes SAUR's fault, who was a bit "unsteady". The programs were worked out in detail by the Hauptaus-schuisse but were fully reported to Technisches Amt which should have a full collection in its archives. SPEER mentioned a "bad habit" of the Hauptausschuisse to enclose with their reports graphic charts of past and future output which usually shewed a gradual increase for the past months, a rising trend for the two or three coming months and then a steep increase. The same picture would be repeated month by month, with the curve gradually shifting to the right on the diagram.

Finally, there were the so-called Fuehrer Requirements (Fuehrerforderungen). These had mostly been stated by Hitler fairly early in 1942 or 1943 and were not modified afterwards except in a few cases. They were mostly very high and far in excess of actual output and capabilities, which was realised by everybody including Hitler himself. However, they retained force of law and were carried over as "target figures" although they were pretty meaningless. Hitler refused to cut them down officially.

The comparative monthly reports on Rhuestungs-statistik in Germany and Allied countries published by the Wissenschaftliche Beratungsstelle of the Planungsamt in 1944 were according to SPEER the only summary reports of this kind. The Beratungsstelle was not an office but a decentralised federation of working parties on various subjects, with one agency acting as secretariat in each working party, in this case the Feldwirtschaftsamt, which was responsible for economic intelligence on foreign countries. SPEER was not acquainted with its economic intelligence methods. He thought very little of the

monthly reports. The tables, in his view, were prepared by a layman and were generally badly laid out. In particular, they were unfair to his ministry, e.g. by showing German output of tanks and assault guns separately as against one total for tanks in allied countries. As assault guns were made in Germany only, SPEER maintained that the comparison of the tank totals only made German production appear relatively smaller even than it was, as assault guns ought to have been included in a comparable total. SPEER thought that he had ordered that they were not to be distributed except in one copy addressed to him, and was surprised to hear that Copy No. 5 of one report had been found in the Statistisches Reichsamt, commenting that this was precisely the thing that this agency, with its statistical acquisitive instinct, would do.

In connection with the figures shown in these reports for Japanese war production in 1943, SPEER was questioned on the state of knowledge on Japan in Germany. He said that the Japanese were extremely incommunicative, and he thought that the figures mentioned above were Feldwirtschaftsamt estimates rather than figures officially furnished by the Japanese. It had been extremely difficult to get any kind of information out of them. On the German side there had been a general order to give them access to all information they wanted, but SPEER was not sure if this applied to weapons on the secret list, and doubted whether V-1 or V-2 had been given to the Japanese. Innovations like Panzerfaust, hollow charges and new ammunition types, however, were supplied to them by the Heereswaffenamt as a matter of routine. SPEER knew that samples of new equipment had gone to Japan by U-boat but knew little about the details of this traffic. Jet plane designs had been communicated and possibly samples despatched. Messerschmitt would know about this. No Japanese observers were in German industry and development institutions, and to SPEER's knowledge few German technicians, if any, had been sent to Japan during the war. The information traffic was entirely one-way. SPEER himself once demonstrated a lecture with lantern-slides<sup>+</sup> on German armaments production to OSHIMA, and OSHIMA also used to attend demonstrations of new German tanks and planes at Rechlin. On one occasion, as SPEER heard from

+ SPEER says that these were with his FLENSBURG documents and if they can be found he can repeat the performance.

MILCH, the Germans asked the Japanese to furnish information on their attacks on Allied warships. Some results were received but they were extremely disappointing.

Questioned on the blockade running in 1942/43 SPEER was unable to give particulars of the eastbound cargoes. He remembered that ship-plates were a conspicuous item, which surprised him at the time, but was in line with the concern about Japanese steel supplies repeatedly voiced to SPEER by OSHIMA. Aluminium was also included. Japanese requirements were registered with the Abteilung Ausland of the Wirtschaftsministerium, which would have details on this trade. SPEER did not know of any design or construction work on machinery and plant ordered by Japan in Germany during the War. Among westbound cargoes, crude rubber was by far the most important item to SPEER. They managed to obtain 9 months' to one year's stock of crude (based on requirements for admixture to Buna). Other items were wolfram, tin vegetable oils for food uses. Priorities and programs for imports through the blockade were determined by the Zentrale Planung itself which was then an active body. BACKE was invited to these meetings, as the food supply requirements versus needs of the Armaments industry was one of the chief issues at stake. The minutes of the Zentrale Planung should contain details.

Other periodical official reports which SPEER knew included a 10-daily report produced jointly by the Planungsamt and Rohstoffamt on the general industrial situation, chiefly analysing difficulties in the planning and allocation of materials, specific bottlenecks, etc.

SPEER knew that a lot of periodical reporting was done by the Ruestungsinspektionen to the Ruestungsamt, but thought little of these reports which in his view were bad. They as a rule did not go beyond the Ruestungsamt, and SPEER dismissed them as "Wichtigtuerei", like many other of the Ruestungsamt's activities. He attached much more importance to personal conferences in maintaining contact with the regional level. Up to May or June 1944 the chairman of the Armament Commissions used to come to Berlin every two or three weeks for reporting and discussing regional problems with SPEER. After that the transport situation made such meetings impossible. Wider meetings (the Ruestungstagungen) were held occasionally at which various regional functionaries as well as Ministerial officials and Hauptausschuss leaders got together, with a total attendance of 200 or

so. These congresses were usually held at places like Rechlin and were combined with demonstrations of new weapons.

The Hauptabteilung Planstatistik in the Planungsamt was headed by WAGENFUHR of the Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung. This Institute, as such had nothing to do with the Planungsamt. Its only function was to review the results of planning, while it was not concerned with providing statistical data for the planning activities of the Amt.

SPEER was vague as to the statistical procedures of industrial planning by the Planungsamt. In his recollection, the starting point was provided by the steel allocation plan. For every quarter, six weeks in advance, a table was produced on which the steel requirements claimed for armaments production by the Hauptauschusse and other Kontingenstraeger were shown on the left-hand side, and those for "indirect armaments production" - e.g. capital equipment, transport, and also the civilian section - on the other side. The figures were totalled up and usually found far in excess of anticipated steel supplies. Originally the balance between requirements and supplies was established after direct bargaining among the members of Zentrale Planung. Later on, when KEHRL's Planungsamt had become a going concern, KEHRL formulated proposals for the settlement which as a rule were quickly approved by the Zentrale Planung.

At a second series of meetings, the allocation of non-ferrous metals and later of other materials, was settled on a similar basis, the previous iron program providing a yardstick. Non-ferrous metals were handled very skilfully by MUELLER-ZIMMERMANN, Reichsbeauftragter for metals. Procedures were different for a number of materials, including coal, where the proposed allocation was worked out by the Reichsvereinigung Kohle and submitted for approval to Zentral Planung. This was originally done once a year in fall, and later at more frequent and irregular intervals. For power, the "Abschaltlisten", or lists of plants to be cut off when in winter a small peak load could not be met (which was a regular feature) were decided upon at meeting held once yearly, also in autumn.

SPEER maintained that we would not find much retrospective analytical material in the archives of his Ministry, as he and his people were always too busy

with immediate and future problems to have time to look back. The only exception is the Rechenschaftsbericht 1944, which he had prepared in early 1945, when he realised that things were nearing the end, and he wanted to have the performance of his Ministry placed on record.

## PART I

### Section 2

This Report is based on an examination of Dr. Rolf WAGENFUEHR, carried out at BAD NAUHEIM on 4th and 5th August, 1945.

SUBJECT: An Appraisal of the Official Statistics of the German War Economy.

#### PREFACE:

It should be remembered that WAGENFUEHR is primarily an economist of considerable international repute rather than a statistician, and that therefore his appraisal of the statistics used in the former Reichs-ministry for Armaments and War Production cannot be considered as final judgment.

#### I. INTRODUCTION.

Dr. Rolf WAGENFUEHR was head of the Statistical Section of the Planning Department in the SPEER Ministry, from 1943 onwards. Previously he was Deputy Director of the "Reichs Institut für Konjunkturforschung" in BERLIN, where he still continues to work.

Dr. WAGENFUEHR had already been interrogated by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and as far as possible an attempt was made to cover new ground.

It is important to bear in mind that, with rare exceptions, WAGENFUEHR did not handle raw materials. Further, the use to which his figures were put by KEHRL, was not strictly his province. As a result much of the following represents the opinions of a pertinacious and enquiring mind, rather than a statement based on the actual compiling of the statistics under discussion.

## II. STATISTICAL SERIES.

WAGENFUEHR distinguished the following series of statistics:

- (a) The statistics of the Trade Groups ("Wirtschaftsgruppen") and the "Reichsgruppe Industrie".
  - (b) The statistics of the Committees ("Ausschüsse") and Rings ("Ringe").
  - (c) The statistics of the Mechanical Statistics Office ("Maschinelles Berichtswesen").
  - (d) The statistics of the Reich Statistical Office ("Statistisches Reichsamt").
  - (e) The armament statistics of the Planning Department ("Planungsamt") (Dr. DAHNS).
- (a) "Wirtschaftsgruppen" (Trade Groups).

The statistics of the Trade Groups existed before 1933 as collected by the Trade Associations (Verbänden). Thereafter membership of the "Wirtschaftsgruppen" became compulsory. Each Trade Group continued to decide the form of return made by its members.

The statistical section of the "Reichsgruppe Industrie" (Abteilung 8) consolidated the returns of the "Wirtschaftsgruppen" but its main effort was the processing of the "Industry Report" ("Industriebericht"), a monthly return common to all firms, the results being issued as the "Industry Collation Report" ("Industrieberichterstattung"). WAGENFUEHR was not able to say when the "Industriebericht" was first introduced, but thought it existed as far back as 1939.

The main defect of the "Industriebericht" statistics was caused by the introduction, in 1939, of an "organisational stop" which prevented firms changing their membership from one group to another.

This means that factories converted to armament production remained in their old Trade Groups. (For example, the manufacture of munition packing cases in plants of the piano industry appears under the heading, as before, of the Trade Group for the Piano Industry, the manufacture of munitions in a chocolate factory, as before, under the Trade Group for Chocolate and Confectionery Goods Industry, etc.).

To overcome this defect a supplementary census (Zusatzerhebung) was taken in the Autumn of 1943 distinguishing for the first time between the production of the firm's parent Trade Group and production for other Trade Groups. The census also showed the inter-relation between production by Trade Groups and by Committees and Rings.

A second defect lay in that figures of production could not be related to specific articles. An attempt was made to classify production through the media of "Reich commodity numbers" (Reichswarennummer). (HOLMBERG of the Armaments Office (Rüstungsamt) was responsible for this work). This system of numbering was unsatisfactory, as any article used both by the army and industry was given two numbers. This system was first applied in the middle of 1944 in an investigation into sub-contracting of a large number of works.

An improved system of commodity numbering represented by the "War commodity numbering system" (Kriegswarennummerierung) was evolved by the KRÄFTIG Committee (see below) in the second half of 1944. WAGENFUEHR considered that the application of this system to the "Employment Return" ("Beschäftigtenmeldung") and "Industriebericht" would have provided the Planning Department ("Planungsamt") for the first time, with the necessary data with which to link the activity of factories with the production of specific products, and hence furnish a basis of studying labour utilisation (see later). The system also had the advantage of being neutral to the existence of overlapping and competing controls as it would furnish data simultaneously to the "Ausschüsse" (controlling specific products) and the "Wirtschaftsgruppen" (controlling trades). Unfortunately the scheme was not introduced.



(b) "Ausschüsse" and "Ringe" (Committees and Rings).

The Committees and Rings mostly had no statistical departments. Their work in connection with statistics was good as a rule only in so far as they were linked up in an organisational sense with the Trade Groups (e.g. Feinmechanik und Optik; Maschinebau; Elektrotechnik).

When the Committees and Rings were first set up every "Leiter" tried to secure information on every conceivable aspect of his sphere, but the statistics were unsystematic. A section at the Central Office ("Zentralamt") (under a colleague of Dr. CLAESS) attempted to coordinate the statistics but only dealt with the problem in a formal fashion. From the middle of 1943, the "Planungsamt" tried to carry out this systematising. To this end extensive preliminary work was undertaken which was only concluded about the middle of 1944. Then a Committee was formed under Dr. KRAEHE (Ruhr Coal Syndicate, BISSEN) which drew up a basic questionnaire (Rahmenfragebogen) for every Group (production, employment, deliveries, etc.). Bound up with this was the work done in connection with so-called "war commodity numbering" which has already been referred to.

(c) Statistics of the "Maschinelles Berichtswesen" (Mechanical Statistics Office).

The most important return was the "Beschäftigtenmeldung" which differed for three groups of factories: Group A - works sponsored by Armaments Inspectorates; Group B - works owned by the Services such as munition filling; Group C - works sponsored by the "Landeswirtschaftsämter" (principally production of raw material and consumers' goods). The "Industriebericht" and the "Beschäftigtenmeldung" were issued together. Of importance in the "Beschäftigtenmeldung" returns was the division of those engaged in production among so-called requirement groups ("Bedarfsgruppen"). In a number of cases this enabled conclusions to be drawn with regard to production, but there were also requirement groups where this was not possible (for example Reichs Ministry for

Enlightenment and Propaganda, Deutsche Gemeindetag, etc.).

An accurate survey of the workers engaged in the manufacture of individual products was rendered difficult by the complicated conditions in regard to returns made of deliveries of components. These included:

- (a) Primary deliveries equivalent to deliveries of raw materials e.g. parts rough-machined by steel producers.
- (b) Firm's own sub-contracts where the product is only usable for certain specific end products.
- (c) Deliveries for general purposes - not immediately discernible for what type of production the goods are earmarked, e.g. screws.
- (d) Deliveries of components to the Reich (for example, aircraft engines) which are placed at the disposal of the assembly firms as free issues.

By a system of numbering deliveries those under (a), (b) and (d) can be allocated, those under (c) on the other hand, cannot. A further complication was that a firm under (d) was not in a position to know whether its product was destined for new production or replacements.

Altogether, the statistics of the "Beschäftigtenmeldung" are difficult to interpret over a period of time, because the number of A-works changed constantly. WAGENFUHR stated that he was no Hollerith expert. He thought that the mechanical preparation of statistics was, however, advisable to cover:

- (1) The question of components production.
- (2) The "Beschäftigtenmeldung".
- (3) Notification of men liable to be called up (Wehrpflichtenmeldung).

In the case of (1) and (2) the value of returns suffered, owing to the absence of a system of numbering which could link the activity of firms to actual products. For (1) to (3) a good preliminary check on original returns was essential. This control had often been absent in mechanical reporting. Oberstleuter PASSOW was too formal in carrying out this task. The quality of the final sorting depended on the work done in the divisional offices. This varied with the calibre of the staff - the best was at BRESLAU.

(d) Statistics of the "Statistisches Reichsamt"  
(Reich Office of Statistics).

The "Statistisches Reichsamt" carried out the main census; otherwise its direct contact with industry was confined to inquiries. It was, however, a central collecting agency, especially the Central Office for Statistics which was used by the "Planungsamt".

(e) Armament Statistics of the "Planungsamt"  
(Planning Department).

The monthly tables of armaments deliveries and the resultant graph of production, wastage and stocks published by the "Planungsamt" were the work of Dr. DAHMS. WAGENFUEHR was consulted on the statistical methods employed. On the last day of every month SAUR received by telephone or teleprint production figures from the heads of the Main Committees and Rings. These figures were used as a basis for immediate decisions but are NOT those in the "Schnellberichte".

On the eighth of the following month, a meeting would take place between Dr. DAHMS, and representatives of the Service Acceptance Offices ("Abnahmestellen") where any disparities between the reports from Industry and the numbers accepted by the Services were investigated. The corrected figures were issued on the 10th of the month as the "Schnellbericht" statistics. WAGENFUEHR accepted these figures as the most reliable of all German armament statistics. In practice, however, the SAUR figures received such

a wide circulation before the corrected ones were issued, that it was often impossible to secure amendments of official documents in which they appeared.

DAHM's statistics covered, in all, about 300 items of war production - (guns, tanks, U-boats, etc.), of which 60 were for the Luftwaffe. WAGENFUEHR estimated that they represented in all about 95% (value terms) of all direct armament production. Alternatively including figures of general equipment (Allgemeines Gerät), uniforms, etc., the total coverage was equal to about 3/4ths of all final war production (Kriegsmaterialendfertigung) i.e. 35,000,000,000 RM of the 50,000,000,000 RM total war production for 1944.

After lengthy discussions it was decided to use value and prices (Werte and Preise) as the common measure of all production statistics. The difficulties in evolving "Man-hour" coefficients proved insuperable, owing to the variations in sub-contracting between firms in the same industry. WAGENFUEHR instanced Opel and Ford. Opel manufactured almost the complete truck in its own works; Ford was mainly an assembly plant. The output of lorries per man-month derived from a coefficient multiplied by the number of persons employed during the month in both works would yield an answer twice as large in the case of Ford as Opel. Locomotive production methods were common throughout the industry - weapons, showed great disparities between firms. For tanks, the Böhmisch-Mährische plant (C.K.D.), making the 38(t) tank, had been taken as a model on the ground that it made more of a complete tank than other firms. A discussion took place, later, on the general use of man-hour statistics (see below page ).

It had not been easy to obtain prices of finished armaments. The price control had been maintained for the production of components, but it was necessary to work out a price for the complete job. The existence of "free issues" was an added complication. Dr. GROTTIAN (BERLIN) calculated that 70% of the final value of a tank was covered by articles manufactured on government account and issued to the assembly firms. The best study to determine the value of armament production was provided by the supplementary census already referred to, taken in autumn 1943 (see above, page 18).

The calculations of operational stocks of weapons published by the "Planungsamt" were completely misleading. They were produced by "Abt. IV" of the "Maschinelles Berichtswesen" by adding the receipts of the Acceptance Offices to the previous month's stock, less the losses reported by the Ordnance Board. Actual stocktaking was carried out only at lengthy intervals and disclosed serious differences. Thus the calculated stock of light and heavy artillery at September 1944 was 490 million RM., stocktaking turned out to be only 350 million RM<sup>1</sup>).

The main reasons for the unreliability of estimates of stock were:-

- i) the figures of losses were incomplete. In the case of large scale retreats there was a complete breakdown of reporting.
- ii) the role played by repairs was not clear. It was possible that e.g. aircraft requiring repairs were not booked out to industry and thereafter may have appeared as new production.

### III. RAW MATERIAL PLANNING.

WAGENFUEHR gave the following outline of the methods used to plan the allocation of raw material:

- i) The Services informed the Main Committees of their requirements.
- ii) The Main Committees reviewed these requirements in terms of the capacity of the member firms; agreed a programme with the Services; translated production into the raw material required; forwarded both the programme and the estimated raw material requirements to the "Planungsamt".

1) Examples of these discrepancies can be seen in Charts 18-21 in a book of "Plansstatistik" issued by FDU as FD. 3487/45. On these charts the position at stocktaking (erhobene Bestände) usually differs considerably from the corresponding interpolated monthly point ("fortgeschrieben").

- iii) The Trade Groups forwarded their requirements for non-service production.
- iv) The official claimants (Oeffentliche Bedarfsträger") e.g. the Ministries, Reichsbahn, Building, Services, for material used in their own workshops etc. similarly produced their demands.
- v) The Planning Department received demands ii) - iv); examined them for reliability; related them to previous production and allocation; examined the raw material production and stock position; made proposals to the Central Planning Office.
- vi) The Central Planning Office together with representatives of the agencies concerned and of the "Reichsstelle" responsible for the material under consideration, decided on the final allocations. The Central Planning Office did not attempt to coordinate the planning of raw materials. As a rule only one question was dealt with at a time ("today coal, tomorrow iron, the day after tomorrow U-Boats").
- vii) Though separate plans were made for all strategic materials, the Planning Department regarded the control over steel allocations as the lynch pin of the planning edifice.

WAGENFUHRER disagreed with the view that the Planning Department, in the main, was concerned only with creating and controlling an allocatable margin of raw materials, i.e. that the control over the greater part of allocations was a formality in that the bulk of materials went to produce the same assortment of goods as had been produced in the previous quarter ('bread-and-butter lines'). He stressed the detailed scrutiny which the entire demand underwent - not only was it compared with previous allocations and resultant production, but the actual quota weights (i.e. the standard amounts laid down for the production of specific articles were also constantly being revised in a downward direction. Further, the Department concerned itself with investigating the size of stocks held in industry and the amounts held in the production pipe-line. As far as the Main Committees were concerned the entire requirement was planned; each had to furnish every quarter a detailed statement of the quota weight per product, the previous quarter's production, the planned production, the planned

gestation period (Durchlaufzeit), and the planned rate of intake of materials (Einsatzzeit des Materials).

The control over the demands of the Trade Groups and the official claimants were more sketchy.

As the Main Committees received about a half of the total iron allocated, WAGENFUEHR considered the amount subject to exact scrutiny, to be a satisfactory part of the total, taking into consideration the large proportion used in defence works, (Atlantic Wall, East Wall, Norway, etc.).

Control over the disposition of the reserves of iron was in the hands of the "Amtsgruppe" (Iron and Steel<sup>2</sup>) (SCHLIEKER in BERLIN and SCHAEFER in HAMBURG). WAGENFUEHR believed that the purpose of these reserves was to provide for repairs to bomb damage rather than to maintain a surplus which could be used to meet the demands of Führer's programs. The normal methods of securing production for these emergency orders was by means of a revision within the programme of the appropriate Main Committee<sup>3</sup>).

- 2) The "Amtsgruppe Eisen u. Stahl, which controlled the Reich Iron Federation ("Reichsvereinigung Eisen"), and Main Rings for iron production, castings and forgings etc. was originally part of the Armaments Supply Department ("Rüstungslieferungsamt") and not, as with non-ferrous metals, of the Raw Materials Department. After the change-over in November, 1944, the functions of the "Amtsgruppe" were taken over by the Planning Department with the exception of control over production which was planned under the Technical Department. The firm "top-control", maintained throughout, is a reflection of KEHRL's dictum that the basis of planning and control was the iron and steel allocation, other production factors being taken care of as bottlenecks arose.
- 3) There is a large measure of difference between WAGENFUEHR and KEHRL on these points. KEHRL's evidence, as the man in charge, is probably more reliable. He agrees that the Planning Department was concerned with cutting down allocations and seeing that there had been gross over-allocations in the past - an investigation in 1944 showed that industry held a year's output of steel in stocks, or in the pipeline. But its main concern was to keep a margin of steel, over and above that necessary to satisfy the normal service requirements, which was allocated to the best

Although each Main Committee planned its requirements independently of the others, it was the duty of SCHLIEKER as head of the Contracts Directing Section ("Auftragssteuerungsstelle") of the "Amtsgruppe", to investigate the relationships between the demands e.g. producing more U-Boats means that less steel is available for tanks, and so on.

The control over steel production was simplified by the existence of the general policy which was to produce as much as possible. A similar policy was in force for aluminium but here decisions involving other departments had to be taken to expand productive capacity. Ultimately the plan was dependent on the supply of bauxite and the availability of power.

Detailed plans, on which quotas were issued, were for periods of three months only. Arrangements could be made to earmark supplies over a longer period (the system of "Vormerkung") but no deliveries could be made until new quota permits had been issued. The example of aircraft showed time and again that the long term plans were far too ambitious. Dr. WARMBIER of the Air Force Planning Department would be able to supply details on raw material planning in the aircraft industry.

Asked how far they were able to coordinate the planning of articles in joint demand, WAGENFUEHR said that the practice varied. Sometimes the work could be done within a department, sometimes by the establishment of a joint committee, often by unofficial contacts between sections.

The most outstanding example of coordination within a department ("Amtsgruppe Chemie") was powder and explosives.<sup>4</sup>). The starting point was the munition programme for the period. The coordinated statistics had to answer the following questions:

3) continued:

advantage e.g. for the Führer's programs. From the SPEER-HITLER conferences (see FD 3353 issued by FDU) it would appear that the iron reserves were kept strictly under control and used to increase output sharply to meet emergency requirements, of which post raid measures doubtless played an increasingly significant role.

4) The example in question for the 1st half-year 1944



- i) What quantities of powder, explosives and dilutants (Streckmittel) were required for the munitions programme?
- ii) What quantities of intermediate chemicals would be required to make i)?
- iii) What quantities of basic chemicals were required to make ii)?  
What percentage of the total demand for each of these chemicals did these quantities represent?

The only statistical link between powder and munition manufacture appeared in the Armament Index (Rüstungs-index). This showed that from 1943 onwards the production of powder failed to keep up with the output of munitions.

An example of inter-departmental coordination was the linking of motor vehicles with tyres, through a joint session of the "Reichsstelle" for Rubber and the Main Committee for Motor Vehicles. A similar committee existed for electrodes and electric steel. On the other hand production of guns and optical equipment was kept in step by unofficial contact between the Committees.

#### IV. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

The place of the occupied territories in the planning of German armament requirements was discussed under the headings of raw material components production, and finished products.

##### Raw Materials.

Uniformity of control of raw material production allocation, both within Germany and in occupied

4) continued;

is reproduced in a book of "Plansstatistik" issued by EDU (FD 3487/45) as Chart 33, "Militärische Pulver u. Sprengstoffe Produktionsplan u. Koordinationsstatistik".

territories, was affected by the presence of representatives of the "Reichstellen" in areas outside Germany. The statistics of production and requirements of the occupied territories were included in the 'Raw Material Balance Sheets' ('Rohstoffbilanzen') which were drawn up every quarter as follows:

Intake	Utilised for
1) Home production	1) Home consumption a) for the Services (Wehrmacht) b) for industry (Wirtschaft)
2) Imports from occupied territory	2) Exports to occupied territory
2a) "Auftragsverlagerungen" <sup>5)</sup>	
3) Imports from allied and neutral countries	3) Exports to allied and neutral countries
1) -3) <u>Current intake</u>	1) -3) <u>Current outgoings</u>
4) <u>Taken from stocks</u>	4) <u>Allocated to stocks</u>
1) -4) <u>Total intake</u>	1) -4) <u>Total utilisation</u>

The most important raw material balance sheets were published in a volume "Rohstoffbilanzen der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942-1944" issued by the Main Statistical Office ("Statistische Leitstelle") of the Statistisches Reichsamt in March 1945.

#### Components production.

From an organisational angle, the production of components was mainly controlled by German firms entering into contracts with their own sponsored French firms (S-Betriebe). The volume of this 'decentralised' production was statistically covered by most of the Rings.

- 5) Amount of raw material used in occupied territory to fulfil German orders.

There are two statistical series showing the volume of components (and finished products) by value, produced in occupied territory, viz: those of the "ZAST" (Zentralauftragstelle - Central Contracts Office) and the "Maschinelles Berichtswesen". The figures differ considerably; probably due to the fact that one of the series excludes cancellations ("Stornierungen"), the other does not. Dr. LAUERSEN of the "Maschinelles Berichtswesen" should be able to throw light on these figures.

### Finished Armaments.

There was a complete statistical blackout regarding both the amounts of finished armaments produced in occupied territories and the raw material used in their production. All statistics of finished armaments show production for Germany, not production in Germany, i.e. no distinction is drawn between home and foreign production. WAGENFUEHR did not know how the amounts of raw materials used in occupied territory for finished armaments were accounted for; he could only suggest that they came out of some (unspecified) reserve. The fact that the armament production of occupied territory could not be separated out from that of the Reich was of little consequence as it was calculated that, for the first half of 1944, the share only amounted to 5% of the total. Only in the case of motor vehicles was it considerably higher. It should be noted that while the "General Government" was considered as occupied territory, the Protectorate, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg were included in the Reich.

WAGENFUEHR did not know how the demands of German's Allies (Italy, Finland, Hungary, etc.) were integrated into the Armament Programs.

### V. MANPOWER UTILISATION (ARBEITSEINSATZ).

Labour statistics were discussed under four headings:

- (a) WAGENFUEHR's opinion on manpower utilisation statistics.
- (b) a comparison between the planning of allocation of labour and the allocation of raw materials.

(c) specific planning of manpower utilisation to fit in with production programmes.

(d) Man-hour statistics.

(a) Man-power Utilisation Statistics.

There are three groups of labour statistics:

1. That of the Reichs Labour Ministry.
2. The so-called Manpower Balance (Kräftebilanz)
3. The "Beschäftigtenmeldung" and "Industriebericht"

1. The statistics of the Labour Ministry, derived from the number of holders of labour books, were used for practical allocations. They had the following shortcomings:

- i) the demarcation line in regard to territory varied from year to year;
- ii) the classes of persons included increased, as compulsory labour book holding was gradually extended to business men in "free" professions ('freier Berufe') and to artisans ('Handwerker');
- iii) they are in the main, on a professional basis and only with difficulty can these figures be related to industry e.g. 'engineers' may refer to workers employed in paper mills, etc.

2. The Manpower-Balance was prepared by the "Statistisches Reichsamt" who drew, in the main, on reports from organisations. It was therefore unreliable in the estimates of numbers of persons engaged in commerce, administration, and the professions (i.e. through duplication or incomplete inclusion). These defects were particularly noticeable when making a comparison with the 1939 occupational census (Berufszählung). When the "Manpower Balance" of 1944 was constructed the figures for the previous years were amended. The reasons for this were unknown to WAGENFUEHR, who suggested that Dr. BRAMSTEDT (BERLIN) might be able to give inform-

ation on this point. The "Manpower Balance" was roughly classified according to the large census groups in the occupational census. No attempt was made to incorporate the "Manpower Balance" into a general review of manpower potential. (Population, Classification according to age groups, etc.)<sup>6</sup>

The "Beschäftigtenmeldung" statistics have already been discussed (see above, page 16). WAGENFUEHR thought that their greatest value lay in the returns for the A group (armament firms) which could be compared with the statistics of the iron and metal processing industries derived from the "Industriebericht".

3. On the general question of the validity of the "Beschäftigtenmeldung" labour figures he made two points. First, that answers to the questions asking the factory to state its labour requirements were normally exaggerated. Second, the figures of new additions to staff differed from those in the statistics of the Labour Ministry. The differences could be explained partly by the high rate of labour turnover in Germany.<sup>7</sup>) The Labour Ministry returns showed allocations to firms, the firms reported arrivals. Between these two were big differences due to escapes of foreign workers, sickness, rejection for unsuitability, etc.

6) But see "BOSCH's Notebooks" (issued as FD 3644/45, Foreign Office (FDU), LONDON), where an attempt has been made, and also for examples of the Manpower Balance.

7) Concerning the general question of labour turnover in Germany, WAGENFUEHR mentioned two interesting studies: "Denkschrift des Braunschweigischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung über die Arbeiterfluktuation in den Herman-Göring Werken". (Memorandum of the Brunswick Institute for Economic Research on the labour turnover in the Herman Goering Works). "Denkschrift des Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts über Arbeiterfluktuation in einem Bezirk" (Memorandum of the Manpower Institute on the labour turnover in a region) (believed to be POTSDAM).

WAGENFUEHR had attempted to resolve these differences by drawing up a model scheme wherein allocations, arrivals and departures were separately noted. Practical examples of its use were published in the Weekly Report ("Wochenbericht") of the Planning Department.

(b) Planning of Labour Allocations.

The problems of Labour Allocation were discussed under the following headings:

1. Overall planning.
2. The "Red-label" ("Rot-Zettel") Scheme for Armaments works.
3. Consumer goods industries.

1. WAGENFUEHR had no direct handling of these problems, and generally referred to BOSCH as the main authority.<sup>8)</sup>

2. The Central Planning Office, was responsible for the overall allocation of manpower to the main agencies requiring labour - armaments, transports, agriculture, etc. Originally discussions were confined to ways and means of satisfying the programmes of the OKH, OKM and OKL. These requirements were based on the demands voiced by armament manufacturers under the Red-label ("Rot-Zettel") scheme.

Firms in the A group requiring extra labour filled in the "Red-labels" which were checked and approved by the Armaments Inspections ("Rustungsinspektion") and forwarded to the Manpower Utilisation Branch ("Amtsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz") in the Armaments Board ("Rustungsamt") in BERLIN. The totality of these demands was then placed before the Central Planning Office.

8) BOSCH in a previous interrogation explained that his function was to endeavour to satisfy the requirements of sections of the SPEER Ministry by means of a re-allocation within the labour pool employed under its direction. Only in cases where the net demand exceeded resources, or to meet the demands of outside users (agriculture, transport) was the matter submitted to the Central Planning Office where SAUCKEL and the interested parties thrashed the matter out.

The main defects of the Red-label system were:

- i) The examination by the local Inspectorates was, as a rule, only a formality, so that firms sometimes applied for workmen whom they really required for non-essential work by instancing important contracts. This readily arose in large firms handling many contracts for different services. In an attempt to relate output to labour supply, firms were asked to produce a "factory utilisation plan" ("Betriebsbeladungsplan") wherein labour utilisation could be assessed. Examples mentioned were those of Henschel & Daimler-Benz.
- ii) The procedure was too slow. By the time the local labour office had received the necessary priority for allocating labour, the need had often passed. In practice firms did better by maintaining cordial relationship with the local Labour Office.

3. The main interest in Consumer Goods Industries lay in the replacement of skilled labour by unskilled. These comb-outs were generally arranged to fulfil quotas imposed on the Trade Groups. WAGENFUEHR instanced the "Wissmann-Atktion" but could furnish no particulars. He added, however, that it had enjoyed a bad reputation in industrial circles..

The fundamental differences between the methods of allocating labour and raw material were:

- i) The demands for labour could not be checked against production programmes in a manner parallel with the balance sheets of raw material use kept for each Main Committee, Ring, Public Body, etc.
- ii) Whereas raw materials were issued as quotas with strict regard to supply possibilities, labour was directed through the media of priorities. There could be no guarantee that such labour would be available where it was required (workers would be released by the spinning industry in the South East when the demand was coming from firms in the North West).

iii) The absence of reliable labour statistics prevented a check being made as to whether the demand had been met.

iv) The final word on labour lay with SAUCKEL who was independent of SPEER.<sup>9)</sup> There was no common statistical basis between the Labour Ministry and the Planning Department to discuss whether labour was being fully utilised.

A fair summation would be that the Planning Department concentrated on controlling materials and left it to hard bargaining to see that the labour was there to fulfil the programmes.

(c) Specific Planning of Labour Utilisation.

It was obviously desirable to evolve methods of linking production programmes to labour requirements. The main bar to such work lay in that the existing statistical classifications did not permit a knowledge of where labour for components production (Zulieferungs) would be required by groups other than the one receiving a programme. The main exception was in the aircraft industry where a detailed investigation by Ing. SCHMIDT enabled both the total labour and the industries in which they were working to be calculated. A similar study had been made for that part of tank production performed by the tank industry and it was assumed that this represented a half of the total manpower on tanks. Here the absence of data as to where the extra-tank industry labour was employed meant that no allocations could be made to cover them.

The solution lay in the introduction of the numbering system which was evolved at the end of 1944 (see page 15), and unfortunately never introduced.

9) SAUCKEL even claimed independence from the decisions of the Central Planning Office ("Zentraleplanung"); see SPEER examination on "Labour Supply and Allocation Policy" SPEER Report No.29 (EF/LM/2) issued by FIAT on 20th August, 1945.



(d) Man-Hours Statistics.

WAGENFUEHR first dealt with figures of loss of man hours through air raids which were returned on the "Employment Report". Only A firms were required to make this return so that the losses of vital industries such as chemicals and steel production were not known. No reliance could be placed on the statistics. The firms suffering the greatest damage failed to make returns, and their previous months' cards were run through the machines. Other firms were loth to specify the true position as they were afraid of losing their workers.

It has already been noted (page 18) that attempts to measure output in man hours were largely defeated by the different position between firms as to the extent to which they relied on sub-contractors. No attempt was made therefore to relate the firm's output in value terms to the man hours worked.

Although the "Employment Report" form divided workers into categories of skill (skilled, semi-skilled, learners, etc.) only gross man-hours figures were used. It was therefore admitted that man-hour productivity statistics over a period of time were not strictly comparable owing to shifts in the proportions of skill. The definition of "skilled" worker had been laid down by Dr. DICKERT in a book on the "Beschäftigtenmeldung". WAGENFUEHR considered it was possible that, during the war, workers had been advanced to the skilled categories as a concealed means of raising wages; further that the standards of examinations for skilled grades had been eased.

A considerable interest had been taken by some of the Main Committees in man-hour productivities, especially where they cooperated with "REFA" (Reichsausschuss für Arbeitsstudien - Reich Committee for Investigating Working Hours). The most fruitful of their studies were published in the "Refabuch" which he suggested should be secured.

VI. CONSUMER GOODS.

The planning of consumer goods production was originally the work of the Ministry of Economics. In the autumn of 1943 the SPEER Ministry took over control of the production side, but distribution remained with FUNK.

WAGENFUEHR took as an example the manufacture of shoes, with which he was personally conversant, to illustrate the various aspects of consumer goods control.

### Calculation of Demand.

Any attempt to estimate the demand for shoes on a per capita basis would inevitably produce an inflated figure, e.g. a large part of the population wore wooden shoes which were seldom replaced. The control was therefore thrown back on taking the demand as equivalent to the sales in the previous year, which was then sealed down by a given percentage. Details of the shoe estimates can be found in the "Shoe Manual" (Grundbuch Schue"). Edited by Herr NIESCHLAG, SINGEN.

Although the requirements were always calculated as constituting a minimum, it was often necessary later on to reduce the figure still further.

### Production Planning.

It was difficult to plan production in terms of output and factory capacity. They were faced with a non-rationalised consumer goods industry making a great diversity of types. Planning had therefore to be confined, at first, to controlling the allocation of raw material and allowing manufacturers to produce as much as they could from their quota. Real production planning started with the introduction of the "War Production Plan" ("Kriegsaufgabenprogramm") in 1943. This programme gave a general prohibition to the manufacture of consumer goods with the exception of a small selection of articles. The production stop on non-essential goods (Dutch tiles, toys) was never quite effective as they could be disposed of among the considerable stocks on the market secured from occupied and neutral countries.

With the transfer of production control to the Armaments Ministry in 1943, a certain measure of rationalisation was introduced under SEEBAUER, the results of which should not be overestimated.

The requirement estimates were arranged regionally, depending on figures of population derived from the number of food ration books reported by the "Wirtschaftsämter".

## Raw Material Planning.

The key to consumption goods planning lay in linking the allocation of raw materials with production planning of the finished products. The quantity of goods to be produced was derived from the estimated demand. The production programme was then translated into raw material requirement by using standard quota weights (called "Supply Keys" - "Einsatzschlüssel" as with Armament production planning (see page 22).<sup>u</sup>

On the other hand, shoe planning had to be co-ordinated with the planning of all raw materials entering into shoes. Until 1942, shoe manufacturers had to apply separately to different "Reichsstelle" for nails, dyes, glues, fabrics, whose decisions in turn were taken on the basis of their own supply and demand position. This anarchy of control was brought to an end by the formation of the "Lenkungsbereiche" which was granted global quotas of auxiliary materials, based on the shoe production plan. These materials were made available to the firms manufacturing under their control.

## Other Factors of Production.

### i) Coal and Power.

Allocations of coal were made regionally by the "Landeswirtschaftsämter". With a few exceptions, the needs of consumer goods industries played only a minor role in coal consumption. Large consumers were given "maximum quantity vouchers" ("Höchstmengenbescheid") which were issued centrally.

The distribution of power was also controlled regionally by the "Bezirklastverteiler". There were no central statistics of coal or power consumption by trades with the exception of an annual analysis of consumption of electricity from firm's own plants.

### ii) Labour.

The supply of labour was similarly controlled regionally through the Labour Offices. The problem here was not allocations but withdrawals. Workers with industrial experience were drafted into armament production and their place taken by housewives and unskilled foreign labour. Thus the productive capa-

city of the industries fell, although employment figures fell only to a small degree.

### Level of Consumption.

There was a certain tension between the Armaments Ministry and the Ministry of Economics after SPEER took over the production of consumer goods. SPEER tried to prove that his reorganisation had not adversely affected consumer goods production; FUNK took the opposite view. The figures of consumer goods output in the "Schnellbericht", quoted by SPEER, were correct but they showed only the course of production of those articles manufactured under the "Kriegsaufbauprogramm".

As to the general problem of estimating changes in German consumption during the war, WAGENFUEHR was of the opinion that calculations based on value were useless as there was no reliable cost of living index to which they could be applied. The assortment of goods entering into the cost of living index, as with the British Ministry of Labour, did not take into account changes in consumption habits. The same objection applied to Dr. GRÜNIG "balance" calculations ("Bilanzberechnungen"). Nor could retail trade statistics ("Einzelhandelstatistik") be relied on, as they were derived from returns from a small sample of firms; if a firm was bombed out or closed down, its turnover (nil) was omitted, so that the resultant picture was always more favourable than in reality.

These objections also applied to the sales statistics of the "Reichsgruppe Industrie". They were certainly complete (i.e. not based on sampling) but following the organisational stop (see page 14) they did not show what goods were being produced by each trade group, nor did they disclose what percentage of output went to consumer use.

WAGENFUEHR suggested that a reliable index could be constructed on a volume basis, by taking the allocations of raw materials to consumer goods industries for civilian consumption. The proportions of military and civilian use could be further checked from the returns of Wehrmacht deliveries in the "Industriebericht". The results would be conservative, as they would exclude increases in output from the same weight of raw material through the adoption of 'utility' designs and the exclusion of fripperies.

Finally they had never adopted the attitude of fixing an irreducible minimum of consumer goods production leaving the rest of German economy free for war production. For a time the balance was the other way. In 1944 they went to the opposite extreme. Textiles were made available only to victims of air raids and the clothing cards became invalid for the rest of the population.

## VII. MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS.

- Q. Can the Armaments Index ("Rüstungsindex") be discussed in greater detail?
- A. I have covered all important points with Mr. MACNALLY of United States Strategic Bombing Survey.<sup>10)</sup>
- Q. How were aircraft repairs represented in the "Schnellbericht" ?
- A. A distinction must be made between three gradations. First, repairs in workshops in the field (large and small repairs), were not covered by statistics. Secondly, repairs by industry where the repair time was less than 1000 hours, were only included in the statistics up to 1943. In regard to the third group - repairs over a 1000 hours - statistics were regularly kept.
- In 1944 repairs were often given priority. They preferred to repair 3 old weapons than to produce one new one, as the expenditure on material was smaller.
- Q. Were obsolete stores returned to industry?
- A. I am unaware of this; it can hardly have been done on a large scale.
- Q. Did the increase in armaments production in 1943/44 result from long-term planning in 1939/41?
- A. No. In 1939, production was still on a very small scale (the monthly production of tanks in the first

10) This Report will be published later by F.I.A.T.

months of the war was about 60). In 1940/41 it was thought that there would be too little steel (the effect of exaggerated quotas). In addition production was too bureaucratically organised. After the campaign in France, production was in part cut down, and this was repeated in the second half of 1941, when Russia was thought to be already defeated. The possibility of a long war was entertained only from 1942, and industrial experts were called in. SPEER first organised the production of tanks, followed in the second half of 1942 by a drive to increase components. The next stage was the conversion of all armaments to mass production methods which was achieved in 1943, and led to considerable increases during the first six months of 1944. In the middle of 1944 came the breakdown. At that time the reserves of raw material were very largely exhausted. By then no great savings were possible in consumption per item, and in addition few possibilities remained of economising in consumption outside the sphere of armaments.

- Q. Why were the hours worked in Germany so few?
- A. I believe the statistics are faulty. They do not include the most important armaments concerns. Generally speaking work was done in several shifts only in cases of obvious bottlenecks, such as ball bearings, electro-steel, etc.
- Q. Was there a shortage of factory space?
- A. No. In Czecho-Slovakia alone there must have been an increase of at least 15%.
- Q. Was the supply of machinery a bottleneck?
- A. I do not think so. Naturally the machinery available became out of date.
- Q. Were there general investigations into the utilisation of capacity.
- A. Yes, in the Census of 1936, but without applying any uniform standard. Every later census related only to individual industries.

- Q. Were any attempts made to effect a major comb-out of skilled labour for armament production, especially from the machine-tools industry?
- A. Yes, SAUR tried this, but only in the latter half of 1944, when it was too late.
- Q. Are the Planning Department statistics of armaments production likely to be correct?
- A. I think they are, where they are based on acceptance figures. If you think figures of aircraft production are too high, you must remember the high monthly losses. Dr. PASSAUER, of BERLIN, can give more details of this.
- Q. What was the decisive bottleneck in German war economy?
- A. The bottleneck varied in the course of years. In 1939/40 it was thought that there was too little iron. In addition the control of the armaments industry by the military authorities was an organisational bottleneck. In 1942/43 there were bottlenecks in shortage of skilled workers and in components. In 1944 transport, supplies of coal, energy and iron constituted the bottleneck. In addition, of course, there were always smaller bottlenecks.

## PART I

### Section 3

#### Second Report on HOLLERITH RECORD MACHINES IN GERMANY

- I. Preamble.
- II. Maschinelles Berichtwesen (MB) of the SPEER Ministry.
1. Organisation
  2. Location of HOLLERITH Machines
  3. Nature of Work

- III. Use of HOLLERITH Machines in the Wehrmacht
  - 1. General
  - 2. German Army
  - 3. Luftwaffe and Navy
- IV. Other Government and Party Agencies using HOLLERITH Machines.
- V. Individual Users and Suppliers.
  - 1. HOLLERITH Machine Users
  - 2. Suppliers
- VI. Index of Personalities.
  - 1. General
  - 2. Staff of HOLLERITH District Office, FRANKFURT/Main
- VII. Use of HOLLERITH Machines in the Occupation.
- I. Preamble

This report brings to light the fact that HOLLERITH machines are being used to a greater extent than previous information indicated. Both the Wehrmacht and government agencies as well as business and industry availed themselves of this vital control medium, now dispersed all over the Reich.

Circumstances prevented plans which called for wide-spread use of the machine in Wehrmacht administrative units from materializing, but the scope of the project indicates the importance attached to it.

It seems that no systematic attempt has been made to destroy what records and machines are left. This report, representing consolidated information from three PWs, gives some of the locations where the records and machines may be found.

PW A was a HOLLERITH GmbH dealer in KOELN from 1934 to 1942. When drafted on 15th March 1943, he was assigned to the record machine agency (MB) of the SPEER Ministry and he was instrumental in organizing most of the record machine work described in this report.



PW B was HOLLERITH GmbH dealer in FRANKFURT from 1938 until he joined MB in August 1944. He was the HOLLERITH expert for the branch in Ruestungsinspektion IX.

PW C is a mathematician and statistician who worked for the Heerespersonalamt from 1931 and joined MB in Nov. 1943 as liaison officer to the Feldwirtschaftsamt, OKW. He devised and organized statistical methods of utilizing record machines.

The information that follows is as of 1st April 1945, when PWs were captured.

NOTE: The following contractions are used in this report:

H for HOLLERITH, e.g. H-machines  
for HOLLERITH machines, H-experts  
for HOLLERITH machines experts.

MB for Maschinelles Berichtwesen of the SPEER Ministry, other machine record agencies are specifically designated, e.g. MB-Luft, MB-SS.

Numbers after names refer to names listed in Part VI. Index of Personalities, furnishing additional details.

## II. Maschinelles Berichtwesen (MB) of the SPEER Ministry.

Central Office. The central office for machine records of the SPEER Ministry (Maschinelles Berichtwesen des Reichsministers fuer Ruestung und Kriegsproduktion) is located at BERLIN SW, Kommandantenstr. 78. The telephone number is 164011.

The central office assumed its present form in 1937. Its functions consisted of handling administrative and personnel matters relating to the use of record machines. In the summer of

1942 a directive issued by Feldmarschall von KEITEL called for plans and ideas to extend the scope of H-machines in other governmental agencies and to inaugurate their use in the Wehrmacht. MB was then made the central planning agency for all machines in use in government agencies. In addition to its previous functions, MB set up an H-machine station of its own to do special work for various other agencies.

## 1. Organization

MB constituted a department (Amtsgruppe) in the Reichsministerium SPEER, Head of the organization was Obstlt PASSOW (1), whose staff consisted of six HOLLERITH experts (2), (10), (11), (30), (31) and PW A. PASSOW was also referred to as "Leiter MB/OKW". The agency was organized as follows:

- Abt I.      Personal und Beschaffung (personnel, and procurement). This section handled personnel and personnel procurement for MB and its branch offices. Head: Herr BARRENSTEIN (3).
- Abt II.      Nummerung (keys). This section was charged with developing the keys used in connection with H-machine card system. Head: Regierungsrat HOERBER (4).
- Abt III.     Maschinen Steuerung (allocation control). This section allocated H-machines to private industry. Beyond fixing the order of applicants on its priority list, the department did little in the way of systematizing control. Its decisions were often contested by the Ruestungslieferungsamt (Armaments Supply Dept.) and relations between the two bodies were invariably strained. A constant shortage of machines rendered this section's efforts ineffective. The section head was Obstlt Dr. SPRINGER (5). The department probably had lists of all H-machine users in the Reich.

II. Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB) of the SPEER Ministry (Continued).

Abt IV Auswertung (statistics). This department compiled and evaluated statistics on H-machines, submitting its findings to SPEER. Regierungsrat Dr. LAUERSEN (6), assisted by Dr. GROTIUS (7), was in charge.

Abt V. Lochkartenbetrieb (punched card section). This section had charge of the H-machines working for MB. It was evacuated separately. A successor to Obstdt HUEBNER (8), former head of the section, who volunteered for front-line duty in March '45, was never appointed.

Abt VI. Druckerie (printery). Printing of statistics forms and other job printing for MB was done by this section, head of which was Hptm LUEDTKE (9). The punch cards used in H-machine operations were printed by the HOLLERITH Maschinen Gesellschaft.

Abt VII. Schulung (training). This section was inaugurated to train personnel for MB, but beyond a lecture course, it accomplished little. The office continued to rely on personnel trained by HOLLERITH for planning and executing its projects. Section head was Regierungsrat Baurat HERBST (10).

Branch Offices. In addition to the central agency in BERLIN, MB had district offices (Bezirksstellen) in each Ruestungsinspektion. These branch offices handled district statistics and reported them to the main office. Their reports were put at the disposal of the Ruestungsinspektion upon request.

Organization of the branch office was similar to that of the central office, except that its departments were called Referate instead of Abteilungen. The Referate were as follows:

II. Maschinelles Berichtwesen (MB) of the SPEER Ministry (continued).

<u>Referat I.</u>	Allgemeines (general office work)
<u>Referat II.</u>	Nummerung (keys)
<u>Referat III.</u>	Kartei (files)
<u>Referat IV.</u>	Auswertung (evaluation)
<u>Referat V.</u>	Betrieb (machine section)

The average Bezirksstelle had the following equipment.

- 1 Alphabeth Tabellier Maschine and Kartendoppler.
- 10 Alphabeth Locher and Pruefer.
- 1 D-11 Tabelliermaschine mit Summenlochung.
- 2-3 Sortiermaschinen.
- 8 Magnet Locher and Pruefer
- 3 Lichttrausmaschinen ("Ultrakop")

The number of machines available at a Bezirksstelle office varied with the size of the district served and the amount of work to be done.

The average Bezirksstelle had appr. 1-2 H-specialists and 40-50 other employees. 1-2 Wehrmacht officers were in charge of each branch office.

Personnel. MB's Reich personnel totalled 1,800-2,000 employees before the HIMMLER Aktion. PWs believe that afterwards its strength decreased in proportion to the increased manpower levies made by the Wehrmacht in general, although some of its trained personnel was given special consideration in regard to deferment. PWs estimate that in addition to regular civilian employees 120 officers and 35 HOLLERITH men remained with MB as of 1 April '45. The officers were not H-machine experts but, in PWs' opinion, front-line dodgers.

## 2. Location of H-Machines

According to PWs, most H-Machines have been evacuated to bomb-safe areas or hide-outs. Locations given in the list of locations below are those known to PWs as of 1 April '45. PWs point out that in some cases the machines may subsequently have been removed. Specific addresses are given wherever possible; many of the towns listed are so small that tracing the machines should present little difficulty.

Deliberate destruction of H-machines is held unlikely by PWs, although at least one instance of the removal of parts to put a machine out of commission is known to them. According to PWs, Obstlt PASSOW issued an order specifically stating that machines and equipment were not to be destroyed. PWs, however, admit the possibility of attempts prior to Allied occupation to render the machines useless by removing such parts as the condenser and concealing them in the care of some inconspicuous employee, at the same time destroying records of real value.

PW gives the last known location of the chief operations unit of Abt. V, MB, as WENDISCH-RIETZ, nr. BERLIN. (Note: the name of WENDISCH-RIETZ was changed by the Nazis to MAERKISCH-RIETZ, but the town is still referred to by its old name and appears as such on GSGS maps). At WENDISCH-RIETZ a punching shop was set up in OTTO's Hotel, and the tabulating machines were installed in Schloss SCHWARZHORN.

According to PW a total of 16 sets of tabulators, punchers, and sorting machines were kept at this station. Later, half of these were shipped by rail to NEUDIETENDORF, Nr. ERFURT, where they arrived about 20 March '45.

The sets were to be installed in the basement of the RIEBECK Brewery, a hide-out selected when plans were made for the creation of a Central Wehrmachts Allotment Agency.

II. Maschinelles Berichtwesen (MB) of the SPERR  
Ministry (Continued)

According to PWs, installation of the machines could not yet have been completed on 2 April '45, when American troops arrived. PWs believe that machines from other evacuated Bezirksstellen, such as KRAKOW, POSEN and STETTIN, may have been taken to NEUDIETENDORF. No documents, however, had arrived there up to 1 April '45.

PWs give the following list of present H-machine locations in conjunction with Bezirksstellen headquarters.

<u>Ruestungsinspektion</u> <u>Bezirksstelle</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Office</u>	<u>Place to which</u> <u>Office Evacu-</u> <u>ated</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>H-</u> <u>Machine</u> <u>Sets</u>
I	KOENIGSBERG	Present loca- tion unknown; possibly HAMBURG. Machines were loaded on a boat which escaped.	2
II	STETTIN	Last at KARO- LINENHORST. Possibly at NEUDIETENDORF	2
III	BERLIN	ZORNDORF	2
IV	DRESDEN	Landwirts- chaftliche Hochschule at TETCHEN- LIBBERD	3
V	STUTTGART	NUERTINGEN	2
VI	MUENSTER	EMSDETTEN	2
VII	MUENCHEN	AICHACH	2

II. Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB) of the SPEER  
Ministry (Continued)

<u>Ruestungs-</u> <u>inspektion</u> <u>Bezirksstelle</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Office</u>	<u>Place to which</u> <u>Office Evacuated</u>	<u>No. of H-</u> <u>Machine</u> <u>Sets</u>
VIII	BRESLAU	?	2
IX	KASSEL	OBERAULA. On 1 April '45 small parts were removed from the H-machines and turned over to Herr SCHNAUD of FRIEDIGERRODE. This was done to render the machines useless to the Allies. Mechanic Hans STAMMMLER of OBERAULA is capable of repairing the machines.	3
X	HAMBURG	Exact location, which is in the immediate vic. of the city, unknown to PWs.	3
XI	HANNOVER	ELSE	2
XII	WIESBADEN	BAD SCHWALBACH	3
XIII	NUERNBERG	ANSBACH BRAUHAUS Str. 9B*	3
XVII	WIEN	Office: KENNYON GASSE Machines: BRUNN or LANGENLOIS(?)	3

\* MB's Training Dept. (Abt VII) had 2 machines at ANSBACH as well.

II. Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB) of the SPEER Ministry (Continued)

<u>Ruestungs- inspektion Bezirksstelle</u>	<u>Home Office</u>	<u>Place to which Office Evacuated</u>	<u>No. of H- Machine Sets</u>
XX	DANZIG	ZOPPOT	2
XXI	POSEN	NEUDIETENDORF	1
	STRASBOURG	vic STUTTGART	2
	BOEHM,	PRAG	2
	MAEHREN		

Other Branches of MB

Zentral Archivfuer Wehrmedi- zien (see para III below)	BERLIN REICHSTAG Building	3
Feldzeug	DUEPPEL NR. ZEHLENDORF or BENCH Allee STRASSFURT (?)	3

3. Nature of Work

Records. HOLLERITH-Machine punched card records of the various reports discussed below are located at WENDISCH-RIETZ, near BERLIN (RR station SCHARMUETZEL See). These, in the opinion of PWs, are not likely to be destroyed outright or sabotaged later. Obtaining keys for their interpretation should not present a major problem, PWs say. In each case keys were usually printed on the questionnaire relating to the subject covered, and no effort was made to keep them secret.

PWs point out that the Summenkarten (total cards) give only general data, e.g. on the subject of industrial firms they would not supply information on individual firms.



Employment Reports. Tabulation of employment figures and related data (Beschaeftigtenmeldung) for business and industry was started in 1942. All industrial and business organizations submitted monthly status reports to the Bezirksstelle of their Ruestungsinspektion. The Bezirksstelle tabulated this data with H-machines, consolidated it, and sent the Summenkaerten on to the main office of MB. On the basis of this data Abt IV in turn made employment reports covering the entire Reich for the SPEER Ministry.

Copies of the reports of each Ruestungsinspektion were sent to Arbeitsaemter (public labor offices), Gauwirtschaftskammern (regional chambers of commerce), and other public bodies.

Firms working for the GAF were the subject of special reports for the RLM (Reichsluftfahrtministerium) and Ob d L (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe).

Firms were classified for employment report and other purposes as follows:

- A - Engaged in war production
- B - Firms belonging to the Wehrmacht
- C - All other establishments with more than 10 employees

Data was compiled on:

- Sex of employees
- Nationality (German or foreign)
- Workers: skilled, semi-skilled, apprentices
- Age groups
- Military status
- Hours worked
- Workers used for actual production
- Gains and losses of personnel

Reports on A and B industries were sent to BERLIN on the 13th of every month; reports on C on the last day of the month.

PWs do not know what specific purpose the reports served or how they were evaluated. They were forwarded to the Aantsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz of the Ruestungsamt, where a commentary was added.

Inasmuch as the employment reports did not cover professions and vocations, they did not give a complete picture of the distribution of German manpower. The increase or decrease in the number of personnel employed in the major industries, however, provided a rough index of the manpower elsewhere.

The original punch cards of the employment reports were filed in WENDISCHRIETZ, duplicates being kept at each Bezirksstelle. The employment file had a 3-digit key, conspicuously printed on each questionnaire submitted to the individual firms covered.

Reports on Coal. Monthly reports were made on the coal situation and forwarded to BERLIN. Only reports on consumption and estimated consumption of Class A firms using more than 20 tons per month were made. The purpose of these reports was to give the SPEER Ministry a basis for computing industrial coal requirements.

Keys for the coal reports were not classified. They were available in any Bezirksstelle. The information recorded on the punch cards included the following data: Kind of coal used, origin, method of transportation employed in hauling.

The coal reports total cards do not list firms individually and in PWs' opinion are therefore only of historical value.

Military Status Reports (Wehrpflichtigenmeldung). These reports were started in April 1943 and discontinued on 30 Nov. 44. They were designed to determine the number of men of combat age available for the fighting forces, in industrial and business organizations. Reports were to be made every three months on the basis of submitted questionnaires. It was found that the reports could not be kept up to date because of the failure of some firms to respond. Under these circumstances the information received was not sufficient to permit its use for drafting personnel for the Wehrmacht, and the project was abandoned.

Industrial Reports (Industrie Berichte). These reports covered the number of workers in and the output of Class A (war production) firms. The reports appeared every three months for a period of a year

and were discontinued in Dec. 44. According to PWS the project was not properly organized and lacked, among other things, a satisfactory key.

Pig Iron and Steel Statistics (Werkstoff Statistik) Beginning in mid-1944 every firm using more than a specified amount of iron and steel, was required to report its former stocks, gains and losses, and stocks on hand, as well as the estimated rate of consumption. For this purpose iron and steel were classified according to quality in approx 20 categories.

This survey was designed to give the SPIER Ministry a basis for allocation. Reports were sent from the Bezirksstellen to BERLIN every three months. One copy and punch cards were sent to Reichsgruppe Industrie in GERA.

The key was printed on each questionnaire submitted. Reports for the last quarter of 1944 could not be completed, according to PWS.

Index of Firms (Reichsbetriebskartei). Every MB Bezirksstelle kept an index of all firms in its Ruestungsinspektion. The address of each firm was shown; the firms were classified according to product. The index was kept in the form of punch cards, duplicates of which were sent to the MB office in BERLIN.

PWS doubt that camouflaged industries and firms were indexed.

Similar indexes, but not of the punch card types, are maintained at the Gauwirtschaftskammern and Ruestungsinspektionen.

Raw Materials Priorities Record (Rohstoffabrechnung). PWS are not entirely familiar with this project, the recording end of which was handled by MB at WENDISCH-RIETZ. Cards and documents relating to it were kept at WENDISCH-RIETZ, where KREMER (30) directed operations.

This project was started in 1939 for the Ruestungskontor GmbH (no details on this organization are available). The bookkeeping department of this organization moved from BERLIN and set up in a barracks at WENDISCH-RIETZ. Only a "rear echelon"

remained in BERLIN, Kommandantenstr 78. Head of the Ruestungskontor in WENDISCH-RIETZ was Herr SKIERKE.

Every firm engaged in war production reported its requirements in raw materials through Ruestungskontor GmbH, which allocated requested materials after a thorough study of each case. Reports of demand were transferred to punch cards so that allocations to individual firms, once established, could proceed automatically.

Prof. HETLAGE, SPEER's former deputy, played an important role in preliminary arrangements for this project.

The work is done with 2-3 sets of H-machines. PWs say that the decline in GERMANY's resources was apparent from the dwindling number of cards received in recent months. PWs believe the key for the priorities record was kept at WENDISCH-RIETZ.

Progress Reports of Ammunition Parts Products (Fertigungsbericht). These reports were handled by Bezirksstelle IV and probably all other Bezirksstellen. The statistics were not evaluated by MB, which only performed the card punch process and forwarded the cards to the MB agency at WITTENBERG-LUTHERSTADT (exact location unknown), the agency for which the work was done.

WITTENBERG sent a quota card (Sollkarte) to the Bezirksstelle on which the production quotas of individual firms, listed according to government number (Reichsbetriebsnummer), were given. Each individual firm submitted a report of actual production with reasons why the quota was not fulfilled. This information was punched and sent to WITTENBERG.

The report was called "Mun I - Bericht", and covered only firms producing ammunition parts. According to PWs a report called "Muni II" was also published but the Bezirksstelle was not identified with it.

"Mun I - Bericht" was first issued in 1942. Reports had to be in WITTENBERG on the 28th of each month. The report was discontinued on 28 Feb: 45 because of disruption of communications.

MB representatives in WITTENBERG were Gefr WULFF and Heereskriegsrat WAGNER (no further details available).

The key was probably kept in WITTENBERG. It consisted of a 21 letter "Kurzbezeichnung".

### III. Use of HOLLERITH Machines in the Wehrmacht.

#### 1. General.

A directive of Feldmarschall von KEITEL issued in the summer of 1942 provided that the MB was to draw up plans and make suggestions for the use of H-machines in the Wehrmacht.

Despite the directive the project encountered considerable opposition. High-ranking military officials, indisposed toward having their military records marred by "new-fangled" ideas, discouraged the idea of putting administration on a machine-records basis. Opposition to the move also came from certain administrative officials, whose pleasant existence in dusty Schreibstuben was endangered, and who, according to PWS, preferred complicated and out-moded administrative processes to combat duty.

A report by US Gen. Brehon SOMERVELL on the role of IBM machines in the American Army caused considerable excitement in Wehrmacht administrative circles. PASSOW favored mobile H-machine units similar to those which the American Army had found efficient.

PWS point out, however, that widespread use of H-machines in the Wehrmacht was precluded by the limited number of Wehrmacht agencies and functions which were as yet on a business machines basis. Nevertheless, MB made some progress in introducing H-machines to the Wehrmacht.

All three PWS feel that MB apparatus was not properly utilized. PWS complain that H-machines were used to an average of only 20% of their capacity. They attribute failure to make full use of H-machines to the fact that Wehrmacht administration was far from being HOLLERITH-minded.

#### 2. German Army.

Feldzeuginspektion (Fz In). The task of putting control of the various depots (Heereszeugaemter) of the

German QM General on a machine-records basis was started in March 42. It was still in operation in April 45.

Under the new system stock reports of all Heereszeugaemter were reported monthly by items to the Fz In in BERLIN. The information was then transferred to punch cards. By means of H-machines consolidated reports on stocks, shortages, and gains and losses in individual items of weapons and equipment could then be made. The consolidated reports were used as a basis for allocation of supplies to the fronts, apportionment of stocks to the Heereszeugaemter, and placing of orders to industry. Ammunition was not accounted for under this system.

As of March 45 the machine records of the Feldzeuginspektionen were still located in BERLIN-DUEPPEL, as were the H-machines used by the Fz In. PW A heard that it was planned to evacuate records and machines to salt mines via STASSFURT.

The following H-machines were used to maintain FZ In records:

- 2 D-11
- 2 Rechenlocher
- 1 American-model Tabelliermaschine, which had been captured in FRANCE
- 3 HSM sorters
- 30-40 Locher and Pruefer

Completed records were filed with FZ In, OKH, in JUETERBOG.

The work of putting the QM General on a machine-records basis was organized by Herbet THIEL (11), Regierungsbaurat HERBST (10), and PW A, Lt. SCHABACKER (12), assisted by two specialists and 60 girls, was last in charge of the project.

A key for stock reports of the Heereszeugaemter was developed by PW A and HERBST by simply numbering the already-existent Heereszeugamt report forms. The key is printed on the stock report forms of the Heereszeugaemter.

High-ranking officials of the Fz In were heard to say that with the increased difficulties caused by

Allied bombing the use of H-machines was an invaluable measure. As a result, HOLLERITH personnel was exempted from the draft to some extent.

Zentral Archiv fuer Wehrmedizin (ZAW). HQ and H-machines of the ZAW were located in the Reichstag building, BERLIN. The ZAW employed H-machines as follows:

A card was made out for every German soldier who was in a military hospital. The soldier's medical history was entered on the card. Each ailment had a keyed number, the appropriate number being punched on the soldier's card. The key used did not correspond with the numerical key of ailments used for the Soldbuch and for regular hospital records. The HOLLERITH key covered several hundred ailments.

Case histories were filed for the purpose of providing central records which would serve as a check on claims entered by hospitalized soldiers for dependency and other payments. The same type of file of case histories was employed in World War I; it could not be kept up to date in this war, however.

H-machines were also used to transfer information received from hospitals on to medical statistics cards. Information obtained from these cards and from individual case-history cards was used in medical statistical research. Statistics were thus obtained on such subjects as the length of cure of various diseases, the merits of certain hospitals and of types of therapeutic methods.

The only copy of the key for these medical records was in the ZAW offices in BERLIN. In the event that the key could not be found it would have to be reconstructed by Stabsarzt Dr. HOSEMANN (15), of the University of BERLIN, the expert who worked on the development of the key.

Generalarzt Prof. Dr. MUELLER (13) was head of ZAW. In charge of the H-section was Lt. KLATTE (14), who worked with two specialists. The H-section was equipped with appr. three tabulators and four sorters.

Statistics on Military Vehicles (Chef WKW). An attempt to index all military vehicles was begun sometime around the start of the war. The project was discontinued in Jan. 45, however, because status reports on vehicles, which were rarely correct, finally ceased coming in at all. The incomplete files were considered useless.

Indexing was done by MB in WINDISCH-RIETZ, where the incomplete records are presumably still located.

Statistical Survey of Officer Candidates. A statistical survey on officer candidates, inaugurated in 1927, was put on an H-machine basis in 1937. A report of background data of each active officer candidate was prepared by MB for the Inspektion fuer Eignungsuntersuchung of the Heerespersonalamt. Included on each report were the following facts: district of origin, profession of father, religion, number of sisters and brothers, place of birth, and home town. This data was to serve as a basis for determining what type of background produced the best officers.

Following the start of the war, identical reports were also made in all Reserve officers. Reports on candidates and Reserve officers were filed both by name and by age group.

An MB staff maintained these records right in the Inspektion HQ. Duplicate files were maintained at the Kriegsschule, POTSDAM-BORNSTEDT.

These records cover all German officer candidates, numbering appr. 150,000. Regular officer candidates were grouped by ages, while reserve officer candidates were indexed by schools (Lehrgaengen). The files did not, however, give information on the whereabouts or disposition of a candidate subsequent to the preparation of his individual report.

The survey was organized by Regierungsrat MASUHR (16). PW C, who developed the key, took charge of the Survey in 1940. Conversion of the survey to an H-machine basis was directed by HOERBER and LICHTEN-THAELER.

The keys, which are simple and not coded, use only one and two-digit numbers. The keys are printed on the original questionnaire completed by the



candidates. All questionnaire dated 1942 and earlier are filed at the Heeresarchiv, POTSDAM.

Allotment Records in Wkr III. In the fall of 1943 the OKH approved a plan for putting records of allotment payments on an H-machines basis. Utilization of the HOLLERITH system, it was believed, would save personnel and speed payments to beneficiaries.

A bombproof site in NEUDIETENDORF (see Para II-2) was chosen as central machine records office for allotments for the entire Reich. Construction work began in May 44.

The task of conversion, which PW A directed, began in May 44 in Wkr III. In this Wehrkreis the 27 local bookkeeping offices (Standortgebuehrnisstellen) were consolidated into one central Wkr office, first located in MESERITZ but transferred to the BLEIDORN Kaserne in JUETERBOG because of the Russian advance.

The next step in conversion to the HOLLERITH basis was the development of a key system covering all banks in GERMANY. Since allotment payments were made by banks or postal money order, according to the wishes of the beneficiary. A payment number (Besoldungsnummer) was assigned each soldier for whom allotments were paid. This number was to appear on each allotment check or money order. An additional card made out for each allotter, which was used until a change in the soldier's status (e.g. promotion) occurred, had a twofold purpose: to advise the allotter of payments made, and for internal bookkeeping.

It was found that of the total of 400,000 allotments paid in Wkr III, 50% were paid by money order, 25% through savings banks, and the remainder through commercial banks.

Opposed by many Wehrmacht officials (apparently only on grounds of self-interest, however) and by various banks, the conversion process required six months to be completed. There were also other obstacles: the supply of paper, approval of new check forms, and shortages in power and transportation facilities. PWs estimate, however, that as a result of the experience gained in Wkr III, re-organization in other Wkr Gebuehrnisstellen could be accomplished within a period of two months.

PW A claims to have organized the work of conversion in Wkr III and to have been consulted on the new, simplified Finance Law (Gebuehrnisgesetz) adopted by the Wehrmacht as of 1 Jan: '45. Head of the Gebuehrnisstelle of Wkr III was Stabsintendant HENNING (17). HOLLERITH work there was in charge of Georg MICHEL (2) and six H-specialists, assisted by a working force of 40.

The following H-machines were used by the Gebuehrnisstelle:

- 3 D-11
- 2 Bull tabulators
- 4 HOLLERITH sorters
- 2 Rechenlocher
- 2 Kartenmischer
- 25 Locher and Pruefer

A copy of the key covering commercial banks is now in the Gemeindehaus, OBERAULA, among the personal belongings of PW A. According to PW A, other copies of this key can be found at the Central Office (Zentralinstitut) of Banks, BERLIN, and at the Gebuehrnisstelle Wkr III, JUETERBOG.

Copies of the key covering the 5,000 savings banks are in the Deutsche Girozentrale, BERLIN, at JUETERBOG, and among the belongings of PW A.

Copies of the key for the approximately 20,000 Genossenschaften (cooperative societies) are at the Deutsche Zentralgenossenschaftskasse, BERLIN, and at JUETERBOG.

Plans for Other Wkr Gebuehrnisstellen. It was planned that the next Gebuehrnisstelle to be converted would be that of Wkr IX, which was located at HERSFELD. H-personnel and H-machines for this work were to be supplied by Bezirkstelle IX of MB, situated in the Evangelisches Gemeindehaus, OBERAULA, nr HERSFELD. The reorganization process had been in progress for only a week when the town and PWs were captured on 1 April 45.

### 3. Luftwaffe and German Navy.

Acting on the authority of Feldmarschall KEITEL's order, PASSOW proceeded to organize machine record

agencies for both the Luftwaffe and Navy. Both passed from MB control as soon as the job was finished.

Luftwaffe. MB-Luft, the air force machine record agency, was located at BERLINCHEN, nr BERLIN, with a branch at the Reichssportfeld in BERLIN.

Head of MB-Luft was Fliegerstabsing HELMERDINGER; Fliegerstabsing KLEIN is mentioned as a member of his staff. No details are available on either of these men.

Marine. The Navy had an allotment office for naval personnel at NORDHAUSEN/Thuringen, and a finance office for personnel at RUDOLSTADT, both using the H-system. Other naval offices equipped with H-machines were in EBERSWALDE, nr BERLIN, and in BERLIN, Nicolsburgerstr.

Government naval yards used H-machines which were under the control of MB-Marine. The machines were kept at the yards.

The Marine Observatorium, BERLIN-GREIFSWALD, nr STRALSUND, also used H-machines. Prof. RAUSCHELBACH was in charge of operations there.

IV. Other Government and Party Agencies Using HOLMERTH Machines.

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Est. No. of Sets</u>	<u>Type of Work</u>	<u>Name of H-Expert</u>
Statistisches Reichsamt	BERLIN	appr. 25	Statistics published in "Statistisches Jahrbuch"	Regierungsrat BIEHLER. Regierungsrat GRANDE.
Reichsgruppe Industrie	GERA	2	Statistics	?
Wirtschaftsgruppe Maschinenbau	formerly BERLIN	?	Statistics	?
Wirtschaftsgruppe Testie	formerly BERLIN	?	Statistics	?
NSDAP Partei Kanzlei	MUENCHEN	5	Membership control and Statistics	Formerly Herr ASMIS (22)
Waffen SS	STORKOW and DACHAU	3-4 4 (latest model)	Not known Central Allotment Finance Office handling 140,000 accounts	Stubaf Dr. BARTELS (18); BUSCH (19) Hstuf. HEIBER (20) BLAETTEL (21)
Reichsbahn	(No details available on location, type of work and organization).			

V. Individual Users and Suppliers.

1. HOLLERITH Machine Users.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Appr.No. of Sets</u>	<u>H-Expert</u>
KOELN	Allgemeine Ortskrank- enkasse	1	PUETZ (23)
KOELN	Staedtische Werke	6	QUANTIUS(24)
KOELN- UNTERSACHSEN- HAUSEN	GERLING-Konzern Lebensversicherung	4	?
KOELN, von Werthstr	GERLING-Konzern All- gemeine Versicherung	1	GOEB (25)
KOELN	COLONIA Versicherung	2	Prokurist CRAMER
KOELN	Rheinisches Braun- kohlen Syndikat	2	?
KOELN	Zentralkranken Versicherung	1	Prokurist JUNKER
KOELN-DEUTZ	West Deutsche Wagen Fabrik	2	SCHENK (26)
SIEGEN/West falen	WALDRICH KG Maschinenbau AG	1	GRISSE (27)
SIEGEN	Huettenwerk SIEGLERLAND	1	KAISER (28)
FULDA	Valentin MAILER AG	1	Alex MAUTERLER (29)
KOBLENZ	DIEBEKA	2	?
FRANKFURT	Deutsche Gold u Silber- Scheide Anstalt	?	?
MAINZ	Sueddeutsche Eisen und Stahl Berufsgenossen- schaft	1	?

<u>Location</u>	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Appr.No. of Sets</u>	<u>H-Expert</u>
WIESBADEN	GLYCO Metallwerke	1	?
INGENHEIM	BOEHRINGER	3	?
HEIDELBERG	Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse	1	?

## 2. Suppliers.

### Paper factories supplying punch card paper

Otto GUENTHER, GREIZ/Thuringen

SCHUEFELN, OBERLENNINGEN/Wuerttemberg

HOFFMEISTER & ENGELMANN, NEUSTADT/Pfalz

### Sole printers for punch cards

Deutsche HOLLERITH Maschinen GmbH:

BERLIN plant for North Germany

### Printers for specialized questionnaires

Richard RICHTER, BERLIN, Lindenstr 25

PARAGON AG, BERLIN-OBERSCHONNWEIDE, Fuststr

STENGE, ERFURT

JUENGER & STRAUSS, QUEDLINBURG

### Suppliers of checks and special paper rolls

AUTOMATIC AG, BERLIN

VI. Index of Personalities.

1. General.

- (1) PASSOW. Obstdt. Head of Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB), SPEER Ministry. Founded Maschinelles Berichtswesen in 1937. Full of ideas but rarely succeeds in executing them. Professional officer; reactivated at the beginning of the war. Popular with subordinates. Not known to be a Nazi.
- (2) MICHEL. Georg. Employee of MB (Dienstverpflichtet). In finance office of HOLLERITH GmbH since 1936. Talented HOLLERITH expert with sound ideas and outstanding technical skill. Born in 1907. Not a Party member. Non-Nazi. Lives in BERLIN-BRITZ.
- (3) BARRLINSSTEIN. Reichsstellenleiter, Abt I, MB. Brother-in-law of Staatsrat SCHMELER. Formerly RR engineer from AACHEN. Nazi. Party member since before 1933. Not recommended by PWs.
- (4) HOLERBIER. Regierungsrat, Abt II, MB. Formerly in charge of H-machines at Reichsbahn-Direktion KOELN. Knows H-process well. Political views not known. Age appr. 48. Last known residence in WENDLICH-RIETZ.
- (5) SPRINGER. Dr. jur. Obstdt. Head of Abt III, MB. Not H-expert. Formerly in personnel department of MINIMAX (producers of fire extinguishers). Later in Wehrmeldeamt, which he tried to put on H-basis. Political convictions not known, but was heard making critical remarks about Nazi regime. His policy was one of avoiding trouble so as not to jeopardize his chances of drawing an old-age pension in peacetime. Popular. Age appr. 46.

- (6) LAUERSEN. Dr. Regierungsrat. Abt IV, MB. Not H-expert. Age appr. 38. No details known.
- (7) GROTIUS. Dr. LAUERSEN's assistant. Not H-expert. Age appr. 38. No details known.
- (8) HUEBNER. Obstlt. Abt V, MB. Viennese who affects Prussian manner. Former bank employee. Not H-expert. Not Party member. Not recommended by PWs. Age appr. 48.
- (9) LUEDTKE. Hptm. Abt VI, MB. Printing expert. Owned a printing shop in BERLIN. Not H-expert. Political views not known. Formerly lived in BERLIN; now in KRONACH/Franken. Age 48-50.
- (10) HERBST. Werner. Regierungsrat. Head of Dept. VII, MB. Formerly with advertising department of HOLLERITH GmbH. Joined MB in 1939. Inconsistent; not suitable for organizing a new project. Non-Nazi. Lives in ANSBACH, Brauhausstr 9 B.
- (11) THIEL. Herbert. (PW A) MB employee. H-assistant in WIEN from 1938 to 1940, when he joined MB (competent expert, it seems. Political views uncertain. Was overheard criticizing the Nazi regime). Born in 1913. Lives in BERLIN-KOEPENICK.
- (12) SCHABACKER. Gerhard. Lt. Head of H-Dept Fz In. Fair H-expert. With HOLLERITH since 1938 as an assistant. Non-Nazi. Born in 1913.
- (13) MUELLER. Genarzt Dr. Prof. Head of ZAW. Not H-expert. Described by PWs as kind old gentleman who is only a figure head. Age appr. 70.



- (14) KLATTE. Lt. H-section, ZAW. Not H-expert. Received job because he is wounded veteran. Not recommended by PWS.
- (15) HOSEMANN. Stabsarzt Dr. Excellent surgeon and teacher (University of BERLIN). Developed H-key for ZAW. Non-Nazi. Lives in BERLIN. Class of 1910.
- (16) MASUIR. Regierungsrat. Mathematician and statistician. Was with Heerespersonalamt until 1942, when he joined the Statistisches Reichsamt. Non-Nazi. Home: BERLIN-KARLSHORST, Andernacherstr (?).
- (17) HENNING. Stabsintendant. Head of Wehrkreisgebuehrnisstelle III. Good finance officer but not H-expert. Non-Nazi. Formerly employed by City of BERLIN. Age about 48.
- (18) BARTELS. Dr. Stubaf. Head of SS Machine-records agency. Not H-expert. Very clever. Age appr. 45.
- (19) BUSCH. SS Sonderf Z. H-expert. Formerly H-dealer since 1932. Joined SS in 1943 in order to take position in SS machine-records agency. Age appr. 35. Last residence in STORKOW.
- (20) HEIBER. Hstuf. Head of SS finance office in DACHAU. Not H-expert. Typical SS bad man. Man of low intelligence.
- (21) BLAETTEL. Herbert (?) Head of H-section at SS finance office in DACHAU. Competent H-expert. Formerly H-dealer; later in H-training section, BERLIN. Severely wounded in RUSSIA. Luke-warm Nazi. Born in 1913. Home town: FRANKFURT.

- (22) ASMIS. H-dealer in MUENCHEN. Drew up contract for leasing of H-machines to Party office. Left H-GmbH in Aug. 44. Lived in MUENCHEN. Age about 38. Unpopular.
- (23) PUETZ. Head of H-section at Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse, KOELN. Formerly in trade union movement. Dismissed from H-section by Nazis but re-hired in 1937. Age appr. 48.
- (24) QUANTIUS. H-expert for Stadt Werke, KOELN. Not a Party member.
- (25) GOEB. Formerly with GERLIN, Allgemeine Versicherung, KOELN. Joined MB in WENDISCH-RIETZ in Nov. 44. Anti-Nazi. Born in 1905.
- (26) SCHENK. Formerly of H-section of Vorwerk, WUPPERTAL. Later with West-deutsche Waggon Fabrik AG, KOELN. Now in the Army. Non-Nazi. Born in 1907.
- (27) GRISSE. H-section, WALDRICH KG. SIEGEN. Competent H-expert. Nazi; wears Golden HJ Badge. Class of 1914.
- (28) KAISER. H-section, Huettenwerk SIEGERLAND, SIEGEN. Formerly with Vereinigte Stahlwerke, DUESSELDORF. Non-Nazi. Age appr. 38.
- (29) MAUTERER. Alex, H-expert, Valentin MEHLER AG, FULDA. Non-Nazi. Age appr. 34.
- (30) KREMER. MB employee. In punching department of Reichsbahndirektion, KOELN. Not H-trained, but has learned well through experience. Joined MB in 1939. Not suitable as organizer of new projects. Born in 1908. Party member but lukewarm Nazi. Lives in BERLIN and WENDISCH-RIETZ.

(31) PEPPEL. Anton. Referent in planning department. H-dealer in FRANKFURT/Main from 1932 until induction. Joined MB in 1944 after a hectic Army career. Topnotch H-expert. Non-Nazi. Lives in WENDISCH-RIETZ and MANNHEIM. Born in 1906. Army rank: Gefr.

2. Staff of HOLLERITH District Office, FRANKFURT/Main.  
(Office was located at BAD HOMBURG, Louisenstr 20, as of 1 April 1945).

a) Businessmen.

ARNOLD. A. Director. About 50. Non-Nazi. Known to IBM, NYC.

URBANSKI. Hans. Manager. About 50. Non-Nazi. Known to IBM, NYC.

HERCHET. Heinrich. Representative. About 35. Non-Nazi. Was with German Navy.

PEPPEL. Anton. See Personalities No. (31).

STOHRER. Hans. Head of machine station. Non-Nazi. Last in German Navy.

HANSEN. Werner. Representative. Party member. Last in German Navy.

GOEBEL. Non-Nazi. About 55.

STECKEL. SS member. Last with HENSCHEL, KASSEL.

b) Technicians.

BECKER. Head of Technical Department. Age 45. Non-Nazi. Top man.

THOENE. Non-Nazi. Top man.

FRISINGER. Political views unknown. Good mechanic: Home: KASSEL.

HOBBEIN. Non-Nazi. Home: TREYSA.

SCHELLBACH. Age 30. Waffen SS member.

GRAUEL. Age 40. Non-Nazi.

DEMBACH. Non-Nazi.

#### VII. Use of H-machines in the Occupation.

In view of PWs' experience in the application of record machines to administrative processes, they were asked to state their own ideas as to the extent to which the existing HOLLERITH machine set-up in GERMANY can be utilized by the occupying forces.

PWs, responding with the enthusiasm of super-salesmen, drew up a length outline of possible uses of H-machines. They cited seven specific occupational problems - registration of manpower, registration of firms, registration of machine tools, prisoner-of-war control, handling of displaced persons, emergency housing, and food rationing - as instances where the use of H-machines would greatly facilitate administration and control.

Emphasizing the fact that in their outline they had touched on only the barest essentials, PWs stated that, in their opinion, HOLLERITH machines - properly employed - would not only lighten the administrative burden, but would also aid greatly in the exercise of administrative control.

In connection with the use of H-machines in the occupation, PWs state that:

a) H-machines in operation at the MB Bezirkstellen of each Ruestungsinspektion provide a satisfactory skeleton for an H-machine system covering all of GERMANY. The MB machines can be supplemented by machines now in the hands of private industry.

b) As of 1 April 45, production of new machines was still in progress, on a small scale, at Deutsche HOLLERITH Maschinen GmbH, BERLIN.

c) Trained personnel was unofficially protected from the draft through the efforts of HOLLERITH and the Speer Ministry. As a result, losses in HOLLERITH

personnel were relatively small. Many of the younger employees may have been captured recently, since most of the men in that age group who were employed in district offices were technically military personnel.

d) Executives and employees of the German HOLLERITH Co., have in most cases not been Nazified and will probably be anxious to cooperate with the occupying forces.

(Source: PW A, Gefr Theodor SCHUCH,  
Bezirkstelle IX, MB.

PW B, Fw Hermann LIENSENFELD,  
Bezirkstelle IX, MB.

PW C, Obstlt (Dr) Robert RITTER,  
Feldwirtschaftsamt).

PART II

Section 4

- a) Letter from Regierungsrat Dr. Lauersen to Capt. A.J. Stella ("T" Force) dated 31.8.1945.
- b) Statement by Oberstleutnant Schulz on the activities of the Liaison Officer of the MB dated 30.8.1945.
- a) Regierungsrat Dr. Lauersen. Hamburg 31.8.1945  
Offizierssammelager  
(Officers' Transit  
Camp). Thurmweg.

Subject: Statistics in the Reich.  
Reference: Interview on 31.8.1945 in Hamburg.

I. Organisation of the Statistical Service.

The chief official statistical authority in the Reich before the war was the Statistisches Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Office) in Berlin. The section "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik" (Industrial Production Statistics) was of special significance. This section has conducted a considerable number (300 to 350) of annual and sometimes even monthly investigations in the most diverse branches of industry. The calculation of the results of these investigations was worked out mechanically by the Hollerith system.

The results of these statistical production investigations were sent to only a small number of people interested.

A very convenient form of collection of results was produced in the Statistische Reichsamt by photostating the results entered in the questionnaire forms. Moreover a card index was introduced for the concerns included in the scheme for the most important branches of industry covered by statistical production enquiries.

The section "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik" of the Statistisches Reichsamt, in which the writer

was employed as Referent (referee) from October 1933 to March 1938, worked chiefly for the former General-bevollmaechtigter fuer die Wirtschaft (Commissioner General for Economy). Since 1935 the experts of the department "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik" have worked on the preparation of the investigations and their exploitation in close collaboration with the relevant Bewirtschaftungsstellen (Supply control Offices) (Ueberwachungsstellen = Supervisory Offices, later Reichsstellen (Reich Offices) ), the wishes of which were considered to the fullest extent.

The results of the industrial production investigations were in most cases published relatively late in the form of the afore-mentioned reports. In this respect complaints were repeatedly made to the section "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik" particularly by the Wehrmacht departments (especially the military economic department of the former Wehrwirtschaftsstabes (Military economic staff) in the OKW) that it worked too slowly. Other customers, especially the above mentioned supply offices were dependent upon the quick delivery of current statistical material and gradually went over to making their own investigations to an ever increasing extent, these giving more consideration to the economic point of view than the official production statistical investigations. In some cases it amounted to a duplicated enquiry to concerns included in the scheme, which resulted in the concerns refusing to fill in the questionnaire of the Statistisches Reichsamt which arrived after receipt of the questionnaire of the Bewirtschaftungsstellen in spite of the existing official obligation to give information. In this way a further delay was caused in the publication of the results of the official industrial production statistics as an increasing number of recalcitrant concerns had to be reminded to send back the official questionnaire.

By and large it can be said, however, that the statistical material obtained from the statistical production investigations provided a comprehensive survey of persons employed, raw material consumption, raw material stocks, production capacity, actual production, coal and power consumption of all branches of industry.

The material on hand in the department "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik" was processed by a special group into comprehensive surveys from the

regional and departmental points of view. Thus about 1937/38 there was inter alia, a special evaluation of statistical production investigations from the military economic angle for the former Wehrkreis XII (Military District XII) which gained the special attention of the OKW.

The plan to bring out such special evaluations for the other Wehrkreise also, fell through probably because in 1938, it became apparent that efforts were being made by the Bewirtschaftungsstellen on the one hand and the relevant Wehrmacht departments on the other to provide similar evaluations at a considerably earlier date than was possible in the case of the Statistisches Reichsamt. This department was also not in a position to work more quickly, (a) as it was dependent upon the instructions of a superior department in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Reich Ministry of Economics), which often did not have the necessary understanding of the efforts of the Statistische Reichsamt, department "Industrielle Produktionsstatistik", and (b) for reasons for inter-departmental policy. In this connection, it must also be mentioned that frequently within the Statistisches Reichsamt itself questions of competence arose which certainly did not help the work of the Industrielle Produktionsstatistik section. The writer transferred to the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Economic Staff) of the OKW in mid-March 1938. There he took over the administration of Gruppe Statistik (Statistical Group) in the raw material department. The Wehrwirtschaftsstab had to represent inter alia the interests of the Wehrmacht in negotiations with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and the former Amt Fuer Roh und Werkstoffe (Office for Raw and Working Materials) in connection with the fixing of quotas for the individual consumers. The data on which the fixing of quotas was based, comprised the figures for German output or production, the stock in hand and the anticipated import as well as the reported requirements for each material to be allocated by quota. It was repeatedly shown by these negotiations that the figures put forward by the representatives of the various departments sometimes differed considerably from each other. This was due to the fact that, especially insofar as metals were concerned, the figures of ore output and stocks were calculated in one case on the analytical metal content and in another on the actual metal content



which could be extracted, or that insofar as stock figures were concerned, the returns were made on different days. It was therefore necessary to ensure that in the above mentioned negotiations for the fixing of quotas uniform figures were provided. For the Wehrmacht representatives at these negotiations this was achieved by commissioning the Statistic Group of the Raw materials department (Gruppe Statistik Der Rohstoff-Abteilung) to supply all offices (Stellen) of the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstabes) as well as other Wehrmacht Departments with uniform figures. It was thereby assured that the Wehrmacht representatives put forward the same figures at all conferences.

By reason of its well developed raw materials statistics, the Wehrwirtschaftsstab was commissioned by the highest authority to work out a scheme for raw material balance sheets to be drawn up at regular intervals (quarterly), which were to include obligatory figures for all departments concerned. These "balance sheets" were to provide information on requirements, quotas, home production, stocks, import and consumption of the most important raw materials, including iron, wolfram, chrome, molybdenum, nickel, copper, lead, tin, zinc, aluminium, rubber and mineral oils. The first of these balance sheets were for the fourth quarter of 1939; the last for the fourth quarter of 1942; by and large they were issued quarterly though sometimes at longer intervals.

A copy of all raw material balances was still in the undersigned's safe in Berlin, S.W.19, Kommandantenstrasse 78 in the middle of April 1945. It cannot be stated, however, whether these copies remained in Berlin, were destroyed there, or were eventually taken with other documents to Friesack (near Nauen).

After the separation of the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsamtes (later designation of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab) at the end of 1942/beginning of 1943, the raw materials balance sheets mentioned, were no longer drawn up in the form of graphic presentations but only in the form of tables of figures. So far as these tables later became accessible to the undersigned, they also were in the safe mentioned above at the middle of April.

Soon after his transfer to the Wehrwirtschaftsstab the undersigned had already proposed to the chief of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (General of the Infantry Thomas) that he should make wide use of the Department of Industrial Production Statistics (Abteilung Industrielle Produktionsstatistik) of the Statistisches Reichsamt, for carrying out statistical investigations. General Thomas agreed to this proposal. It could not, however, be put into practice because the Abteilung Industrielle Produktionsstatistik was separated from the Statistisches Reichsamt about the middle of 1938 and, as "Reichsamt für Wehrwirtschaftliche Planung" had become an independent department, which however, continued to be subordinate to the Reichswirtschafts Minister and was accordingly bound by the latter's instructions.

For this reason, the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsstab was forced to build up its own statistical Referate and groups, as only by this means was it assured that its interests were sufficiently considered when statistical compilations and surveys were made. This necessity was particularly urgent after the outbreak of war. The necessity arose of procuring an efficient statistical department in the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsstab, which was in the position to deal swiftly with the demands for statistical surveys, which, increased constantly following the outbreak of war. At the end of 1940 the Group "Zentralstatistik OKW" was formed in the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsstab by order of the head of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command and its direction was taken over by the undersigned. As the former group Rohstoff-Statistik in the Rohstoff-Abteilung had the task of compiling obligatory figures for raw materials for all the offices of the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsstab, the same task fell to the Gruppe Zentralstatistik O.K.W. for the preparation of figures covering employment of labour and weapons, equipment and munitions production. In the latter sphere, the undersigned had, by special order of General Thomas, compiled very detailed statistics covering weapons, equipment and munitions as early as 1939, these giving information as to production, stocks, consumption at the front, and planned production for practically all types of weapons, equipment and munitions.

The Gruppe Zentralstatistik of the OKW represented the interests of the Wehrmacht in regard to the carrying out of statistical investigations vis a vis all non-

Wehrmacht departments - particularly the statistical Central Committee, which by order of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan was installed as the highest authority for sanctioning statistical investigations and was responsible for seeing that industry was not needlessly burdened by these investigations.

## II. German Statistics during the War.

With the outbreak of war the need for up-to-date statistical data for the military authorities as well as the Bewirtschaftungsstellen (Commodity Control Offices) had increased considerably. Very soon it was discovered that the increasing flood of questionnaires which poured into the firms laid a considerable extra strain upon them, which led to considerable ill humour in the firms concerned. The ultimate result was that once again widely divergent figures were frequently put forward for given subjects and conditions.

The group Zentralstatistik (Central statistics) of the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) made all efforts to ensure, for their part, that the demands of the Army were given preference in every case, and further had the task of bringing the statistical demands of the various Wehrmachtstellen (Military Authorities) back to proper proportions. This was also assured by the fact that the Zentralstatistik of the OKW obtained the right to arrange and sanction statistical investigations for the Army.

Especially close was the co-operation between the Zentralstatistik of the OKW and the Reichsgruppe Industrie (Diplom Kaufmann Bickert u. Dr. Gierth), with the Statistisches Reichsamt (Dir. Dr. Bramsted), with the Commissioner-General for Labour (Ministerialrat von Valta, Ministerialrat Dr. Luyken) and with the Reichsstand Des Deutschen Handwerks (Dipl. Volkswirt Schünemann), as well as with the Central Statistical Offices of the branches of the Armed Forces. The last mentioned were set up at the suggestion of the Zentralstatistik of the OKW and served as preliminary investigation offices for the statistical investigations for the Army arranged for the Zentralstatistik of the OKW. At the same time they had the task of carrying out the statistical work of the military authority concerned on a uniform principle.

It may be said that no statistical investigations of any importance were carried out during the war without the sanction of the Zentralstatistik of the OKW. The most detailed investigation concerning the direction of labour was the so-called Kräftebilanz (Labour balance). This was done for the first time on the 31.5.39 and was then repeated yearly on the same date. This Kräftebilanz produced the most detailed data for the direction of labour. It was always carried out with the closest co-operation of the Statistisches Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Office), and covered all fields of national economy. The total results, however, were always only available at the end of the year in which the investigations had been started. Provisional figures were usually issued three or four months after the starting date.

End 1942/beginning 1943 the Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsstab of the OKW was split up into a Rüstungsamt which was put under the control of Reich Minister SPEER and into a Wehrwirtschaftsamt (later Feldwirtschaftsamt) which remained under the OKW.

At about the same time the Lochkartenabteilung (punched card department) which had existed in the Heereswaffenamt since 1938 was transferred from there and made into a separate department under Reich Minister SPEER with the title "Maschinelles Berichtswesen Des Reichsministers Für Rüstung Und Kriegsproduktion". The office Maschinelles Berichtswesen (M.B.) leader Lt.Col. PASSOW, was subject to the directions of the Rüstungsamt, as well as the directions of the head of the Zentralstelle Berichtswesen with Reich Minister SPEER (Staatsrat Schaefer).

The Zentralstatistik of the OKW was incorporated into the department M.B. in June 1943 with its personnel and sphere of work, under the name Abteilung IV (Erhebung und Auswertung), whose management the undersigned took over.

### III. The Organisation of the Maschinelles Berichtswesen. (Mechanical report system).

The Maschinelles Berichtswesen received instructions from Reich Minister SPEER to carry out statistical investigations for all his spheres of activity, and to calculate these mechanically as far as extensive ones

were concerned. At the same time the department M.B. was at the disposal of all other high Reich departments, as well as the OKW, for similar tasks.

For the technical handling of statistical investigations a net of "M.B. Bezirksstellen" was at the disposal of the M.B. Of these Bezirksstellen an equal number existed as there were Rüstungsinspektionen. The zones of the M.B. Bezirksstellen were fundamentally the same as those of the "Rüstungsinspektionen". The M.B. Bezirksstellen were independent offices, which obtained their instructions from the M.B. Zentrale in Berlin. Only the heads of the M.B. Bezirksstellen were subordinate to the competent Rüstungsinspekteur for disciplinary purposes.

At every Bewirksstelle the necessary machines for mechanical calculation were available, such as hole punches, checkers, sorting machines and charting machines. As far as it was the case of mechanically calculated surveys covering the whole of the Reich, the M.B. Bezirksstellen did the calculation for their Rüstungsinspektion zone. The results were brought to Berlin, by courier, in the form of tables and holed cards, and there totalled up by the machine department of the Central Office, the result then being sent to all offices who had any part in the investigation.

The Zentral M.B. (M.B. Central Office) was organized as follows:

Head: Oberstleutnant Passow  
Left middle of April 1945 for Aichach,  
moved on from there on the 24.4.1945,  
present whereabouts not known.

Chef-Gruppenleiter: Major Dr. Bresser,  
Berlin-Hermsdorf, Oranien-  
burgerstr. 18.

Department I: Personnel and Finance.  
Department Head: Barrenstein,  
Berlin-Zehlendorf, Auerhahnbalz 42

Department II: Numbering System (Nummerung).  
Head of Dept: Hörber  
Released meantime to Krefeld,  
Tannenstr. 5.

- Department III: Office Machines.  
Head of Dept: Lt.Col.Dr. Springer,  
Berlin-Spandau, Kelterweg 31.
- Department IV: Official enquiries and evaluation.  
(Erhebung & Auswertung).  
(Fundamental questions regarding  
official enquiries Grundsätzliche  
Fragen Des Erhebungswesens). Head  
of Dept: Regierungsrat Dr.Lauersen,  
Hamburg, Officers Transit Camp  
Thurmweg.
- Department V: Management (Betrieb).  
Head of Dept: Lt.Col.Hübner, left  
Berlin middle of April 1945 for  
Aichach, from there on 24.4.1945  
to South Germany, present where-  
abouts unknown.
- Department VI: MB. - Printing Works.  
Head of Dept: Capt. Lüdtkke, last  
heard of in Kronach, present where-  
abouts unknown.
- Department VII: Training.  
Head of Dept: Lt.Col. Passow.  
(Technical training of the MB.Staff).
- Department VIII: Security (Abwehr).  
Head of Dept: Lt. Col. DR. Von  
Mallinckrodt, left middle of April  
1945 for Aichach, travelled from  
there further, present whereabouts  
unknown.
- Department IX: Liaison Officer to the Field Economic  
Office (VO/MB= Verbindungsoffizier  
Zum Feldwirtschaftsamt) Lt.Col.Dr.  
Schulz, Hamburg, Officers Transit  
Camp Thurmweg.

All fundamental questions relating to official enquiries as well as the methods and system used were in the charge of Department IV, which gave the necessary directions to the MB-District offices for carrying out the official enquiries entrusted to the MB. The technical working directions were given by

Department V. All results after completion of the statistical enquiries were submitted to Department IV, which in collaboration with the department requesting the information, settled the question of size, form of presentation, contents and time of submission of the evaluation required. All technical questions and the time required for the work in MB were discussed and fixed with Department V.

The MB offices mentioned below were at the disposal of the MB Central Office for carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the many different enquirers:

MB-Bezirkstelle (District Office) I: Königsberg/Pr.  
Head: Capt. Hilgenfeldt.

The District office was transferred at the beginning of February 1945 to Rostock. It was impossible, however, to transfer the machines in time. They remained in Rostock.

MB-Bezirkstelle II: Stettin  
Head: Major Janner.

The Machinery was in Stettin-Krakow and was transferred in March 1945 to Gustrow in Mecklenburg. Whether this transfer was actually carried out, is not known to the undersigned. It is possible that some of the machines were accommodated in the Charlottenthal district near Krakow/Mecklenburg.

MB-Bezirkstelle III: Berlin  
Head: Capt. Dr. Ott.

Until the end of November 1943 the MB District Office was established in the house of the Armaments Inspectorate III in Berlin. The Machine installations were then transferred to Zorndorf in Mark Brandenburg. A further transfer took place in February 1945 in a westerly direction. It is not known to the undersigned where the machines ultimately got to. In all probability some of them were sent to Friesack north of Nauen, and others to Neudietendorf in Thuringia (between Erfurt and Gotha).

MB-Bezirkstelle IV: Tetschen-Liebwerd  
Head: Capt. May

No transfer took place according to the knowledge of the undersigned. Formerly the District office IV had its seat with the Armaments Inspection IV in Dresden.

MB-Bezirkstelle V: Stuttgart  
Head: Major von Herwarth.

Transferred about two years ago to Nürtingen and presumably remained there until the capitulation.

MB-Bezirkstelle VI: Bismdetten  
Head: Ing. Jacobs

Former seat Munster as far as is known to the undersigned, part of the "Machine-Park" of the MB-D.O.VI was transferred in Jan./Feb. 1945 to the Hanover District. Exact address he is unable to supply.

MB-Bezirkstelle VII: Munich  
Chief: Major Rahl

Later transferred to Aichach (between Augsburg and Ingolstadt). The undersigned was informed by the district office chief, since dismissed by the Americans, that the MB Betriebstelle VII has been handed over to the American Authorities and that it has been Landesamt! affiliated to the Bavarian statistical Landesamt. Here Rahl further reported that all important statistical material and files were destroyed shortly before the Americans arrived at Aichach. Amongst these were also the results of the monthly regional employee returns, sent to Aichach by order of the MB-Zentrale (central office) by all MB-Bezirkstellen.

MB-Bezirkstelle VIII: Breslau  
Chief: Reg. Baurat Schneider

The machinery was in Trachtenberg near Breslau until January and was transferred from there into the district of Sorau. The machines were not, however, installed there, but transported to Tetschen-Liebwerd to the MB-Betriebstelle IV after a short time. The undersigned does not know whether the machines actually arrived there or whether some of them were brought to Neudietendorf.



MB-Bezirkstelle IX: Kassel  
Chief: Captain Schulte

The MB-Bezirkstelle IX had been transferred from Kassel to Obersula/Hersfeld district by the end of 1943. There was no further transfer of this office before the capitulation.

MB-Bezirkstelle X: Hamburg  
Chief: Major Kruse

The machinery of this office was at Bentesdorf. All machines were there when the British troops marched in, and were confiscated by the occupation-authorities.

The Abwicklungsstelle (winding-up office) of the MB-Bezirkstelle X is in Hamburg at the Wehrkreis-Kommando X (Wi. V.O.) (Army district command). Some of the machines have been collected from Bentesdorf by a British party, as reported to the British liaison officer Lt. Barnett. The undersigned does not know where these machines were taken.

MB-Bezirkstelle XIa: Hannover  
Chief: Capt. Dr. Spatzier

The machinery was transferred to Elze near Hannover. Probably no further transfer from there has taken place.

MB-Bezirkstelle XIb: Magdeburg  
Chief: Capt. Speiermann

The machinery was in Gommaern. A transfer to the west bank of the Elbe was planned in March 1945. The undersigned does not know whether this transfer was actually carried out.

MB-Bezirkstelle XII: Wiesbaden  
Chief: Captain Schniewind

The machinery was in Bad Schwalbach. A transfer to Oberaula (MB-Bezirkstelle IX) was planned for the end of March/beginning of April 1945. The undersigned does not know whether the machines were actually collected. They probably did not arrive at Oberaula.

MB-Bezirkstelle XIII: Nuernberg  
Chief: Captain Dr.Eng. Bahmeyer.

The office was transferred from Nuernberg to Anzbach by the end of 1943. A further transfer was planned in April 1945. The undersigned does not know whether this transfer has actually taken place. In Anzbach were also some machines of the training department of the Mb-Zentrale, where engineers of the MB organization were trained. It was planned to transfer these machines too; the undersigned however cannot state whether this plan actually materialized.

MB-Bezirkstelle XVII: Vienna  
Chief: Major Kloeckner

The machinery was transferred to Langenlois. Probably no further transfer has taken place.

MB-Bezirkstelle XX: Zoppot  
Chief: Major Dr. Matthieu

The machinery was dismantled by the end of March 1945 and packed for dispatch. The dispatch has not been carried out, however, so that it can be assumed that the machines in Zoppot have fallen into Russian hands.

MB-Bezirkstelle XXI: Posen  
Chief: Major Dr. Ludwig

Owing to the advance of the Russians, the Bezirkstelle XXI was evacuated to the West at the end of 1944. The machines were, as far as is known to the undersigned, transported from Posen to Neudietendorf in Thuringia.

MB-Bezirkstelle Oberrhein (Upper Rhine): Strassbourg.  
Chief: Captain  
Simon

The machine department was evacuated from Strassbourg to Bezirkstelle V at Nuertingen in August 1944. The leading personnel moved to Schenkenzell in the Black Forest.

MB-Bezirkstelle Prague: Prague  
Chief: Captain Bartsch

As far as is known to the undersigned, no evacuation has been carried out.

MB-Bezickstelle in the Government General: Frankenberg/  
Sa.  
Chief:  
Captain Kobe

Formerly at Cracow. A further evacuation, as far as is known to the undersigned, has not been carried out.

In consequence to the increasing difficulty in transport and communications caused by the events of the war, it became more and more difficult to keep the Central Office (MB-Zentrale) at Berlin informed. The undersigned, who left Berlin on 17th April 1945, can therefore not state with certainty whether further evacuations of MB-Bezirkstellen were carried out. For this reason, the undersigned can give no information other than that given above. More recent information could, perhaps, be given by Major Dr. Bresser, chief of the Chef-Gruppe, who remained in Berlin, or by the above-named chiefs of the different MB-Bezirkstellen

By order of Reich Minister SPEER, all departments of the Reich Ministry Speer carried out a vigorous reduction of personnel in the first half of April 1945. The department MB was, according to orders, split up into a Group North and a Group South.

The direction of the MB Group South was taken over by Dienststellenleiter Lieutenant-Colonel Passow, the direction of the MB Group North by the undersigned.

Lieutenant-Colonel Passow left Berlin on 14th April 1945 in a southerly direction. He was accompanied by Abteilungsleiter VIII (Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. V. Mallinckredt). Lieutenant-Colonel Passow travelled via Aichach and continued his journey from there on 23rd or 24th April 1945. Regarding his present whereabouts, the undersigned knows nothing.

The MB-Group North consisted of 5 persons, altogether, among them the permanent deputy of the undersigned, Dr. Grotius, who is at present at Bad

Groemitz, Haus Kluever. The Group North left Berlin on 17th April 1945 and went, via Guestrów/Meckl., to Bad Groemitz. Another arrival there, on 26th April 1945, was the VO/MB Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Schulz who, together with the undersigned, left Groemitz for Flensburg on 3rd May 1945. Since the beginning of July 1945, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Schulz and the Obergefr. (corporal) Schumann have held themselves at the disposal of the British 21st Army Group by order of the British Liaison Officer with the Wehrkreiskommando (Army District Command) X at Hamburg, Offizier Samellager (Officers Transit Camp) Thurmweg.

It is not known to the undersigned what files were taken along by the MB-Group South. The person in charge of these matters, UFFZ (NCO) Mataushek, appointed by the undersigned, travelled with the MB-Group South and took with him a number of most important documents referring to the employment returns. It is not known to the undersigned where this material is today nor whether it was destroyed.

The files removed from Berlin by the MB-Group North were submitted to the British Liaison Officer with the Wehrkreiskommando X and are at present partly in the hands of Captain A.S. Stella, partly in the liquidation office of the MB-Bezirkstelle X in the house of the Wehrkreiskommando X.

IV. The various activities of the mechanical report system. (Translators note: refers to MB., i.e. Maschinelles Berichtswesen.)

The various activities, for which MB was made responsible, consist mainly of extensive statistical investigations which were calculated by means of a mechanical system using index card punching machines. In addition, other statistical investigations, especially of a scientific nature, were carried out on a considerable scale without the use of card punching machines.

An important task of MB was the development of modern office machines, also the simplification and standardisation of the whole printed form system, especially that of the armed forces.

MB also made considerable progress in the card index system by creating a standardised Reich Index card for firms and the Reich index card for personnel. The introduction of these standardised index cards became increasingly more urgent the longer the war lasted, but, at the same time, increasingly difficult. The person mainly concerned with card index matters was, in addition to the MB-Dienststellenleiter Departmental Head (Passow), the Oberschuetze Dinges, who left Berlin with the Group South on 14th April 1945 and of whose whereabouts the undersigned has no information.

On the Wehrmacht's instruction the MB kept very concise health-statistics, registering each sick and wounded by means of a punched-card-index (Lochkarte). The MB department where these health-statistics were compiled had its offices until recently in the Reichstag-building at Berlin.

Furthermore, the MB handled the so-called Raw-material-Accounting (Rohstoff-abrechnung) of the Ruestungskontor keeping precise accounts for raw-material-quotas of the quota-holders. The mechanical part of the Raw-Material-Accountancy by punched-card-index-system was carried out at the machine-section (Maschinenbetrieb) at Maerkisch-Rietz/Scharmuetzelsee, where Kremer was chief of the Raw-Material-Accountancy; as far as it is known to the undersigned, he left Maerkisch-Rietz for Neudietendorf/Thuringia at the beginning of April 45.

Advanced preparations had been made for the transfer of the Wehrmacht's mechanised pay-accountancy to the MB; as a start the pay-accounting in Wehrkreis III (military District III) has been put into operation. The chief of MB, Oberstleutnant (L/Col) Passow, and the punched-card-index expert Schuch (address unknown, probably at Oberaula) are able to give detailed information on the system and the stage reached in pay accounting.

At the beginning of 1944 the MB developed a modern method of registration of persons (Menschenerfassung) and experiments with this method were conducted. It deals with individual registration (Personal-Einzel-Erfassung). The most significant characteristics of each person, such as name, birthday,

training, actual occupation etc. are registered on an index-card, by means of a transparent and traceable questionnaire, and then punched. By means of sorting, tabulating and listing of these punched index-cards with the aid of writing machines (Alphabet Schreibende Maschinen) it is possible to compile statistical surveys of name-lists for any desired section of persons within the shortest time.

Towards the end of 1944 the method of individual registration was applied experimentally for the evaluation of an investigation, made by the Ruestungsamt, on tool-makers and jig-makers, employed in armament factories. The data available did not actually fulfil the requirements demanded by MB for smooth running of the mechanised accounting-work. The MB succeeded however in submitting to the departments concerned useful lists, part of them containing names of the registered tool- and jig-makers. This particular job was entrusted to the MB Bezirkstelle Frankenberg/Sachsen; at that time its chief was HPTM (Captain) Bartsch, later chief of the MB office at Prague. In charge of MB-Abteilung IV was Gefr. (L/Corp. Toenjes, Berlin-Spandau, Ruhlebenerstrasse 159.

Preparations regarding the indexing of all male research workers in armament factories were far advanced. Furthermore, preparations had been made by L/Col. Passow, in negotiations with the departments concerned, to list individually UK-Gestellte (reserved occupation) and hospital-inmates, as well as recruits for the replacement-army (Ersatzheer). For some of the Wehrmeldeämter (Armed-Forces Recruiting Offices) as well as for various units of the replacement army (Ersatzheer) the method of individual statistical registration had been experimentally applied. Data relating to the statistical registration of persons are to be found at the liquidation office (Abwicklungsstelle) of the former MB Bezirkstelle-X with the Wehrkreiskommando-X. (Military District-Command X). The method for the determination of the quota-weights by means of the punched-card-technique, which had been fixed by the combined efforts of MB and the Reichsstelle Eisen und Metalle (Reichs-office for Iron and Metals). (Director Dr. Petzold) were in an experimental stage of development. With the aid of this method, the demands of raw-materials and semi-finished products can be ascertained for any separate product and for the total production-programme.

The initial work for this method was conducted mainly - apart from the undersigned - by the chief of department II (Abteilungsleiter II) Hoerber), and by the technical expert of the MB Zentrale, Michel, whose whereabouts are not known to the undersigned.

The most important statistical investigation conducted by MB was the

Monthly Return of Employees.

(Monatliche Beschäftigtenmeldung).

Through collaboration of all departments concerned the questionnaire used for this investigation had been developed as a standardized questionnaire (Minheitsfragebogen); it was gradually to replace all questionnaires dealing with employed persons. The MB was commissioned to conduct this investigation and to convey the results to all departments which needed them.

The Monthly Return of Employees covered about 80-85,000 firms, the bulk of them being factories. The firms dealt with were divided into three sections of investigation (Erhebungskreise). "Section A" covered about 12,000 Armaments works (Ruestungsbetriebe) supervised by the Ruestungsinspektionen (Armaments-Inspections) these factories constituted the so-called Armaments -sector (Ruestungssektor) within the jurisdiction of Reichs-Minister Speer. "Sector B" covered about 1,000-1,200 firms, which were actually production shops belonging to the Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsdienststellen).

"Section C" covered about 65-70,000 firms, supervised by the Landeswirtschaftsaemter (Regional Economic Offices), the Forst und Holzbewirtschaftungsaemter (Forestry and timber Economic Offices) and Food-Offices.

The monthly results for section A and B were forwarded on the 18th of the following month to the departments concerned. The results for "Section C" were usually available 4-5 weeks after the month under report.

During the last month of the war it became increasingly difficult to obtain the returns punctually as numerous firms could not return their questionnaires

to the competent MB-Bezirkstelle on time due to bomb damage and communications difficulties. The MB-Bezirkstelle in its turn was therefore in no position to transmit to the Central Office in Berlin the returns for its district. The Bezirkstelle had instructions to produce so-called "Emergency returns" based on a firm's most recent monthly return available in cases where firms delayed the return of their forms. During the last few months of the war, on account of the constantly increasing number of emergency returns the results of the return of employees, based on calculations, naturally came to differ more and more from the facts, and the value of their evidence as well as their significance as basic information for the direction of labour became all the more problematic

The enquiry form for the return of employees is arranged mainly as follows: the break-down of employees according to employment groups (owner, employee, skilled worker, semi-skilled workers, unskilled worker, apprentices); break-down of employees according to their origin (German, foreigner, Russian Prisoner of War, other Prisoners of War); actual and lost working hours (the latter subdivided according to losses due to direct or indirect air-raid damage and to late-comers etc.), return of employees liable for military service, subdivided according to their medical category and each of these categories arranged according to age-groups; intake and release of labour during the month under report, call-up for military service; break-down of labour according to the jobs actually performed in the factory. (This question, however, had to be answered by firms of the Erhebungskreis A (survey group A) only).

The questionnaire for the return of employees for firms of the Erhebungskreise A and B and, finally, also of C, had been printed on transparent paper i.e. paper suitable for photographic tracing. Thus both the reporting firm and the offices receiving the questionnaire were able to produce any required number of copies without any further clerical work. For the firms of the Erhebungskreis A, the MB-Bezirkstellen produced inter alia photostats every month for the Labour Exchanges as well as for the committees and rings concerned with the production of these firms.



The results of the monthly employee returns formed amongst other things the basis for the conferences concerned with the allocation of labour for armament production which were held every month by the representatives of both the Generalbevollmächtigten Für den Arbeitseinsatz (Commissioner General for Labour Control) and Reichminister Speer.

February 1945 was the last war month for which the Reich employee return was compiled. Unteroffizier (Sgt.) Mataushek of Group "South" most probably took a copy of this return with him.

Up to the end of 1944, the Industrial Reports (Industrie-Berichterstattung) were transmitted together with the employee returns i.e. in the Erhebungskreis "C" by using the back page of the questionnaire for the employee return. The Industrial report was originally a representative investigation undertaken by the Statistisches Reichsamt. It was subdivided into Economic Groups (Wirtschaftsgruppen) in accordance with the structure of the organisation of Trade and Industry and was later on transferred from the Statistisches Reichsamt to the Reichsgruppe Industrie. The latter used its organisation for the despatch and collection of the questionnaires. Its statistical department compiled the monthly returns. As mentioned above, the "Industrie Berichterstattung" (Industrial report system) was a representative investigation. Only once every year were all firms belonging to the Reichsgruppe Industrie covered by the Industrial Report System. The computation of the final result based on the monthly representative returns remained the responsibility of the Statistisches Reichsamt. MB-Bezirkstellen had also been concerned with the returns of the Industrial Report System.

The enquiry of the Industrial Report System related to the break-down of employees according to: owners, salaried or wage-earning employees as well as to the break-down of the total turnover into direct and indirect turnover for the Armed Forces. The returns were to be subdivided according to Economic Groups and branches of industry according to the organisation to which the reporting firm belonged. In 1944, the Industrial Report System was switched over from monthly to quarterly investigations. They were to cease after January 1945.

The person in charge of the Industrial Report System in the Reichgruppe Industrie was Diplom-Kaufmann Bickert, chief of the statistical department. The person in charge of the returns of employees and industrial reports in the department of the undersigned (in MB) was, up to September 1944, Dr. Gierth, who was then called up, and afterwards O. Schtz. Bodwig, Berlin Britz, 64, Mieningstrasse who remained in Berlin, also Gefr. Tönjes, Berlin-Spandau, 159, Ruhlebnerstrasse who probably also remained in Berlin.

The MB also carried out, at longer intervals, (every 3-4 months) the so-called "Wehrpflichtigenmeldung", returns of persons liable for military service. These covered all German male employees in commercial and industrial firms on the date of the investigation, and subdivided them according to age-groups and, within these, according to medical categories with a further break-down according to the branches of the Armed Forces.

The results of the return of men liable for military service (Wehrpflichtigenmeldung) were communicated to the Speer Ministry and there formed the basis of discussions with the Wehrmacht on call-ups of deferred men from the armament industry. The returns were compiled separately for each employer of deferred labour (Uk-Bedarfsträger), corresponding to the production of individual factories for certain employers. At the same time the Allgemeine Heeresamt, later on called Wehrersatzamt (General Army Office, later Army Replacements Office) also made out regular returns on deferments but on a rather different system so that differences of opinion repeatedly cropped up as to the number of deferred persons. In order to remove these differences it was proposed to base the returns of men liable for military service on individual registration (Personaleinzel-Erfassung) once this system had been got under way i.e. on registration of the individual deferred persons.

The person in charge of the returns at MB, Department IV was previously mentioned Oberschuetze (Lance-Corporal) Ludwig.

The Assessment of the "Labour Balance"  
("Kraeftebilanz") which, on the orders of OKW (Army High Command) and of Reich Minister Speer and under

the leadership of the Reich Statistical Office (Statistische Reichsamt, Dir. Dr. Bramstedt) has been drawn up annually since 1939, as per May 31st, was also handled by MB. Its results were notified inter alia to the OKW, the Speer Ministry, The Commissioner for Labour, and the Reichsgruppe Industrie.

At the beginning of 1944, MB was instructed by the Bevollmächtigte Fuer Den Ruestungshandel (Delegate for Armament Trade) to compile a monthly return of employees in the Armament Trade. The questionnaire used was drawn up jointly with the Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Working Committee) Ruestungshandel (Dr. Zeigler, Dr. Leisse). As, due to material conditions the questionnaire had to be rather complicated, this investigation, which was also carried out by the district offices of MB, made rather a slow start. Referee of MB department IV, (was) Oberschuetze Ludwig.

Towards the end of the war, a return of employees in Armament Crafts (Ruestungshandwerk) was about to be made. The proposed questionnaire was drawn up in collaboration with the delegate of the Reichsstand Des Deutschen Handwerks (Reich Organisation of German Handicraft, Mr. Schuenemann). The actual return of employees in the armament trade was not, however, taken in hand before the end of the war, only a preliminary questionnaire was sent to the firms in question.

The results of the Return of Employees, the Industry Information Service (Industriieberichterstattung) the Return of men liable for military service (Wehrpflichtigenmeldung), of the Assessment of the Labour Balance, and the results of statistical investigations on the labour position with regard to Germans, foreigners, prisoners of war, etc., as made regularly by the Commissioners of Labour were continually combined by MB department IV in the so-called 'S-Book Labour' (Statistisches Handbuch Arbeitseinsatz', Statistical Labour Handbook) which was distributed to all departments of the Speer Ministry concerned. The copy belonging to the undersigned and a Loose-Leaf book (Ringbuch) containing figures from the Return of Employees were at the beginning of May handed over to Ministerialrat Bail at Muerwik and were also confiscated when the then Reich Government was arrested on May 23rd, 1945.

The department of the Speer Ministry with which the undersigned, as far as questions of Labour Statistics were concerned, worked continuously in the closest collaboration, was the Amtsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz (Official Group Labour) at the Ruestungsamt (Major Dr. Duerfeld, Hauptmann Dr. Schinkoethe). As far as is known to the undersigned Major Dr. D. left for Chemnitz at the beginning of April 1945.

In January and February 1945 detailed discussions were held with all the authorities concerned on the question of a further curtailment of Labour Statistics. It was urgently demanded that the factories, already strained to the utmost, should be relieved of the duty of providing statistical returns. On the other hand, the leading authorities demanded that they be provided as speedily as possible with up-to-date statistical material in order to control labour allocation. The multitude of authorities which, regarding labour or production control, were concerned with the factories, was so great as to necessitate providing works' returns for numerous authorities. If the works were ordered to send in their forms direct to all the authorities concerned, this amounted to quite a considerable strain. If, on the other hand, it was decided that all these forms were to be sent to one single authority which in turn was to inform all the authorities interested, this round-about way, in addition to the strain on transport services, resulted in a considerable delay before the reports reached the authorities concerned. The practical outcome was that this question was no longer a question of methods and organisation of statistical investigations but that, in the last instance, these difficulties were a result of the complicated organisation of the armament industry and could only be removed by simplifying this organisation, each authority which was in any way responsible for any production returns from the factories concerned considered its returns the most important ones.

The responsibilities of the MB further extended to the preparation of statistics for weapons, equipment and ammunition. As mentioned at the beginning of this report, as early as September 1939 by order of the chief of the then Wehrwirtschaftsstabes in the OKW, monthly statistics for weapons, equipment and munitions covering production, stocks, front-line consumption

and planned production of the most important types of weapons, equipment and munitions had been compiled. These statistics consisted of graphs with monthly amendments which were duplicated photographically. These statistics were based on reports from the branches of the forces, submitted to the Wehrwirtschaftsstab with regard to production and stocks of weapons, equipment and ammunition, and on reports of the Fuehrungsstaebe H.Q. staffs of the forces with regard to front line consumption.

During air raids on Berlin in November 1943, nearly all copies of these weapon, equipment and munitions statistics were lost, with the exception of one specimen, on the basis of which the re-construction of these statistics was begun at the end of 1944. With this re-construction, a different method of duplicating was adopted. The transparent sheets of these re-constructed statistics were handed over to the British Liaison Officer attached to the Wehrkreis-kommando and at present are in the hands of Capt. A.S. Stella.

With regard to the control exercised by Reichsminister Speer very soon it became necessary to be informed as soon as possible, of the most recent figures, at least as far as the important types of weapons, equipment and munitions were concerned. For this reason, it was decided, early in 1942, to create the so-called "Schnellmeldung Ueber Die Ruestungsfertigung" (Rapid report on armament production) for the most important weapons, equipment and munitions. These reports were compiled by the MB. The necessary figures, which were definitely considered as provisional ones, were obtained by personal calls of the referees of the MB on the appropriate military authorities. Later on, they were supplied by the appropriate Ausschuesse (Committees). In this way, it proved possible for Reichminister Speer to receive information as to the state of production by the 3rd, or 4th day of the month following the month under review. The figures in these "rapid reports" were checked before-hand in co-operation with the statistical department of the Technisches Amt in the Reichsministerium Speer (Dipl. Ing. Dahms). Already as early as 1941, the undersigned had compiled "regional statistics of weapons and equipment" based on acceptance figures of the forces. By means of graphs, these

statistics showed the regional distribution of output of the more important weapons and equipment according to the various Ruestungs-Inspektionen. For each weapon and item of equipment a separate card was made out, bearing a table showing the state of production of that particular weapon etc., broken-down according to firms.

Due to the increasing scale of evacuation of authorities from the Berlin area, and the communications and transport difficulties, it finally became impossible to carry on with those regional statistics of weapons and equipment to the same extent and on the same dates as was done in 1942 and 1943. Because of lack of documents, the undersigned is not in the position to state up to what month regional statistics were drawn up for weapons and equipment.

MB Department IV also developed the "Index of the Ruestungsendfertigung" (production of complete armament). This index consists of more than 300 individual columns (Einzelreihen), and, combining a multitude of these individual columns, it forms columns for entire groups, such as light infantry weapons, heavy artillery weapons, AFVs, aircraft etc. The index is based on the average of 1942 = 100. The index, originally based on working hours, later on prices, shows the volume of changes in production within the individual groups. The index of the production of complete armaments was worked out in close co-operation with the Planungsamt. The persons responsible for the statistics of weapons, equipment and munitions in Dept. IV. B were the permanent deputy of the undersigned:

Dr. Grotius, Bad Groemitz, Haus Kluever;  
L/Cpl. Caspar Schroeder, Berlin-Halensee,  
Hektor Strasse, 7;  
Pte. Zank, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Aachener Strasse,  
43.

Sch. and Z were originally told to join the group "North", but remained in Berlin, to the knowledge of the undersigned. With all probability the most important files relating to statistics of weapons, equipment and munitions are also there. Some of these files were on the 17.4.45, still in a safe of the Planungsamt, Berlin, Fasanen Strasse 6, buried by a bomb hit. It is possible that further files had been

taken away by officials of the Planungsamt to Blankenburg/Harz. At the Planungsamt, Dr. Rolf Wagenfuehr and Mr. Salje were responsible for the statistics for weapons, equipment and munitions.

By the end of 1944, the MB received instructions from the Reichsministerium Speer to carry out a comprehensive stock-taking covering the clothing, weapons and equipment in the stores of the Wehrmacht, Reichs Labour Service, German Red Cross and other organizations such as the Todt Organization. However, only a small number of the existing stores were supplied with the necessary forms for returns.

This stock-taking was to have been done in the same way as that done for years by the MB with the stocks of the Feldzeuginspektionen (Ordnance Inspectorates) which were dealt with by the Berlin-Dueppel branch of the MB (Head Lt. Scharbaker).

In conclusion, it may be stated that, within the limits of this report, it has been possible to outline the various activities of the MB only roughly. Further details could be provided by separate reports on the various functions. For this purpose it is however, necessary that the above-mentioned referee should be made available as far as they can be got hold of. This refers, in particular, to Dr. Grotius and Mr. Hoerber.

Signed

Dr. LAUERSEN

(Actual Signature)

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8.9.45

b) VO/MB

Hamburg  
30.8.45.

Concerns: Requested details of the various activities (Arbeitsgebiet) of VO/MB. (VO/MB: Verbindungsoffizier Maschinelles Berichtswesen Liaison Officer, mechanical report system).

Extensive statistical jobs were done, besides those statistics produced by MB, which could not be carried out by machines, e.g. S-books for men in leading positions.

For the purpose of making new connections, and for training, the VO/MB made independent statistical tests, which were generally not by order, but which served scientific interests or could be used to solve everyday fluctuating problems. So for instance the research of the man-power-balance of the Reich, of medically A1-reserves still employed in industry, of migrations in the Reich, i.e. the moving of population as a consequence of air-raids - based on the distribution of ration cards, of loss of labour in the industry by enemy occupation in 1945, etc. etc.

In accordance with the VO/MB's general education as a Doctor of agronomics, and farmer with agricultural diploma, and political economist, in which capacity he worked on agricultural statistics since 1928, he carried out statistical examinations of agriculture, on his own initiative, e.g. results of cattle census, the nutrition political situation, the supply problem of fat and albumen, the question of labour allocation in agriculture 1944 and 1945, the fixing of rations for April 1945 and finally the effects of territorial loss on the food situation.

Moreover, the VO/MB was also in permanent close contact with all experts, who worked on objective, scientific agriculture statistics. To this category belongs the

"Institut fuer europaeische  
Landbauforschung und  
Ernaehrungswirtschaft  
in Berlin, W.8, Leipziger-  
Strasse 110/11, under the direction of



Prof. Dr. Woermann, Halle who, however, was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944, and his first assistant, Dr. Paetzold, a pupil of Prof. Dr. Falcke from Leipzig, who has worked for many years in Turkey. Literature of the institute, in particular charts of German and European food economy, is to be found in the library of the Welwirtschaftliches Institut of the University of Kiel, (under the direction of Prof. Guehlich), which has at present been transferred to the cathedral of Ratzeburg i.L., south of Luebeck. There some works are also to be found on the food industrial achievements of the Landesbauernschaften during the war years, with the last known edition of February 1945. Author Dr. Fensch, former pupil of Prof. Dr. Sagave who was persecuted by the Nazis and died in Kiel. Dr. Fensch now works together with Prof. Guehlich in Ratzeburg.

The deputy of the VO/MB was Oberregierungsrat Dr. Ritter, a highly gifted young mathematician who shortly expected his confirmation as Privatdozent (Junior Lecturer) and who, together with a collaborator, Regierungsrat Dr. Strobel from Buremberg, succeeded in finding a system by which, based on brilliant mathematical reasoning, square roots, cube roots, and, roots of the higher order can be solved mechanically in the simplest way. This method was, owing to its great importance for science and technique, registered as a patent at the beginning of this year. It was used by VO/MB in winter 1944/45 when MB was charged with making difficult ballistic machine calculations (evaluations of pictures showing hits on the target of artillery ranges). Dr. Ritter was in Meiningen in Thuringia in April, he was seriously ill with a heart disease and was, as far as is known, in a hospital in Meiningen when the Americans entered the place.

(Signed): DR. SCHULZ.

Lieutenant Colonel.

(Actual Signature)

PART II

Section 5

MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN

Interrogation of Dr. Lauersen  
by Major Stelle, at Hamburg.

Dr. Lauersen

Hamburg, 14.9.1945.

I. Re: Drawing up of Raw Material - Balances  
(Rohstoff-Bilanzen)

The authorities responsible for the provision of raw materials in the Reich have attempted to form a picture of the situation likely to develop concerning the supply position in the various raw materials.

The authorities foremost interested in questions of raw material provision were:

the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Reich Ministry of Economics).

the former AMT Fuer ROH- und Werkstoffe (Office for Raw and Working Materials).

the Beauftragte fuer den Vierjahresplan (Commissioner for the Four Year's Plan).

the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces).

the various Rohstoff-Bewirtschaftungsstellen (former Ueberwachungsstellen, later Reichsstellen).

The aforesaid authorities kept tables and charts in their statistical departments, from which the supply position of the various controlled raw materials could be seen.

In the general discussions of these departments on questions of raw material supply it soon emerged that the various departments arrived in many instances at diverging figures, and thus at different assessments in the various spheres of the raw materials position. This fact proved to be very disturbing since there existed no uniform design in raw material planning.

These divergences were particularly conspicuous with regard to metals, and found their explanation, inter alia, in the varying estimates of the metal yield,

of home ore production, in the different assessments of imports expected, and also of metals to be gained by the metal drive, thus producing different figures in the balances kept by the various departments.

In order to arrive at a uniform scheme of balancing, the Beauftragte fuer den Vierjahresplan therefore commissioned the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and the Wehrwirtschaftsstab in OKW (Rohstoff-Abteilung) to develop a uniform scheme of balancing in 1939.

The scheme drawn up by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Supply Staff) became binding and formed the basis for the balances from the 4th quarter 1939 onwards.

The basic figures for the raw material balances, to be drawn up at regular intervals, concerning German production, stocks in hand, assured and estimated imports, registered requirements, allocated quotas, and real consumption - were agreed to in so-called "balance-discussions", by the delegates of the aforesaid authorities.

On this occasion, the figures have been ascertained, by the Wirtschaftsministerium and the competent Ueberwachungsstellen with regard to German production on one hand, and by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab with regard to requirements of the Wehrmacht departments on the other.

The assessment of the balance figures relating to the requirements of the Wehrmacht was made by having the Wehrmacht branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) report, at regular intervals, to the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Rohstoff-Abteilung) their requirements in the various raw materials. Later, the Wehrmacht branches were required to furnish an accurate report as to how they proposed to distribute the allocated raw materials amongst the various products - arms, munitions, equipment, building materials.

The demands of the Wehrmacht branches were generally regarded as being excessive, and on many occasions it was necessary to modify the demands in lengthy discussions, before the negotiations of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab with the Wirtschaftsministerium took place.

It was always necessary to reduce the demands of the branches of the Wehrmacht, since the requirements

reported by them were always in excess of the quantities available for distribution, and often the demands of one Wehrmacht branch had to be cut down in favour of another, whichever was in more urgent need of the articles in question.

The figures submitted by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab in the balance discussions, and concerning the provision of raw materials, were made up in clear tables by the statistical department conducted by the undersigned. Copies of these tables were handed over to each delegate present in the discussions.

Any alterations of figures contained in these tables were marked down in the copy left with the delegate of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (raw material department). This copy served as a proof for the drawing up of the chart showing the raw material balances in the statistical department of the Rohstoff-Abteilung of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab.

Immediately upon termination of the balance discussions the amount of allocated quotas was reported to the various officially recognised consumers (Bedarfsträger).

A reserve was always formed on principle for each raw material which was drawn upon in the case of urgent demands suddenly coming forward.

The form of the raw material balance charts, apart from minor alterations, has remained practically the same since the 4th quarter of 1939 up to the end of 1942 (vide the statistical guide (Handbuch) submitted to the British L.O. with the Wehrkreiskommando x).

Early in 1943 it was decreed by order of the Fuehrer that in future the raw material balances be submitted to him no longer as charts but as tables (in Tabellenform). However, most of the offices, which were being furnished with balances, received by special request both, tables and charts.

In the middle of 1943, when the Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt was being divided into the Wehrwirtschaftsamt (later called Feldwirtschaftsamt) and Ruestungsamt, the Statistische Abteilung (Statistical department) conducted by the undersigned was attached

to the Ruestungsamt and incorporated in the Maschinelles Berichtswesen.

From this time on the raw material balances were made up in tables only, by the competent office in the Reichsministerium Speer (Rohstoffamt).

On account of the year-long personal connections of the referees attached to the undersigned with the referees of the Rohstoffamt, the figures contained in the raw material balance tables were also at the MB's disposal.

(sign.) Lauersen, 17.9.45.

PART II

Section 6

MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN

Interrogation of OBERSTLEUTNANT  
Dr. SCHULZ by Major STELLA, at  
HAMBURG, 15.9.45.

Re: Connections between M.B. and FWi Amt  
(FELD - WIRTSCHAFTSAMT)

"When the WIRTSCHAFTS-RUESTUNGSAMT was divided up, the MB was allocated to Minister SPEER. In the earlier stages no direct connections existed between MB and FWiAmt (formerly called WWiStab - WEHRWIRTSCHAFTSSTAB). As, however, most of the various referees know one another, there was to some extent a loose exchange of views. It soon emerged that a clear borderline in the spheres of activity between FWiAmt and RUEAMT i.e. Ministry SPEER could not always be maintained, and that overlapping and parallel work resulted.

During the winter of 1942/43 MB was still entirely occupied with adapting itself to the new subordinate position and the extension of its spheres of activity. This concerned foremost the running of machinery proper, but also the tasks of exploitation.

The FWiAmt (WWiStab) included the ZENTRALSTATISTIK (Central Statistics) in the special functions of the department for raw materials. More and more it was considered desirable to centralize all the matters of statistics in the MB. This was being achieved for the most part in 1943, REG.RAT., Dr. LAUERSEN, who had worked already in close cooperation personally and materially with MB transferred to MB together with his collaborators. Thus the opening up of contact amongst the referees dealing with various spheres of interest became increasingly necessary for the FWiAmt as well as for the MB".

While the writer explains in the following paragraph the various difficulties still prevailing of achieving an ideal cooperation between the two offices (FWiAmt and MB) during the 18 months before the destruction by an air raid (22/23.11.43) of the Berlin

offices of the FWiAmt, and their subsequent transfer to FRANKFURT/ODER and WANNSEE, and after enumerating the persons in charge of the offices, as follows:

Chief Inland in the FWiAmt: OBERST RUDELSDORF.  
Chief MB: OBERSTLEUTNANT PASSOW.  
Liaison Officer: OBERSTLEUTNANT Dr. SCHULZ.  
(the writer himself -  
Examiner's note).  
Referee on economics  
questions: DIPL. VOLKSWIRT (political  
economist) THIELE.  
Military Mathematicians: OBERREGIERUNGSRAT  
DR. RITTER.  
DR. STREBEL.

he continues verbatim:

"The main task of the liaison officer MB consisted of reporting to the FWiAmt the figures exploited by MB, such as the SCHNELMELDUNGEN (express reports), reports on labour employed, statistics on munitions and implements and so forth. On the other hand, he had to listen to the needs of the FWiAmt in regard to figures wanted, or figures that might be wanted, and accordingly to get MB to provide such material".

"With regard to details of the work, may I draw attention to the report dated 30.8.45. Copies of the various essays are contained in the files of MB at the WEHRKREISKOMMANDO X, and explanations can be given on same".

"The functions of the liaison officer MB and his staff were performed in such a way that the questions of competence could be bridged, and that the work of the MB was performed within the framework of the FWiAmt in a relevant, objective, true, statistical manner".

Signed. Dr. SCHULZ.

## PART II

### Section 7

Interrogation of Dr. Bahnmayr, Head of Maschinelles Berichtswesen, Bezirksstelle XIII, and Advisor to Central Office thereof. Ansbach, Pfarrgasse 19, Office Brauhausstrasse 9b.

1. Personality: Dr. Bahnmayer is an expert of machine reporting. He has been in it for a number of years, and has made it his business to find out all about it and the ways in which it can be improved. His advice was often not heeded, thus he is able to criticize the system. He is an expert pure and simple, and if approached as such, he will talk willingly. He has an enormous respect for American statistical methods.

2. Machine Reporting: It was originally introduced at OKH for purely military questions, comparable to our forms 66-2 and 20. In March 1940 Dr. Bahnmayer advocated in Berlin the introduction of punched card systems into the Ruestungsinspektionen. It was then taken over by them, but with a very small staff, and on a modest basis. The present independent Maschinelles Berichtswesen was not founded until August 1943. Speer appointed Schmeer as Chief of Reporting, of which Machine Reporting was one of the main parts. His task was to simplify the methods of reporting. The district offices were made independent of the Ruestungsinspektion whose area they covered, responsible only to Berlin. The idea that every firm should make only one report which would then be distributed through MB to all parties concerned was a good one and was carried out completely with regard to the Beschaeftigtenmeldung, but not as strictly or not, at all in other cases.

3. Beschaeftigtenmeldung: As soon as MB receives the firm's copy of the Beschaeftigtenmeldung, it starts to revise it for accounting mistakes. About 30% of them had some mistake or other. That is done by the MB employees. The Beschaeftigtenmeldung came in regularly on the 3rd of each month (in this area at least) and was sent out again 2 or 3 days later. The main pressure of MB was directed at having the firms turn in that one form quickly rather than the others, at least as far as A and B firms are concerned. As soon as the correction is done, the particular firm's data are punched on cards after a careful system. When all these cards are prepared, it is sorted by a sorter machine and then added up by the final machine according to various criteria. This final addition, in which all possible questions and breakdowns are carried out, is called the "Auswertung". This was originally done on large special forms with different forms for different areas or groups of industry. Later MB used



the same forms that the firms itself uses, only instead of one firms' data it contains the added data for a number of firms, and another sheet is used again for a different breakdown. This eliminates the more complicated forms and safeguards at the same time that every question filled out by the individual firm is also answered with regard to all of them. (The forms of that description, captured by me for the Gau Schwaben, are being cleared also through channels).

The Beschaeftigtenmeldung received then the following distribution Ruestungskommando at the "betreuende" agency; Labor Office; Gauwirtschaftskammer; DAF; Ruestungsinspektion (head of personnel office); chairman of Ruestungskommission; MB central office in Berlin.

The "C" firms had a less exact and quick treatment. They were sent to the Gauwirtschaftskammer for examination whether they had any mistakes. By the time they got back, they were also punched and added, and then went out; the originals going back to Gauwirtschaftskammer. The distribution was not as extensive.

4. Division of Firms: The "A" firms were generally called Ruestungsbetriebe, but their official title was "Wehrwirtschaftsbetriebe in Betreuung Wehrmacht". "B" firms are the firms actually owned and operated by the army, like the Heeresmunitionsanstalten. "C" firms are Wehrwirtschaftsbetriebe in Betreuung Landeswirtschaftsamt (or Food or Forestry Office). "D" firms used to exist but have not now for quite some time. Every firm is in a certain respect a member of the Gauwirtschaftskammer, because this agency looks after certain items like power, etc., for all firms concerned (?). The distinction between "A" and "C" is not always clear. Apart from being a constant reason for friction between the two types of organisations, in the case of borderline firms, not even the principles were clearly established. This particularly with regard to the Zulieferungsindustrie. In Muenster e.g. the prominent leader of MB, Erdmann (head of Ruhrstab Speer) did not include any Zulieferung because it would have swelled the "A" firms to an unwieldy size. The informant believes this a mistake and that Zulieferung should be given the same priority as the finished product, but he knows that this principle was

not adhered to all along the line. In Munich, however, they went as far as to include a tin can factory among the "A" firms. Thus it was not unified throughout the Reich and the figures for "A" firms are not comparable between different MB district offices.

5. Industriebericht: Compared to the Beschaeftigtenmeldung, the Industriebericht takes second place. When the firm sent it in together with the former, it was not examined by MB, but sent on to the Gauwirtschaftskammer, where the examination takes place, and the original forms are sent back to MB. Here they are punched and tabulated, but not on the original form, but only on a informal summation sheet, as it came out of the summation machine. The summation was done according to various questions which follows clearly from the types of questions asked on the form and the Reichsgruppe Industrie requested certain additional Auswertungen from time to time. If these additional questions became more numerous, the form itself was changed, so that the respective question was directly answered on the form, and could thus be added up without difficulties. These rough additions were sent only to the Reichsgruppe Industrie, which had its main office lately in Gera. The head of that office is Dipl. Kaufmann Bickert, a very capable man who knows a lot about these problems. His wife and family live in Murnau a/Staffelsee, where he might be found today. The type of questions answered by this sheet of "Dummonlechkarten" was usually among others a breakdown by various Wirtschaftsgruppen for which purpose the Wirtschaftsgruppe was mentioned on the form itself. The firm had to state the main Wirtschaftsgruppe to which it belonged by its preponderant production, and then also 3 further groups if it so desired. The breakdown was then normally done by the main Wirtschaftsgruppe, but from time to time a certain Wirtschaftsgruppe also wanted data on firms which produced in their field only to a smaller extent.

Informant was quite definite that none of the Ruestungs-agencies received any part of the Industriebericht. The Gauwirtschaftskammer received the Auswertung only with regard to work hours. The Reichsgruppe Industrie kept these reports for quite some time, and after they had been collected from all parts of the Reich, sent the respective reports on in consolidated form to the individual Wirtschaftsgruppen. But it

took easily half a year from the time the MB received the original report and the time the consolidated report was received by the Wirtschaftsgruppe. That is why some of the Wirtschaftsgruppen asked the firms belonging to them to send them a copy of the Industriebericht directly.

"B" firms did not make any Industriebericht. The "A" firms, of course, only insofar as they belonged to industry and not to handicraft. The number of the firm mentioned on top of the sheet is the so-called Reichsbetriebsnummer. The first numeral indicates the membership in a certain profession, e.g. 0 for industry and 9 for free professions. The second group of numbers, 4 figures between slants, indicates the geographical area the firm belongs to. The last group is the number that particular firm has within the particular area - information which is thus only of importance to the agencies in that particular area. All three parts together form the Betriebskammer.

The original with one copy of the Industriebericht is then sent once more to the Gauwirtschaftskammer, and passed on to the Reichsgruppe Industrie, which passes the original on to the Wirtschaftsgruppe concerned. Some of the Wirtschaftsgruppen had their own Hollerith machines which enabled them to get their own results sooner (Machineconstruction, Electrotechnik etc). This was a different procedure from the Beschaeftigtenmeldung, which stayed at the MB, and was kept for about  $\frac{1}{2}$  year.

In the very last period the Industriebericht was supplanted by a Kriegseilindustriebericht which included only firms with over 300 workers. The others had only to make a report every three months. The questions in this report every month were very much reduced.

6. Fertigungsbericht: There were consecutively three different forms of it. The old form which was very thorough in its coverage of firms, though less thorough in its questions, was introduced during 1941. At the end of the same year a "Fertigungsspendelliste" was introduced. It had the following form: The head contained the name of the firm and all the information like number, type of finished product, Wirtschaftsgruppe etc.

lauffe Nummer	Auf- trags nummer	Jahr _____	Bezeich- nung d. Gerates	Stueck- zahl	Soll	Ist	Abge- nommen.	Versandt
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_____	_____	year	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
current number	num- ber	of or- der in- cluding H for Heer, (or M or L) or V for Verwalt- ung.	Type of product	num- ber	of units ordered	sup- posed pro- duction	actu- al pro- duc- tion	Accep- ted by Army or Navy Accep- tance Office.	Delivered

At the beginning of 1944 a new form of Fertigungsbericht was introduced. As far as the contents of the form are concerned, it is more detailed and effective than the old one. But it was only made for about 15% of products. The only finished product it contained was ammunition. It is quite impossible to gain any picture of the situation from these reports. The system by which these products were selected was quite unclear, and seemed rather haphazard. It was made by the ordering agencies, auftraggebende Stellen, like OKH, OKM etc. While there were a lot of finished products not included in the Fertigungsproduktliste because of the secrecy of their production, it had at least a great number of instruments and products of crucial importance, though only insofar as they were covered by direct orders of the auftraggebende Stellen, thus no sub-contracting and rarely Zulieferungsindustrie were to be found in that report. By contrast therewith the new Fertigungsbericht lacks only systematic coverage.

There was no attempt to even punch cards for them. They were copied and passed on to the central MB office in Berlin. A special section there was created, under the leadership of Dr. Dahms. His findings are however, totally inconclusive insofar as not supplemented by the reports of the Rings and Committees. Other copies of this report were sent to the OKH in Wittenberg, to the Ruostungskommando, partly to the Rings and

Committees, and sometimes also to the Rüstungsinspektion. The original went back to the firm so that they could enter the next month on it; when completely filled, these cards were kept by MB. It should again be emphasized however, that certain munitions like airplanes, U-boats, tanks etc., were not even reported in the best time, i.e. the time of the Fertigungspendelliste.

7. Other districts offices of MB: Evacuated.

- Munich, Bezirksstelle VII. Now in Aichach, Landwirtschaftsschule (on the road from Augsburg, 20 km in direction Ingolstadt). Head: Major Rahl. Medium efficient.
- Stuttgart, V. Now in Nuertingen, in the factory Heller (between Stuttgart and Tuebingen). Head: Major von Bittenfeld. Brains: Referent Breckle.
- Strasbourg - Oberrhein. Now in Schenkenzell, in the school. (in the Schwarzwald, near Freudenstadt, direction from Stuttgart to Oberndorf.) Head: Hauptmann Simon. Good man.
- Salzburg, B. St. XVII. In immediate vicinity of town. Head: Major Steffek. Does not know anything.
- Kassel, B. St. IX. Now in Untersula near Kassel. Head: Ing. Feik.
- Muenster, B. St. VI. Now in Emsdetten (from Muenster on road to Bremen, 24 km). Head: Ing. Jacobs, one of best men in country.
- Berlin Center. Now Maerkisch-Rietz, near Koenigswusterhausen Scharmuetzelsee. Dr. Lauerson, brains of the central office.
- Dresden, B. St. IV. Totschen-Liebwort, Landwirtschaftliche Hochschule. Head: Hauptmann May. Good man.
- Breslau, Not dispersed. Regierungsrat Schneider.

Posen, Now: Frankenberg in Sachsen. Head: Hauptmann Bartsch.

Wiesbaden, Dispersed in immediate vicinity. Ing. Hartmann.

Hannover, Head: Hauptmann Speyermann. Brains: Major Meene, but also not a very good man.

Hamburg, Major Kruse. Good man.

### 8. Miscellaneous information:

a. Wehrkreisbeauftragte. Was put in by Speer against the Ruestungs agencies. Gradually, to push these agencies out of the limelight, he created the Rings and Committees as self-governing agencies which should work with him. Between them they create a complete picture of the finished production, which MB and the army armament agencies are no longer in a position to get for themselves.

b. Kohlenmeldung. In addition to all the reports mentioned MB. was also keeping a report on coal consumption by industry. Amount on stock last month, amount required, amount used. Broken down by types of coal.

c. The numbers of Bedarfsgruppen, as indicated on the Beschmeldung should agree with the various committees and Rings. Thus, if that had been carried out, which it was not, the Beschaeftigtenmeldung could have been broken down by punching into those pertaining to the various Rings and Committees, and these consolidated reports could have been sent to these respective agencies. As it did not work, however, special reports to Rings and Committees became necessary.

d. Wehrwirtschaftsoffiziere are the regional representatives of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab of the OKH in Frankfurt/s.O. They made a report to this agency once a month. A similar report was made once a month by the Ruestungsinspektionen to the Ruestungsamt but due to their too general nature no weight was placed in these reports. In the Speer ministry they rather consulted the reports of Rings and Committees.

PART II

Section 8

MASCHINELLES BERICHTSWESEN

- Report 1: Caspar Schroeder.  
Report 2: Hans Gert E. Toenjes.  
Report 3: Dr. Herman Strebel. Forschungen und Ergebnisse auf dem Gebiet der Angewandten Mathematik (Research and Results in the Field of Applied Mathematics).  
Report 4: Dr. Paul Bramstedt. Bericht ueber die vom Statist. Reichsamt durchgefuehrte kriegswirtschaftliche Kraeftebilanz (Report on Labour Returns connected with War Economy drawn up by the Statist. Reichsamt).

Appendix - Arbeitsplan.

Report I

Name SCHROEDER, CASPAR 1/Cpl.

Born 7.11.1904 in Seidfeld i. Westf.

Activity. On 10.9.1942 to the OKW Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt, Zentralstatistik, (Supreme Wehrmacht Command, Military Economy and Armaments Office, Central Statistics Department), formerly Raw Materials Statistical Department); transferred to the Maschinelles Berichtswesen (Mechanical Reports System) in August 1943, and took over Group IV/3.

Functions of Group IV/3:

- 1) Comprehensive statistics of arms and munitions;
- 2) Survey of the armaments situation (Schnellmeldung (express report);
- 3) Index of final armaments production;
- 4) Stocktaking.

## I. Activities after 17.4.1945.

It has not been possible to make safe the files which were kept in the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung (Institute for the Investigation of Market conditions) as ordered by Dr. Lauersen. The steel safe which had been buried as a result of bombing could not be uncovered, and was then destroyed in the course of the final fighting. It was impossible for those who had stayed behind to leave Berlin; as no travel permits were made out for men of the 'kv' (fit for war service) and 'bed kv' (fit for limited war service) classes. They were said rather, all to have been placed at the disposal of the Stadtkommandant (City Commandant). A conference at the department on Thursday which was to deal with the immediate handing over of Tonjes and Ludwig, was put off (after lively discussions), until the next Monday, as urgent tasks had still to be arranged. The discussion never took place, as the city centre came under fire in the meantime and a telephone connection could no longer be obtained. I instructed all the men to return home, to finish what work was started as far as possible and not to return to the department. It was no longer even possible to leave Berlin with falsified papers, as Berlin had been surrounded meanwhile.

N.B. The director of the Maschinelles Berichtswesen, Lt. Col. Passow, Lt. Col. von Mallencrodt, Staatsrat Schmeer, and Dr. Uebler are said to have been arrested on the Swiss frontier.

## II. The Statistical Reports of Group IV/3.

### 1) The comprehensive arms and munitions statistics (Black books).

They (the statistics) represent a combination of the surveys relating to armament stocks of the individual Wehrmacht branches, which were issued on the 15th of each month showing the position as on the first day of that month.

The development of the following figure surveys were presented in graphic form, first by curves, later by columns stating the figures:



a) The production forecast for the next six months.

The prospective output figures were taken as a basis of the statement, as they were to be expected according to the opinion of industry and the Wehrmacht branches, provided that the necessary deliveries of materials, power supply and labour remained assured.

In recent months the figures could not be adhered to owing to the effect of air attacks and the advance of the enemy and had to be altered from month to month.

b) Receipt and Finishing.

In the case of arms and apparatuses the receiving figures were taken as a basis, as they were reported by the receiving depots (Abnahmestellen) of the Wehrmacht branches. In the case of ammunition the rounds were reported which could be made up out of the individual parts supplied.

c) Intake Feldzeug-Inspektion (Field Equipment Inspectorate and Nachschubaemter (Supply Offices)).

The quantities of weapons, apparatuses and munitions delivered to the Wehrmacht branches appeared here. The figures were supplied by the Feldzeug-Inspektionen and Nachschubaemter respectively.

d) Stocks Feldzeug-Inspektion and Nachschubaemter.

The stocks ascertained from the stocks of the preceding month adding intake and deducting goods sent out, which correspond to the actual stock.

e) Consumption at the front.

Consumption at the fronts according to the reports of the Wehrmacht branches to the Generalquartiermeisters (Quartermasters General). Special note was made of other deliveries of weapons, apparatuses and munitions (Deliveries other countries).

f) Total Stock.

The total stock was reckoned in terms of figures, starting from the previous month's stock taking do-

livery figures into account and deducting consumption, (consumption at the front and elsewhere).

The total stock was always doubtful, as actual stocktaking confirmed later. The incomplete reports of the units at the front were the cause of this. The necessary corrections were very considerable and did not produce a very agreeable effect. I have the impression that one passed over these inroads in silence as far as possible. One tried to spread out sudden inroads after the end of battles of encirclement (Stalingrad, Northern Africa etc.) over several months.

On this account the figures produced against items c) and f) had always to be regarded very critically.

2) Survey of Stocks of the most important arms and implements (Schnellmeldung).

This report was provided in order to procure the delivery figures reported at the end of month for arms and munitions for certain departments of the Ministry as quickly as possible.

It was a question of a purely statistical comparison of production forecast, production and delivery, consumption at the front and stocks of the most important arms, implements and types of ammunition. According to a special order the delivery figures were to be reconciled with the figures of the Buero Fuer Kriegsstatistik (Office for War Statistics) in the Technische Amt (Technical Office). This Office, which made out its return from its own investigations, which were generally more optimistic and apart from the delivery figures reported in addition the almost finished weapons and implements as delivered, latterly reported weapons and implements as delivered which could be delivered prospectively by the 5th of the following month. This method was preferred in the case of the emergency programmes (not programmen) (Panzer, I.F.H. and S.F.H.).

3) Index of the final armaments production.

This index was created in order to obtain a survey of armament development in its simplest form. In the case of arms and implements the delivery figures were taken as a basis, and in the case of ammunition

the production figures. The combination of the individual weapons, implements and types of ammunition was affected by the group price as sole factor which was fixed for all articles covered in accordance with standardised directives. The index showed developments clearly in the various months. It was contested by the Buero fuer Kriegsstatistik as it quickly revealed losses which were apparent in the individual groups and sub-groups, but which one did not willingly bring into the open. Since in various cases the correctness of the Index and the untenability of the attacks against it were demonstrated a monthly return was ordered. As a result retrospective corrections of the figures of the Buero fuer Kriegsstatistik became necessary even for the so-called Fuehrer report (Fuehrermeldung) (Panzer, I.P.H. s.F.H.). I personally consider this Index the most valuable task achieved by IV3.

#### 4) Inventory and stocktaking.

The storage depots of the Wehrmacht branches and all other public bodies were to be controlled according to contents and accomodation by this function. This job became no longer practicable. The preparations for a mechanical control were certainly concluded, but exploitation which was intended at first for individual Ruestungs-Inspektionen (Armaments Inspectorates) could no longer be achieved.

(Signed) CASPAR SCHROEDER.

(Typewritten signature)

(Full translation)

Report II.

Report by Hans-Gort E. Toenjes. Born 2nd April 1908 in Halle a.d. Saale.

Residence: Berlin-Spandau, Ruhlebener Str. 159 II.

M.B. Drafted as soldier to the Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB) of the Reichsminister fuer Ruostung und Kriegsproduktion (Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production).

Being unfit for active service for health reasons, I was detailed to the Maschinelles Berichtswesen (MB) of the Statistische Sammel-und Bearbeitungsstelle des Reichsministers fuer Ruostung und Kriegsproduktion (Statistical Collecting and Processing Department of the Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production) as statistical specialist at the end of August 1943.

After a short transitional period of a few weeks I was employed as referee (Referent) in the Main Group IV.

Main Group IV.

Scope of activity. Fundamental problems of the enquiry system and exploitation.

Director: Reg. Rat Dr. Lauersen.

Deputy: MVR Dr. Grotius

Staff: 60 to 70 persons including typing, draft and card index personnel.

Organisation: Departments 1 to 4 with expert and specialised spheres of activity, drafting office and card index of firms.

Scope of work: Working on all problems with regard to the methods of new and current enquiries from the point of view of a rational and above all mechanical processing in collaboration with statistical departments in the Reich. Control over the authorisation of new and current enquiries. Drawing up employment statistics, chiefly in the armaments industry. Formulating principles of exploitation. Collection and exploitation of all statistical data relating to employment, certain raw materials and

secondary partial statistical calculation of employees as opposed to the primary overall statistical calculation of the labour return. Technically the figures relating to the labour book statistics were obtained by counting out the labour book card indexes (card indexes of labour books issued) which were kept by the labour offices. Strictly speaking they were statistics of labour book cards and consequently again dependent upon the maintenance and treatment of the card indexes.

The alterations noted by the labour book statistics in the number of workers, were alterations in the reserves shown by the labour book card index and in this way need by no means agree with the actual alterations in the number of workers employed. Here it was a matter of potential errors of several million. In this way the Generalbevollmaechtigte Fuer den Arbeitseinsatz (Commissioner General for Labour Control) Gauleiter Sauckel claimed, at the beginning of 1944 before leading generals, to have brought in 13 million foreign workers into German industry in the preceding year. Actually it was a matter of a genuine increase of barely one million. The mistake of this statement arose in that he did not consider the reflux abroad of foreign workers, and the transfers of workers from factory to factory were entered as genuine intake, thus, errors which are impossible in an overall primary statistical calculation.

The Statistische Reichsamt was able to correct similar mistakes in connection with statistics relating to the employment of German women by means of the labour returns, which arose on the basis of the mistakes in the labour book statistics to the amount of over one million. In this way it remains the indisputable merit of the labour returns that they have reduced exaggerated conceptions of the position and possibilities of employment of workers to the true proportions and have worked against unfounded optimism in the strongest way.

#### Collaborators in the Labour Returns.

- 1) Dr. KURT FIEDLER. Director of the special department:  
KRIEGSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE -  
KRAEFTEBILANZ

(Labour Returns connected with the war economy).

- 2) Dipl.-KAUFMANN SOEDER - Scientific assistant.
- 3) Dr. HERMANN HENNIG. Specialist for labour returns in industrial economy (connected with INDUSTRIEBERICHTERSTATTUNG). Deals with regional organisations.
- 4) Dr. WILHELM HEINSOHN. Compiler of labour returns for artisans.
- 5) AMMANN HERMANN HEIN. Successor of Dr. HEINSOHN as compiler of labour returns for artisans.
- 6) OB.-INSPEKTOR MUENICKEL.
- 7) REG.-INSPEKTOR POSER. Compiler of labour returns for agriculture.
- 8) OB.-INSPEKTOR MICHALSKI. Group director of the ARBEITSGRUPPE KRAEFFTEBILANZ (Working Group for Labour Returns).
- 9) Mrs. APT. ) Sub-group directors in the GRUPPE
- 10) Mr. SCHIAN. ) KRAEFFTEBILANZ (Group for Labour
- 11) Mr. NITZSCHE.) for all work on hand. Returns).

Collaboration of the ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTSWESSEN (MB) (Mechanical Reporting System) and the STATISTISCHE REICHSAMT.

The ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTSWESSEN and the STATISTISCHE REICHSAMT worked together in two branches of statistics, namely in the branch of INDUSTRIEBERICHTERSTATTUNG (industrial reporting) and labour returns connected with war economy (KREIGSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE KRAEFFTEBILANZ).

- 1) Collaboration in the branch of industry reporting.

The ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTSWESSEN with its connected statistical departments of the RUESTUNGSINSPEKTIONEN (Armaments Inspectorates) worked

on the personal report of about 9,000 industrial concerns developed by the Supreme Command of the WEHRMACHT (OKW). The ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN then expanded the content of the PERSONALMELDUNG (personal report) (questions asked) and extended the PERSONALMELDUNG to all industrial enterprises. As a result the necessity arose of amalgamating the expanded PERSONALMELDUNG with the INDUSTRIEBERICHTERSTATTUNG. So the PERSONALMELDUNG and the INDUSTRIEBERICHTERSTATTUNG were merged into the BESCHAEFTIGTEN MELDUNG (Employment Report). For the INDUSTRIEBERICHTERSTATTUNG that meant a transfer from the WIRTSCHAFTSGRUPPEN (Economic Groups) attached to the REICHSGRUPPE INDUSTRIE (Reich industrial Group) (professional decentralisation) to the INDUSTRIEABTEILUNGEN (Industrial Departments) of the WIRTSCHAFTSKAMMER (Economic Chambers) likewise attached to the REICHSGRUPPE INUSTRIE (regional decentralisation). The enquiries relating to the BESCHAEFTIGTENMELDUNG were carried out henceforward by the INDUSTRIE-ABTEILUNG of the WIRTSCHAFTSKAMMERN and their mechanical preparation by the statistical departments of the corresponding Armament Inspectorates. The rough results coming from the mechanical preparation were collected together by the REICHSGRUPPE INDUSTRIE and in the ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN. The STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT again processed the final figures as overall figures (total figures) for the Reich, for the industrial branches and RUESTUNGSINSPEKTION areas. The ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN prepared the content (questioning) as well as the methodical and technical execution of the BESCHAEFTIGTENMELDUNG, but the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT collaborated in the practical and organisational evaluation of the BESCHAEFTIGTENMELDUNG. In both departments, in the ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN and in the STATISTISCHEN REICHSAMT collaboration was assured by making experts available.

2) Collaboration in the field of the labour returns.  
(KRAEFFTEBILANZ).

Content or questioning relating to the enquiries in connection with the labour returns were dealt with together by the OKW and the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT in the first war years. The order to carry out enquiries was given to the STATISTISCHE REICHSAMT by the OKW.

On the establishment of the ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN these tasks were likewise transferred to this department. The ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN since then has fixed the questions to be put in the enquiries for the labour returns on fundamental lines in general discussions with the relevant REICHSSTELLEN with considerable collaboration from the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT; it entrusted to the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT the order to collect the enquiries relating to the labour returns and eventually transmitted the results passed to it from the STATISTISCHE REICHSAMT to the relevant REICHSSTELLEN. Both ZENTRALE fuer MASCHINELLES BERICHTWESEN and the STATISTISCHE REICHSAMT have shaped and directed the function of the labour returns in continual and close collaboration of both departmental directors.

Curriculum vitae of Dr. PAUL BRAMSTEDT.

Born 22.1.1884 at HARRBERG (KRS.EUTIN, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN). 1894 to 1903. HUMANISTISCHE GYMNASIUM at EUTIN. Easter 1903, leaving examination. 1903 to 1908. Studied political sciences (economic and social sciences, sociology, philosophy and history) at the Universities of KIEL and LEIPZIG. Academic teachers:- Prof. Dr. FERDINAND TOENNIES, Prof. Dr. LUDWIG BERNHARD, . 1908 - 1909. Military service at Dresden.

- 1.11.1909. Scientific assistant in the PREUSSISCHES STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT in BERLIN.
- 1.11.1910. to 1.11.1912. Private Secretary to General DIREKTOR HEAFENER (of the firm VOIGT & HAEFFNER A.G.SPEZIALFABRIK ELEKTRO-TECHNISCHER SCHALTAPPARATE, (electrical technical switching apparatus) FRANKFURT a.M.)
1. 1.1913. Again scientific assistant in the PREUSSISCHES STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT in BERLIN .
1. 5.1914. Scientific assistant in the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT, BERLIN.
- August 1914. Western Front, October 1914 to October 1919 prisoner of war in French hands,
- 1.11.1919. Scientific assistant in the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT.
- June 1928 to end of August 1945. Departmental director in the STATISTISCHES REICHSAMT.



APPENDIX

MB.

Working Plan

Position on 1.2.1945.

Maschinelles Berichtswesen des Reichsministers fuer Ruestung und Kriegsproduktion. (Mechanical Reporting System of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production).

Amtsgruppenchef:  
(Head of Office Group)

Lt.Col. Passow.

Secretariat:

Ang.(Angestellte = Employee) Brigitte Lingk.

Ante-room:  
Ang. Edelgard Meyer.

Stellv.Amtsgruppenchef:  
(Deputy Head of Office Group).  
Lt.Col. Huebner.

Bureau Officer.  
Lieutenant Hirschfelder.

Betriebsobmann: Ang. Bergel,  
(Political Shop Steward)

Chefabteilung: MB (Chef.ABT.)  
(Head Department)

Head of dept: Major Dr. Bresser Representation of  
Enquiry room: Ang.Annelies Mueller.the Amtsgruppenchef  
Deputy: in current matters.

Group Ch/1: MB (Ch/1)  
Head of group: Maj.Dr.Bresser Directive functions.  
Enquiry room: Ang.Anneliese Mueller.

Group Ch/2:	MB (Ch/2)
Head of group:OB.Reg.Baurat	Correspondence.
Dr.Ing.Bormann	Weekly reports.
Enquiry room:Ang.Elisabeth Schubert	War diary.
Group Ch/3:	MB (Ch/3).
Head of group:Ang.Dr.V.Eckartsberg	Internal supervision
Enquiry room:Ang.Lieselotte Mark.	of time limits.
	Definition regulati-
	ons. Special econo-
	mic talks.
	Specialised library.
Section (Referat) Ch/3a:	MB (Ch/3a)
Ang.Dr.Dierfeld	Press and films.
(Detailed to MB)	Publications.
Section Ch/3b:	MB (Ch/3b)
Feldwebel Gnilka	Photography.
Department 1.	MB (1)
Head of dept:Reichsstellenleiter	Internal organisa-
Barrenstein.	tion and adminis-
	tration.
Enquiry room:Ang.Charlotte	
Klement	
Deputy:Oblt.Dr.Schulz	
Group 1/1:	MB (1/1)
Head of Group:Oblt.Dr.Schulz	Personnel and estab-
Enquiry room:Ang.Ruth.Wegner	lishment of the MB
Deputies:	organisation.Experi-
a) personnel matters:	mental work in MB.
Oschtz.Dr.Richhardt	
b) procurement and establishment	
matters: Obzahlm.Jaenert.	
Section I/1a	MB (1/1a)
Oblt.Dr. Schulz	General staff mat-
	ters.General prob-
	lems of internal
	organisation.
	Matters relating to
	officers and offi-
	cial. Decorations.

Section I/lb. Oschtz. Dr. Richhardt	MB (1/lb) Instructions, working plan. Tariff and service order system. Recruitment of staff.
Section I/lc. Oschtz. Dreher	MB (1/lc) War strength infor- mation. Personnel card indexes and surveys. Investiga- tion of personnel control in MB.
Section I/ld. Ang. Gerhartz	MB (1/ld) Matters relating to male staff.
Section I/le. Ang. Lotte Vogt	MB (1/le) Matters relating to female staff. Atten- dance lists. Leave lists. Sickness cer- tificates.
Section I/lf. Is dealt with by special section I/lb.	MB (1/lf) Staff matters rela- ting to N.C.O.s and men.
Section I/lg. Ang. Bartel	MB (1/lg) Procurement - Dis- tribution of orders.
Section I/lh. Ang. Luise Vogt	MB (1/lh) Procurement. Examina- tion of accounts.
Section I/li. Obzahlm. Jaehnert	MB (1/li) Accountant for establishment.
Group I/2 Head of group: Reichsstellenleiter Barrenstein Enquiry room: Ang. Charlotte Klement. Deputy: Stabsintendant Paulick.	MB (1/2) Internal administrat- ion of Amtsgruppe MB.