

KV 2/94 – KV 2/99

Dr. Walter Schellenberg

Survey

Part II

It has to be noticed, that currently we have to deal with the conversion of the German military Abwehr into the S.S. controlled Amt VI Mil. Amt. The triggering event was the defection of the couple Vermehren to the British in Istanbul, on 7-8 February 1944. Hitler responded (on 12 February) furiously and ordered:- that from now-on the Abwehr should become headed by the R.S.H.A. Admiral Canaris was instantly dismissed, and a merging period being initiated. The big blow was the failed assassination attempt on Hitler, on 20 July 1944. Because the Abwehr was heavily involved in this plot against Hitler, its leadership was liquidated. Now considering my **current ethic dilemma**: We encounter quite trustworthy statements. Though, some men have been, in a period of their lives, more or less, engaged in atrocities; or at least being responsible for it. For whatever reasons, they (often) have become involved in so-called “Einsatz-Gruppen” in Russia. Their doings have been well documented. Though, my problem:- they constitute, quite often, the only reliable source of eyewitnesses information; in the fields we are currently dealing with. Astonishing, quite many of these men were in the possession of an University Degree and often received a PhD as well; we have to bear this always in mind. Which, by the way, being much easier - than to step-down at crucial moments in life; of which’s implications they might not have been aware of, when it actually occurred. Albeit, that the sphere in which it all happened - should have triggered deep moral considerations. Ignorance? Are they the only ones to be blamed? On the other hand, there were also (some) personalities concerned in this bleak environment, whom, for what ever circumstance, weren’t directly involved in crimes against humanity; for instance:- Schellenberg and Wirsing; but they bore, nevertheless, responsibility. Therefore: our engagement - in unrevealing dark aspects of history - does still make sense.

What has been reproduced, is my selection, out-off the huge pile of pages!

I have added, on places where, in my perception, it is necessary comments. These are always recognisable by, for instance: (xxx) or (AOB, xxx); albeit that sometimes I use red or green text colours.

Please notice: that it concerns always my selections out of the piles of materials, added with what I suppose is necessary to understand the time-frame, and/or the circumstances better.

By Arthur O. Bauer

STATEMENT BY SCHELLENBERG RE WOLFF.

At the end of March, the Gruppenleiter VI D laid before me an intelligence teleprint, received in Amt VI, which stated that through a contact of DOLLMANN, via an Italian, Graf PARILLI, a contact to DULLES existed. WOLFF intended to go to Switzerland, in order to conduct talks with DULLES. I enquired of KALTENBRUNNER whether he knew anything about these events. I requested him to talk the matter over with HIMMLER, as perhaps WOLFF's intentions were known in that quarter. In this case also nothing was known. KALTENBRUNNER had orders from HIMMLER to telephone, immediately, to WOLFF. As it later transpired, WOLFF was already under way and could no longer be reached. WOLFF and HARSTEN were ordered, by W/T, to Berlin. Talks took place in an evacuation centre of KALTENBRUNNER's, near Schleiz, in a farm house on the Autobahn. I had collected STEINLE of VI B and PAETZGEN VI D, who were stationed in the area in their evacuation posts. WOLFF explained in a long statement what he had discussed with DULLES, and it transpired that he had already spoken with DULLES on two occasions. According to what he said, his motive was at long last to build a bridge to the West. The Upper Italian zone offered good grounds for carrying out such talks, since in the event of a surrender without fighting, the entire maintenance of order, in this particular industrial area, would also be of importance to the Western Powers (Communists and Partisans). Thus, it might be possible under these circumstances for the German troops to retain their weapons, and thereby become a type of commissioned Police Force of the Western Powers. The most important point of WOLFF's talk concerned myself. At the beginning of his discussion with DULLES WOLFF declared that he had not come forward as a traitor, but on the other hand he did not come with plenary powers; he said he came as an SS-Fuehrer, who was seeking a contact. In so doing WOLFF had uselessly utilised, and without effect, one of my most important contacts, whom I had been watching over and nursing ever since 1942, since DULLES could not even begin to discuss capitulation or peace with a person who was not a fully fledged plenipotentiary. The results of the talks, as reported by WOLFF, were relatively negative; he would have to attempt to get his position legalised subsequently, and obtain full powers for any fresh talks conducted. He could not say, however, even under these conditions whether DULLES would be able to talk with him, since in the preliminary conversations the point was not raised. The only thing that remained for me to do in this situation was to demand that I should be included, in good time, in any future plans of WOLFF. KALTENBRUNNER could not get on at all with WOLFF, the Graefin WESTRAP must have played some role in this respect. He, therefore, wanted to request HIMMLER to dismiss WOLFF. He told WOLFF that he intended to send one of his acquaintances, one Oberf. MUEHLMANN, with him to Italy, so that he would be informed more quickly, in future, about important political questions of this nature. This was of course a clear rebuff to WOLFF and HARSTER. KALTENBRUNNER then went with WOLFF to HIMMLER. The latter was not in agreement with the step taken by WOLFF, but did not drop him in an out of hand manner, but gave KALTENBRUNNER instructions to utilise his good connections with HITLER and for WOLFF to be given some sort of subsequent cover for his actions. I do not know the precise outcome. I only saw KALTENBRUNNER a few days later; I believe that, in the meantime he had been to the south. He said he had spoken with the Fuehrer and that matters had gone well for WOLFF: it was not clearly stated how the matter was terminated. At any rate HITLER had not taken a serious view and had even dictated a few sentences to HEWEL, saying how he wished future cases of this nature dealt with. In spite of my efforts to obtain closer details from KALTENBRUNNER, so as to draw a clear picture of the WOLFF affair for myself, I did not succeed.

At the end of March (1945), the Gruppenleiter VI D laid before me an intelligence teleprint (Fernschreiben), received in Amt VI, which stated that through a contact of Dollmann, via an Italian, Graf Parilli, a contact to Dulles existed. (AOB, during the course of April 1945, several Amt VI members have had contacts with Dulles and or his representatives, all sanctioned by Allen Dulles) (SS-Brigadeführer*)(SS-General) Wolff intended to go to Switzerland, in order to conduct talks with Dulles. I enquired to go to Switzerland, in order to conduct talks with Dulles. I enquired Kaltenbrunner whether he knew anything about these events. I requested him to talk the matter with Himmler, as perhaps Wolff's intentions were known in that quarter, In this case also nothing was known. Kaltenbrunner had orders from Himmler to telephone, immediately, to Wolff. (AOB, all curious, as on behalf of Himmler all sorts of communications existed some even from about mid 1944 onwards) As it later transpired, Wolff was already under way and no longer could be reached. Wolff and Harster were ordered, by W/T to Berlin. Talks took place in an evacuation centre of Kaltenbrunner's near Schleiz, in a farm house on the Autobahn. I had collected Steimle (should later also be dealt with) of Amt VI B and Paeffgen VI D, who were stationed in the area in their evacuation posts. Wolff explained in a long statement that he had discussed with Dulles, and it transpired that he had already with Dulles on two occasions. According to he said, his motive was at long last to build a bridge to the West. The Upper Italian zone offered good grounds for carrying out such talks, since in the event of surrender without fighting, the entire maintenance of order, in this particular industrial area, would also be of importance to the Western Powers (Communists and Partisans). Thus, it might be possible under these circumstances for the German troops to retain their weapons, and thereby become a type of commissioned Police Force of the Western Powers. The most important point of Wolff talk concerned myself. At the beginning of his discussion with Dulles Wolff declared that had not come forward as a traitor, but on the other hand he did not come with plenary powers; he said he came as an SS-Führer, who was seeking contact, one of my first important contacts, whom I had been watching over and nursing ever since 1942, since Dulles could not even begin to discuss capitulation or peace with a person who was not a fully fledged plenipotentiary. The results of the talks, as reported by Wolff, were relatively negative; he would have to attempt to get his position legalised subsequently, and obtain full powers for any fresh talks conducted. He could not say, however, even under these conditions whether Dulles would be able to talk with him, since in the preliminary conversations the point was not raised. The only thing that remained for me to do in this situation was to demand that I should be included, in good time (gerechter Zeit), in any future plans of Wolff. Kaltenbrunner could not get on at all with Wolff, the Graefin Westrap must have played some role in this respect. He, therefore, wanted to request Himmler to dismiss Wolff. He told Wolff that he intended to send one of his acquaintances, one Oberführer Muehlmann, with him to Italy, so that he would be informed more quickly, in future, about important political questions of this nature. This was of course a clear rebuff to Wolff and Harster. Kaltenbrunner then went with Wolff to Himmler. The latter was not in agreement with the steps taken by Wolff, but did not drop him in an out of hand manner, but gave Kaltenbrunner instructions to utilise his good connections with Hitler and for Wolff to be given some sort of subsequent cover for his actions. I did not know the exact outcome. I only saw Kaltenbrunner a few days later; I believe that, in the meantime he had been to the south. He said he had spoken with the Führer (Hitler) and that matter was terminated, At any rate Hitler had not taken a serious view and had even dictated a few sentences to Walter Hewel (Nazi Diplomat). Saying how he wished future cases of this nature dealt with. In spite of my efforts to obtain closer details from Kaltenbrunner, so as to draw a clear picture of the Wolff affair, myself, I did not succeed. (AOB, it ended up that the German troops surrendered in Northern Italy. It is most likely, that in the preamble of agreement, Wolff was secured some form of freedom of process; he nevertheless underwent legal processes. This cover lacked fully after Dulles' retirement from office in Washington. And the Bundesrepublik started legal procedures against Karl Friedrich Otto Wolff. After Dulles' retirement from the US Government, he was though brought to some kind of justice, but by far not as harsh as it would have been without Dulles' foregoing protection)

[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Wolff_\(SS-Mitglied\)](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Wolff_(SS-Mitglied))

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Wolff

* Wolff possessed the same rank as has had Walter Schellenberg



VIII. Deciphering

S. 85590

24. The deciphering department of the OKW under Colonel KETTLER supplied daily great quantities of deciphered messages which were called ever since the time of Ludendorff "V.N." (Verlässliche Nachrichten). They were printed on thin white paper and carried a broad red edge. SCHELLENBERG had established relations with the deciphering department of the OKW in 1942, because he wanted to exploit the experiences of the Wehrmacht both in "W/T Abwehr" as also in the development of German coding "methods" for his own use. SCHELLENBERG made very early contact with General FELLGIEBEL, chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as General THIELE, department chief under FELLGIEBEL. Both these men were killed in connection with the 20th July. SCHELLENBERG's relations with THIELE were very good. They had come close to one another through their joint work in the Board of Directors of the Standard Electric company (the former American Holding company). THIELE after the arrest of FELLGIEBEL had become FELLGIEBEL's successor. In this capacity he wanted to bring a long discussed plan to fruition, i.e. unite all deciphering services of the Reich in one hand and to put them at the exclusive disposal of the Geheime Meldedienst for systematic interpretation and use.

25. Apart from the German Foreign Office which possessed an extensive deciphering service, the Forschungsamt was above all the organisation which had not only an extensive - one could almost say 100% - telephone monitoring service, but also a very large deciphering department. It also monitored normal broadcast services. (This was done too by the Foreign Office, the Propaganda Ministry and the OKW!) The Forschungsamt also embraced an extensive press and publication interpretation department as well as one of the best existing archives. SCHELLENBERG maintains that apart from the obvious reasons of saving personnel and other grounds of economy, the Amt Ausland together with the deciphering department of the Forschungsamt, was really a domain of the Geheime Meldedienst. SCHELLENBERG also saw that there was no need for the telephone monitoring service to be independent, but that it really belonged to the domain of Amt IV. Since 1942 SCHELLENBERG insisted that HIMMLER should speak with GOERING who had reserved the Forschungsamt for himself as his purely personal field of work and to insist that he (SCHELLENBERG) should take the Forschungsamt over.

26. HIMMLER always refused this. He declared that GOERING would never do it as he believed that he would thereby make him (HIMMLER) and the SS too strong. Another very strange argument was added to this: HIMMLER said GOERING should bear vis a vis Hitler the responsibility for all telephone monitoring, for if he HIMMLER, would do this Hitler might suddenly conceive the idea that his own telephone conversations were overheard. SCHELLENBERG thereupon acted independently. He needed the results both of the Forschungsamt as a whole and of the work of the deciphering department of the OKW. At the beginning of 1943 SCHELLENBERG had come to a working agreement with Secretary of State KOERNER and at the end of 1944 KOERNER was prepared to concede to SCHELLENBERG the Forschungsamt with the exception of the telephone monitoring, which since the middle of 1944 belonged to Amt IV. SANDBERGER and RAPP began in February 1945 to take the Forschungsamt over. Owing to the general development of the situation, however, this move did not take practical shape. After the arrest of THIELE, a general, whose name SCHELLENBERG has forgotten, was appointed chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen. A General called GIMMLER was put in charge of the Amtsgruppe (deciphering and W/T Abwehr). Colonel KETTLER during the time when THIELE was in prison had continued to seek close contact with SCHELLENBERG. SCHELLENBERG put KETTLER in touch with Dr. SCHMITZ who entered and remained in close relationship with him. KETTLER modelled his evacuation measures on those of SCHELLENBERG because he had always thought, just as GIMMLER had done, that SCHELLENBERG by taking over the Forschungsamt would acquire decisive influence over the deciphering department.

27. The evacuation measure of this very important department did not run smoothly however. The much needed material remained for weeks packed in cases

Deciphering.

24. The deciphering of the OKW under Obst. Kettler supplied daily great quantities of deciphered messages which were called ever since the time of Ludendorff "V.N" (Verlässliche Nachrichten). They were printed on tin white paper carried a broad red edge. Schellenberg had established relations with the deciphering department of the OKW in 1942, because he wanted to exploit the experiences of the Wehrmacht both in "W/T" Abwehr as also in the development of German coding "methods" (OKW/Chi) for his own use. Schellenberg made very early contact with General Fellgiebel, chief of Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as General Thiele, department chief under Fellgiebel. Both these men were killed in connection with 20th July (1944). Schellenberg's relations with Thiele was very good. They had come close to one another through their joint work in the Board of Directors of the Standard Elektrik (Lorenz) (the former American I.I.T. Holding company). Thiele after the arrest of Fellgiebel had become Fellgiebel's successor. In this capacity he wanted to bring a long discussed plan to fruition, i.e. unite all deciphering services of the Reich in one hand and to put them at the exclusive disposal of the Geheime Meldedienst for systematic interpretation and use. (AOB, this only partially materialised, because OKW/Chi lasted to exist and, not discussed, but the Kriegsmarine B-Dienst still remained an entity).

25. Apart from the German Foreign Office (Auswärtigesamt) which possessed an extensive deciphering service, the Forschungsamt (Herman Goering's) was above all the organisation which had not only an extensive – one could almost say – 100% - telephone monitoring service, but also a very large deciphering department. It also monitored normal broadcast services. (This was done too by the Foreign Office (A.A.), Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry and the OKW!) The Forschungsamt also embraced an extensive press and publication interpretation detachment as well as one of the best existing archives. (AOB, Goering's Forschungsamt published their reports (summaries) on 'brown paper' sheets and were also known as "braune Blätter") Schellenberg maintains that apart from the obvious reasons of saving personnel and other grounds of economy, the Amt Ausland together with the deciphering department of the Forschungsamt, was really a domain of the Geheime Meldedienst. (AOB, considering Goering's character, this never could be brought to fruition). Schellenberg also saw that there was no need for the telephone monitoring service to be independent, but that it really belonged to the domain of Amt VI. Since 1942 Schellenberg insisted that Himmler should speak with Goering who had reserved the Forschungsamt for himself as his purely personal field as his purely personal field of work and to insist that he (Schellenberg) should take the Forschungsamt over.(?)

26. Himmler always refused this. He declared that Goering would never do it as he believed he would thereby make him (Himmler) and the SS too strong (powerful). Another very strange argument was added to this: Himmler said Goering should bear vis a vis Hitler responsibility for all telephone monitoring, for if Himmler, would do this Hitler might suddenly conceive the idea that his own telephone were overheard. Schellenberg thereupon acted independently. He needed the results both of the Forschungsamt as a whole and of the work of the deciphering of the OKW (OKW/Chi). At the beginning of 1943 Schellenberg had come to a working agreement with Secretary of State (which actually differs from the Anglo-Saxon Secretary of State) (Paul) Koerner and at the end of 1944 belonged to Amt IV (not Mil Amt?). Sandberger and Rapp began in 1945 to take the Forschungsamt over Owing to the general of the situation, however, this move did not take practical shape. After the arrest of Thiele, as general, whose name Schellenberg has forgotten, was appointed chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (Praun?) A General called Gimmler was put in charge of the Amtsgruppe (deciphering and W/T Abwehr). Obst. Kettler during the time when Thiele was in prison had continued to seek close contact with Schellenberg. Schellenberg put Kettler in touch with Dr. Schmitz who entered and remained in close relationship with him. Kettler modelled his evacuation measures on those of Schellenberg because he had always thought, just as Gimmler had done, that Schellenberg by taking over the Forschungsamt would acquire decisive influence over the deciphering departments.

27. The evacuation measure (out off Berlin towards the South) of this very important department did not run smoothly however. The much needed material remained for weeks packed in cases. Rest are scattered materials



IX. "Irreführung" (Deception)

29. This subject was dealt with in Amt VI by a special department created by SCHELLENBERG called "Mil.i" which was placed under ~~Kapitaen~~ von BECHTOLSHEIM. During the months before the invasion the interest of the "Geheime Meldedienst" centered quite naturally on the enemy plans connected with the impending invasion. In co-operation with the different General Staffs, SCHELLENBERG arranged for all reports concerning invasion (derived from agents, the Press, the deciphering department, W/T double agents and other sources) to be entered graphically in special charts. By means of varying colour affects it was possible to fix optically intervallic intensification respectively obscuration of space and time factors. SCHELLENBERG recognised in some of these fluctuations, the planned work of the enemy's secret services. At first these findings only raised the question of how to tighten the control and the direction of all Amt VI and Mil Amt connections. SCHELLENBERG made this very question the subject of constant instructions to all department chiefs.

"Irreführung" (Deception)

29. This subject was dealt with in Amt VI by a special department by Schellenberg called "Mil.i." special (enemy) deception department placed under Kapt. Von Bechtolsheim. During the months before the invasion the interest of the "Geheime Meldedienst" centred quite naturally on the enemy plans connected with the impending invasion. In cooperation with the different General Staffs, Schellenberg arranged for all reports concerning invasion (derived from agents, the Press, the deciphering department, W/T double agents and other sources) to be entered graphically in special charts. By means of varying colour effects it was possible to fix optically intervallic intensification respectively obscuration of space and time factors. Schellenberg recognised in some of these fluctuations the planned work of the enemy's secret services. At first these findings only raised the question of how to tighten the control and the direction of all Amt VI and Mil Amt connections. Schellenberg made this very question the subject of constant instructions to all department chiefs.

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓


The Police attachés were all united in an "Attache group". This group was under the immediate orders of KALTENBRUNNER and was commanded by SS Standartenführer Dr. ZINDER.

39. These Police attachés were from SCHELLENBERG's point of view of little importance regarding Amt VI or Mil Amt work because they were "marked" officers bearing the onus of Gestapo activities and therefore in most cases automatically shunned by the other members of the mission. In the whole scheme they were however important to SCHELLENBERG because the representatives of Amt VI had been by an arrangement with the German Foreign Office conceded the right to use the special so-called green envelope of the courier post which enjoyed diplomatic rights. In this arrangement it was stated that the Police attache is responsible to his chief of mission regarding the activity of all agents and representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS in every country. The Police attachés, and above all MUELLER, tried to derive from the above mentioned stipulation a right to act as superiors. They never succeeded in this, though it led to continuous internal fights and intrigues. The attachés themselves were all officials who had originated from the police career, as well as personal proteges of MUELLER who were given good jobs as awards for special deeds or for other reasons. Not one of these police attachés was suited in the sense of a really far sighted political intelligence service. The only really bright ones were WINZER whose intelligence was, however, outweighed by grave deficiencies of character, and Dr. HOFFMANN, a legal man who did not originate from the Police. SCHELLENBERG in order to secure influence on these Police attachés, succeeded in obtaining the exclusive authority for the allocation of foreign exchange. This right proved to be an important counter-weight against MUELLER's influence. SCHELLENBERG in the end only used the Police attachés as letter boxes and as a postal service. Gradually they themselves tried to join SCHELLENBERG's work which he says "became increasingly successful".

The Police attachés were all united in an "Attache group". This group was under the immediate orders of Kaltenbrunner and was commanded by SS Standartenführer Dr. Zinder.

39. These police attachés were from Schellenberg's point of view of little importance regarding Amt VI or Mil Amt (foreign military espionage) work because they were "marked" officers bearing onus of Gestapo (Stapo) activities and therefore in most cases automatically shunned by other members of the mission. In the whole scheme they were, however, important to Schellenberg because the representatives of Amt VI had been by an arrangement with the German Foreign Office (Auswärtigesamt) concede the right to use the special so-called green envelope of the courier post which enjoyed diplomatic rights. In this arrangement it was stated that the Police attaché is responsible to this chief of mission regarding the activity of all agents and representatives of the Reichsführer SS (Himmler) in every country. The Police attachés, and above all (Gestapo) Müller (Amt IV), tried to derive from the above mentioned stipulation a right to act as their superiors. (AOB, their existed a constant competence battle between Müller and Schellenberg) They never succeeded in this, though it led to continuous internal fights and intrigues. The attachés themselves were all officials who had originated from the police career, as well as personal protégés of Müller who were given good jobs as afterwards for special deeds or for other reasons. Not one of these police attachés was suited in the sense of a really far sighted political intelligence service. The only really bright ones were Winzer whose intelligence was, however, outweighed by grave deficiencies of character, and Dr. Hoffmann, a legal man who did not originate from the Police. Schellenberg in order to secure influence on these Police attachés as letter boxes and as a postal service. (digesting the text lines, I get the impression, that Schellenberg is not speaking, but someone unknown gradually created it) Gradually they themselves tried to join Schellenberg's work which he says "became increasingly successful".

↓



Amt VI collaboration with the Japanese.

42. The officers of Amt VI dealing with Japan were:

Professor Dr. Classen Dr. Kirfel
Dr. Leo Dr. Weirauch (till the end 1944)

And a number of other experts whose names Schellenberg has forgotten,

Mil. Amt officers dealing with Japan were:

Obst Ohletz (he operated via Karl-Heinz Kraemer in Stockholm who was in touch with Onodera the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm)

Two naval officers whose names Schellenberg does not remember.

Hptm. Plage, who ran an office in Berlin (travel bureau or something similar) under the cover of which the daily exchange of intelligence took place with Japanese officers.

Several other expert, whose names Schellenberg is not familiar with, collaborated in this domain.

Dr, Wirsing (also good friend with Karl-Heinz Kraemer in Stockholm) as another collaborator of Amt VI with the Japanese intelligence regarding Japan, whilst Obstlt. Freund, together with an officer whose name Schellenberg has forgotten, covered the field of counter espionage.

43. The names of Japanese officers in the collaboration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and Schellenberg's Amt are as follows.


Oshima

Kawahara - First Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, an impenetrable and difficult man who was the real political observer representing Tokio.

Komatsu - Major - general and military Attaché. Typical army officer who dealt with everything in a crude military way and was blindly devoted to Oshima, Komatsu's assistants were:-

a) Otani. He had a good command of Russian and was the expert for Russia. An able intelligence officer and in Schellenberg's view on of the best the Japanese had in Germany.

(AOB, the following materials are bits and pieces of no relevance, like on Ritter (Dr. Ranzau), Celery, Snow and other non-related matters; did they need to store rubbish?)



Amt VI/Mil Amt Organisation plan

While engaged in this mission, he was summoned to a conference with WANECK and SKORZENY. On 27 Apr 45 WANECK showed SANDBERGER a signed directive from KALTENBRUNNER to the effect that KALTENBRUNNER was personally taking over the reorganization of the secret intelligence service. WANECK was appointed head of Gruppe B, C, D, E, G, and of Mil B, C, and F; SKORZENY was appointed head of Gruppe F, S, and Mil D, E, and G. Departments A, Wi, T, and Mil A were dissolved.

While engaged in this mission ([April 1945](#)), he ([Sandberger](#)) was summoned to a conference with Waneck and Skorzeny. On 27 Apr 45 Waneck showed Sandberger a signed directive from Kaltenbrunner to the effect that Kaltenbrunner was personally taking over the reorganization of the secret intelligence service. Waneck was appointed head of ([Amt VI](#)) Gruppe B,C,D,E,G and of Mil ([Amt](#)) D,E, and G. Departments A, Wi, T and Mil A were dissolved.

(AOB, for me it is a bit strange to notice that both Amt VI and Mil Amt still operated, whereas I supposed that Mil Amt succeeded Amt VI, which, when you take a closer look at the Organisation scheme that Sandberger headed both Mil Amt A, where he was designated Sdf. Dr Sandberger and for Amt VI A/Kult Dr. Sandberger. I cannot imagine how this would have worked in parallel with the same people. However, curious it is)

WANECK ordered SANDBERGER to discharge and send home most of the personnel of Amt VI. STEIMLE, PAEFFGEN, MEISSNER, and SCHUBACH, the deputy of RAPP who was somewhere in the North, were to report to WANECK; LASSIG, KRUEGER, SIMON, and Maj PORETSCHKIN were to report to SKORZENY.

Waneck ordered Sandberger to discharge and send home most of the personnel of Amt Vi. Steimle, Paeffgen, Meissner? And Schuhbach, the deputy of Rapp who was somewhere in the North were to report to Waneck; Lassig, Krueger, Simon and Major Poretschkin ([Nachrichten Reg. 506](#)) were to report to Skorzeny. ([Skorzeny surrendered in the "Alpenfestung"](#))



131 3/38 Gp.789 P. & C. 1-4

PF 600,561.

"FILE CLOSED"

HISTORICAL

S C H E L L E N B E R G DR. WALTER.

VOLUME 3.

10124

P.F. 600,561. SUPP. VOL.

ee Also

Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date
P.A.		24 JUL 1951	SJ/CAS	23.2.77	
M		24 JUL 1951	PA		
RR		24 JUL 1951	Kloetz	9 MAY 1991	
		24 SEP 1951	PA	10 MAY 1991	
		24 JUL 1953	HICS		
		24 JUL 1953	PA		
		16 AUG 1953			
		16 MAY 1957			
AOE		3 OCT 1957			
ABE					
ACE					

HISTORICAL

KV 2/96

LIMITED CIRCULATION

Please refer to S. Form 239 before sending this file to another Section.

S. Form 238D

FILE HELD BY

RMS/X

S. 238D Edn. 1

Y FILE

THIS FILE WHEN IN TRANSIT MUST BE IN A CLOSED ENVELOPE, ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO THE OFFICER.

HELD by R. 5 A

The file should be passed for P.A. to R.5.

Transit slips in respect of this file should always be forwarded to R.5.

PF 600,561.

"FILE CLOSED"

VOLUME 3.

KV 2/96
Schellenberg Dr. Walter
PF 600561

Please notice the red stamps indicating the times that this file had been studied; which runs from 1958 up to May 1997

KV 2/96-1, page 18

20.7.45. Cable from 12th A.G. re Irene SCHELLENBERG 101a.

20.7.45 Cable from 12th Army Group re Irene Schellenberg (the name of Schellenberg's wife)

KV 2/96-1, page 19

23.7.45. From V.F.7. for interrogation of SCHELLENBERG re the KATYN affair. 111a.

23.7.45 From V.F.7. for interrogation of Schellenberg re the Katyn affair.

(AOB, in Katyn, the Russians murdered ca. 10,000 Polish PoW Officers! The Germans discovered this site near Smolensk and uncovered and documented what was, under the circumstances, possible. At the Nürnberg tribunal, this subject was not part of the prosecutions. Only after Perestroika, late 1980s and early 1990s the Russians started peu à peu to admit that atrocities had once taken place)

Copy in PF 276/67 Y Box 6206.

155a

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

To: Lt.-Col. Stinson.

From: Capt. Oughton.

With reference to Mr. Ferguson's memorandum of 20.7.45., SCHELLENBERG has supplied the following information:-

1. MUSY

PF 276/67 - Y Box 6206.

SCHELLENBERG first met MUSY in Autumn 1944, when MUSY came to Germany on an invitation of HIMMLER, which, SCHELLENBERG thinks, probably resulted from an initial overture by MUSY. MUSY had first met HIMMLER in 1940 or 1941.

MUSY was an 'Alt Bundesrat' in the Swiss Government, a leading figure in Swiss political life, a Catholic conservative and a strong opponent of Communism. SCHELLENBERG believes he is over 70 years of age.

He arrived in Berlin in his own car, driven by his younger son, BENOIS, and both, as guests of HIMMLER were accorded special attention. SCHELLENBERG travelled with him to Breslau where they joined HIMMLER's special train: he formed the conclusion from conversations during the journey that he and MUSY were in fundamental agreement, especially concerning Germany's position, and that MUSY might exercise a beneficial influence on HIMMLER, who was susceptible to his temperament and his mature years.

During this and subsequent visits, MUSY was primarily interested in the solution of humanitarian questions - the Jews, the release of French women from Camp Ravensbrueck, etc. SCHELLENBERG helped him to the best of his ability with HIMMLER, whilst KALTENBRUNNER's influence was always thrown on the other scale. Hstuf. GOERING of SCHELLENBERG's staff and MUSY's son took part in the discussions. MUSY also endeavoured to persuade HIMMLER, discreetly, of the futility of further resistance by the German armed forces.

The prime question in which MUSY was interested was the future of the Jews in Germany. MUSY was empowered to act for the Joint Jewish Rabbis Organisation of America and Canada (representative in Switzerland: Dr. STERNBUCH). During this visit in Autumn 1944, a settlement in principle was agreed to by HIMMLER (who also consented to the release of certain other individuals from concentration camps). All Jews interned in Germany were to be sent to Switzerland for onward transport to America. HIMMLER was anxious for a material concession in return (unaware to SCHELLENBERG he was conducting similar negotiations with the Jewish Joint Organisation about Hungarian Jews through Staf BECHER and making the same stipulation about a material concession in return) - currency which might be used to purchase vehicles - but he was eventually persuaded that the gesture in itself without return might have a better effect on world opinion.

The details were settled during seven or eight visits paid by MUSY. The most important was in January 1945 when MUSY went to Berlin and, from there, to HIMMLER's Command Post in the Black Forest (where he was commanding the Upper Rhine Army Group). Conversations took place at Wildbad and the following agreement was made between HIMMLER, MUSY and SCHELLENBERG. Every two or three weeks one trainload of 12,000 to 15,000 Jews was to be sent to Switzerland. In return MUSY guaranteed to publicise the matter in the leading North American papers as soon as the first train arrived, and the Joint Organisation deposited with him in a Swiss bank 2,000,000 Swiss francs, which were to be passed to the German government, if HIMMLER felt he needed a material counter-concession to justify his action in the face of criticism in Germany; if not, the money would be given to the Red Cross.

1. Musy

Schellenberg first met Musy in Autumn 1944, when Musy came to Germany on an invitation of Himmler, which, Schellenberg thinks, probably resulted from an initial overture by Musy ([Swiss citizen](#)). Musy first met Himmler in 1940 or 1941,

Musy was an 'Altbundesrat' in the Swiss Government, a leading figure in Swiss political life, a Catholic conservative and a strong opponent of Communism. Schellenberg believes he is over 70 years of age.

He arrived in Berlin in his own car, driven by his younger son, Benois, and both, as guests of Himmler were accorded special attention. Schellenberg travelled with him to Breslau ([now Polish Wroclaw](#)) where they joined Himmler special train: he formed the conclusion from conversations during the journey that he and Musy were in fundamental agreement, especially concerning Germany's position, and that Musy might exercise a beneficial influence on Himmler, who was susceptible to his temperament and his mature years.

During this and subsequent visits, Musy was primarily interested in the solution of humanitarian questions – the Jews, the release of French women from Camp Ravensbrück, etc. Schellenberg helped him to the best of his ability with Himmler, whilst Kaltenbrunner's influence was always, thrown on the other scale. Hauptsturmführer Goering ([a relative of Herman Goering](#)) of Schellenberg's staff and Musy's son took part in the discussions. Musy also endeavoured to persuade Himmler, discretely, of the futility of further resistance by the German armed forces.

The prime question in which Musy was interested was the future of the Jews in Germany. Musy was empowered to act for the joint Jewish Rabbis Organisation of America and Canada (representatives in Switzerland: Dr. Sternbuch). During the visit in Autumn 1944, a settlement in principle was agreed to by Himmler (who also consented to the release of certain other individuals from concentration camps). All Jews interned in Germany were to be sent to Switzerland for onward transport to America. Himmler was anxious for a material concession in return (unaware to Schellenberg he was conducting similar negotiations with the Jewish Joint Organisation about Hungarian Jews through [Standartenführer](#) Becher and making the same stipulations about a material concession in return) – currency which might be used to purchase vehicles – but he was eventually persuaded that the gesture in itself without return might have a better effect on world opinion. (AOB, [this latter notice is only very brief. In fact a complicated operation was initiated between Budapest and Jewish representatives in Turkey. The key figure was Gyorgy \(Georgy\) Gross and a wide range of aliases were used. He, a Jewish person, was finally sent \(by a special chartered aeroplane\) to Istanbul \(Istanbul\) there it ran into a failure, but Gross did not intend to return and was forced to take the train to Jerusalem; but was taken off that train by the British at Aleppo; all intriguingly documented in KV 2/130 + KV 2/131](#))(It was noticed at the SD / B.d.S. office in Budapest, where all negotiations took place, that all was directed by "Heinrich with the glasses")

The details were settled during seven or eight visits paid by Musy. The most important was in January 1945, when Musy went to Berlin and, from there, to Himmler's Command Post in the Black Forest (where he was commanding the Upper Rhine Army Group). Conversations took place at Bad Wildbad and the following agreement was made between Himmler, Musy and Schellenberg. Every two to three weeks one trainload of 12,000 to 15,000 Jews was to be sent to Switzerland. In return Musy guaranteed to publicise the matter in the leading North American papers as soon as the train arrived, and the Joint Organisation deposited with him in a Swiss bank 2,000,000 Swiss francs, which were to be passed to the German government, if Himmler felt he needed a material counter-concession to justify his action in the face of criticism in Germany; if not, the money would be given to the Red Cross.



Early in February the first train crossed the Swiss frontier carrying 12,000 Jews from Theresienstadt. MUSY carried out his part of the bargain (articles appeared in the American newspapers, notably one in the New York Times on the 8th February), but HITLER issued a personal order promising the death penalty if any more Jews were evacuated from Germany. The occasion for this was an intercepted message from a De GAULLE outpost in Spain alleging that HIMMLER was arranging the release of the Jews in return for a promise of asylum for 200 Nazi leaders in Switzerland. KALTENBRUNNER and FEGELEIN were both hostile to the scheme, as was BECHER, who pointed out that press publicity was not so important as material concessions. (It was at this time that tension between HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER on the question of their personal influence with HITLER became acute). HIMMLER refused to see MUSY again, though he continued to oppose evacuation of the camps, which was, in fact, saving the Jews in another way.

In early April MUSY again visited Berlin. He was commissioned to pass to the Allies as HIMMLER's spokesman the German intention not to evacuate camps but to hand them over through special representatives. MUSY returned to Switzerland and SCHELLENBERG was notified by radio that the message had been passed to Washington. When, despite this, camps were evacuated, MUSY returned to Berlin to get SCHELLENBERG to intervene; SCHELLENBERG persuaded HIMMLER to issue counter-orders, which did have some effect (HIMMLER had already had some camps evacuated and KALTENBRUNNER was working on the orders of HITLER that all camps should be evacuated). MUSY's son went to Theresienstadt to look after some Jewish families who had been released by HIMMLER and was prevented by the military situation from returning to Switzerland. He helped Hstuf. GOERING and representatives of the Swedish Red Cross to rescue individuals from the "Ravensbrueck" and "Neuengamme" camps, going eventually to Sweden, thanks to the good offices of Count BERNADOTTE, whence he wished to return to Switzerland.

SCHELLENBERG and MUSY dealt with the following other matters during MUSY's various visits.

- a. The release of a large number of individuals from camps. Not all the releases authorised by HIMMLER were achieved because of practical difficulties and ill-will on the part of the departments concerned.
- b. An ambitious scheme to entreat an armistice of several days from the Western Powers during which all persons imprisoned in occupied territory and Jews would be handed over to them. SCHELLENBERG was of the opinion that such an offer could hardly be refused and would have such an effect on the morale of fighting troops that compromise talks might be possible. HIMMLER would have done this if he could have been sure of the co-operation of a man like KALTENBRUNNER, but his overtures to KALTENBRUNNER were rebuffed. The question of preventing opposition by HITLER had been discussed between SCHELLENBERG and MUSY, and MUSY had said: "HIMMLER should be ready for the last consequences. HITLER could not be described as normal".
- c. MUSY asked for the release of HERRIOT, an old friend of his, to resume his place in the French government. MUSY thought England would be interested in this as a counterpoise to De GAULLE and that, if HERRIOT were allowed to escape, it might give an opening for talks with England to end the war. KALTENBRUNNER declined HIMMLER's request for the release of HERRIOT, describing SCHELLENBERG as an idiot.
(MASSON, some time earlier, made a similar request for the release of REYNAUD: SCHELLENBERG tried, but failed).
- d. The release from a Labour Camp of the nephew of the Papal Nuncio in Berne, BERNADINI, was authorised by SCHELLENBERG on his own responsibility.
- e. The release of Polish women from "Ravensbrueck", eventually authorised by HIMMLER, but too late.

Early in February the first train crossed the Swiss frontier carrying 12,000 Jews from Theresienstadt. Musy carried out this part of the bargain (articles appeared in the American newspapers, notably one in the New York Times on the 8th February (45)), but Hitler issued a personal order promising the death penalty of any more Jews were evacuated from Germany. The occasion for this was an intercepted message from a De Gaulle outpost in Spain alleging that Himmler was arranging the Jews in return for a promise of asylum for 200 Nazi leaders in Switzerland. Kaltenbrunner and Fegelein (the husband of Eva Braun's sister) were both hostile to the scheme, as was Becher, who pointed out that the press publicity was not so important as material concessions. (It was at this time that tension between Himmler and Kaltenbrunner on the question of their personal influence with Hitler became acute). Himmler refused to see Musy again, though he continued to oppose evacuation of the camps, which was, in fact, saving the Jews in another way.

In early April (45) Musy again visited Berlin. He was commissioned to pass to the Allies as Himmler's spokesman the German intention not to evacuate camps but to hand them over through special representatives. Musy returned to Switzerland and Schellenberg was noticed by radio that the message had been passed to Washington. When, despite this, camps were evacuated, Musy returned to Berlin to get Schellenberg to intervene: Schellenberg persuaded Himmler to issue counter-orders, which did have some effect (Getapo) Müller had already had some camps evacuated and Kaltenbrunner was working on the orders of Hitler that all camps should be evacuated). Musy's son went to Theresienstadt (always intended to be the camp for internees, who might once be exchanged abroad) to look after some Jewish families who had been released by Himmler and was prevented by the military situation from returning to Switzerland. He helped Hauptsturmführer Goering and representatives to the Swedish Red Cross to rescue individuals from the "Ravensbrück" and "Neuengamme" camps, going eventually to Sweden, thanks to the good offices of Count Bernadotte, whence he wished to return to Switzerland.

- Schellenberg and Musy dealt with the following other matters during Musy's various visits.
- The release of a large number of individuals from camps. Not all the releases authorised by Himmler were achieved because of particular difficulties and ill-will on the part of the (German) department concerned.
 - An ambitious scheme to treat an armistice of several days from the Western Powers during which all persons imprisoned in occupied territory and Jews would be handed over to them. Schellenberg was of the opinion that such an offer could hardly be refused and would have such an effect on the moral of the fighting troops that compromise talks might be possible. Himmler would have done this if he could have been sure of the cooperation of a man like Kaltenbrunner, but his overtures to Kaltenbrunner were rebuffed. The question of preventing opposition by Hitler had been discussed between Schellenberg and Musy, and Musy had said: "Himmler should be ready for the last consequences. Hitler could not be described as normal" (AOB, all Schellenberg's commitments were not on behalf of Amt VI or Mil Amt, but due to his close contacts with Himmler)
 - Musy asked for the release of Herriot, an old friend of his, to resume his place in the French government. Musy thought England would be interested in this as a counterpoise to De Gaulle and that, if Herriot were allowed to escape, it might give an opening for talks with England to the end the war. Kaltenbrunner declined Himmler's request for the release of Herriot, describing Schellenberg as an idiot. (AOB, In my perception, Kaltenbrunner was subordinated to Himmler, maybe Hitler's directives were finally decisive)

(Masson, some time earlier, made a similar request to the release of Reynaud: Schellenberg tried but failed)

- The release from a Labour Camp of the nephew of the Papal Nuncio in Berne, Bernandini, was authorised by Schellenberg on his own responsibility
- The release of Polish women from "Ravensbrück", eventually authorised by Himmler, but too late.



Organisation of Amt. VI and Mil. Amt

Amt VI and the Mil. Amt were linked under one head of department. Directly subordinate to the head of department were:-

A Secretariat (2 female secretaries, 1 personal Referent, and one military adjutant)

Zentralbuero (directed by Gruppenleiter VI and Mil. Amt; it included about 50 persons, together with the numerous secretarial staff. It produced the so-called 'Daily Reports' - Tagesmeldungen - provided summaries, important radio and press reports.)
Dr. SANDBERGER, Oberfeldrichter SCHOEN.

The Mil. Amt was divided into 7 sections:

Mil. A:	Personnel, Administration, Training and recruits. Central Registry. Leiter: Dr. SANDBERGER.
Mil. B:	The whole Western Area. Leiter: Standartenfuhrer Dr. STALLER, Major i.G. von THAYSEN.
Mil. C:	The whole Eastern Area. Leiter: Oberstleutnant i.G.d.L. OHLETS.
Mil. D:	Sabotage and Propaganda. Leiter: Obersturmbannfuhrer der Waffen SS. KOEHLER. Major i.G. RAUMANN, succeeded by LOOS.
Mil. E:	Radio Organisation. Leiter: Oberstleutnant BOENING, Funknachrichtenregiment 506 - Major FURETSCHER.
Mil. F:	Frontaufklaerung. Leiter: Oberst i.G. RUNTROCK, Oberstleutnant von dem KUEBEBROCK.
Mil. G:	Technical Devices (also G-Groups). Leiter: Oberstlt. BOENING Oberstlt. MUELLER.
I&H:	Oberstlt. i.G. von dem KUEBEBROCK
I&L:	" i.C.d.L. SEAPAR.

Organisation of Amt VI and Mil Amt.


Amt VI and the Mil Amt were linked under one head of department. Directly subordinate to the head of department were:-

A Secretariat (2 female secretaries, 1 personal Referent, and one military adjutant).

Zentralbüro (directed by Gruppenleiter VI and Mil Amt; it included about 30 persons, together with the numerous secretarial staff. It produced the so-called 'Daily Reports' – Tagesmeldungen – provided summaries, important radio and press reports).
Dr. Sandberger, Oberfeldrichter Schoen.

The Mil Amt was divided into 7 sections:

- Mil. A: Personnel, Administration, Training and recruits, Central Registry.
Leiter Dr. Sandberger (in due course his file will be dealt with as well)
- Mil. B: The whole Western Area,
Leiter Standartenführer Dr. Steimle.
Major i.G.* von Thaysen.
- Mil. C: The whole Eastern Area.
Leiter Obstlt. i.G. d. Luftwaffe Ohletz
- Mil.D: Sabotage and Propaganda.
Leiter Obersturmbannführer der Waffen SS Skorzeny.
Major i.G. Naumann, succeeded by Loos.
- Mil.E: Radio Organisation
Leiter Obstlt. Boening
Funknachrichtenregiment 506 – Major Poretschkin.
- Mil F: Frontaufklärung
Leiter: Obstlt. i.G. Buntrock
Obstlt. Von dem Knesebeck
- Mil G: Technical Devices (also G-Trupps)
Leiter: Obstlt. Boening
Obstlt. Müller
- IaHeer: Obstlt. i.G. von dem Knesebeck
- IaLuft: Obstlt. i.G. d. Luftwaffe Semper



- IaMarine: Kapitän z. See von Bechtolsheim
- Mil. I: Operational deception (irreführung).
Kapitän z. See von Bechtolsheim, and a newly arrived Major
- Kommando Meldegebiete (K.d.M.) at home (Innland) an abroad, Frontaufklärungsleitstellen, Kommandos and Trupps.

* i.G. = im Generalstab

Amt VI was divided into 10 groups:

<u>6A:</u>	Personnel, Administration, Training and Recruits.
6AR	(Legal Questions)
6KULT	(Exploitation of the Home Territory and Liaison with the Ministries)
	Leiter: Dr. SANDBERGER Dr. CARSTENS.
<u>6B:</u>	The whole Western Area but exclusive of England and America.
	Leiter: STEIMLE. Obersturmbannführer REICHEL
<u>6C:</u>	The whole Eastern Area excluding the Balkans. Operation "ZEPPELIN". Leiter: Standartenführer Dr. RAPP.
<u>6D:</u>	England, America (both), Sweden, Finland. Leiter: Dr. PAETZGEN.
<u>6E:</u>	The whole Balkan Area. Leiter: Obersturmbannführer WANNECK.
<u>6F:</u>	Havelinstitut (Radio) and Technical Devices. Leiter: BOENING Sturmabführer der Waffen SS FAROSS.

Amt VI was divided into 10 groups:

IV A:	Personnel, Administration, Training and recruits.
VI AR	(Legal Questions)
VI Kultur	Exploitation of the Home Territory and Liaison with the ministries
	Leiter Dr. Sandberg (who we also encountered in Mil Zentralbüro)
	Dr. Carstens.
VI B:	The whole Western Area but exclusive of England and America.
	Leiter: Steimle Obersturmbannführer Reichle
VI C:	The whole Eastern Area excluding Balkans. Operation "Zeppelin".
VI D:	England, America (both), Sweden, Finland/ Leiter: Obersturmbannführer Wanneck (Wanneck?)
VI F:	Havel Institut (Wannsee) (Radio (W/T communications) and technical Devices. Leiter: Boening Sturmabführer der Waffen SS Faross.

↓

6G: Research and Evaluation of economic methods.
Institutes and Publication Departments.
Leiter: Sturmbannführer KRALLERT.
Hauptsturmführer von LIEBEN.

6Wi: Economics and Technology.
Leiter: Standartenführer Prof. Dr. SCHMIED.
Sturmbannführer Dr. PINT.

6S: Sabotage, Resistance Movements.
Leiter: SKORZENY.

6Z: Counter Espionage.
Leiter: Oberstl. FREUND.

Representatives of Amt VI at home and abroad.

The organisation of the two Amts was not fixed, but continually in flux. The last measure was the linking of all radio and technical devices under the personal direction of BOENING, because of the necessity of a unified supply of raw materials which were becoming increasingly short, (for example: cables, wireless equipment, etc.)

In the so-called National Groups of Amt VI, individual countries were allotted to Referate. In the Mil. Amt, the departments were divided into an Erfassungsgruppe (collecting group) (sub-divided by countries) and an evaluation group (Auswertungsgruppe) (sub-divided by subject).

VI G: Research and Evaluation of economic methods.
Institutes and Publication Departments.
Leiter Sturmbannführer Krallert
Hauptsturmführer von Lieben

VI Wi: Economics and Technology
Leiter: Standartenführer Prof. Dr. Schmied
Sturmbannführer Dr. Pint

VI S: Sabotage, Resistance Movements
Leiter Otto Skorzeny

VI Z: Counter Espionage
Leiter: Obstlt. Freund

Representation of Amt VI at home and abroad.

The organisation of the two Amts ([Amt VI](#) and [Mil Amt](#)) was not fixed, but continually in flux ([in Bewegung](#)). The last measure was the linking of all radio and technical devices under the personal direction of Boening, because of the necessity of a unified supply of raw materials which were becoming increasingly short, (for example: cables, wireless equipment, etc.)

In the so-called National Groups of Amt VI, individual countries were allotted to Referate. In the Mil. Amt, the departments were divided into an Erfassungsgruppe (collecting group) (sub-divided by the countries) and an evaluation group (Auswertungsgruppe (sub-divided by subject).



Both spheres were linked at the head in personnel and were, in practice, already very extensively and deliberately fused together. Outwardly, a conscious division was maintained, partly because there was an agreement with the O.K.W. to retain the name Mil. and partly because certain matters of money, currency, etc. and above all matters of personnel, could be better decided in the Wehrmacht than in VI. Both spheres were divided into Referate (as I have cited above), and in Gruppe VI A also into Abt. VI KULT as well as Referate.

Abt. VI KULT. had the task of investigating all possibilities which the home territory offered in its various facets, and to offer to specialist departments, persons or organisations already prepared (economics was reserved for VI Wi.) The department had a liaison office in each ministry which was also responsible for passing relevant information to the ministry. At the same time, VI KULT. could collect striking intelligence in the home territory and pass it on to its own specialist departments. There was a special arrangement with the Foreign Office. In this respect, additional assignments were allotted.

VI AR: Legal questions, supply questions, agents' contracts, questions of damages, questions of administration, were dealt with here.

In the two personnel departments, the personal documents of all officers, SS Fuehrer, soldiers and employees were maintained, and all related tasks (promotions, transfers, punishments, commendations, etc.) carried out. The administration (Verwaltung) was primarily responsible for material matters (supplies, equipment in general); matters of personnel were dealt with by Amt II.

Gruppe VI A and Abteilung Mil. A.

Both spheres were linked at the head of personnel and were, in practice, already very extensively and deliberately fused together. Outwardly, a conscious division was maintained, partly because there was an agreement with the O.K.W. to retain the name Mil. and partly because certain matters of money, currency, etc. and above all matters of personnel, could be better decided in the Wehrmacht than in VI. (the OKW kept acute operational military intelligence, where the value of it last only a short time) Both spheres were divided into Referate (as I have cited above), and in Gruppe Vi A also into Abt. VI Kult as well as Referate.

Abt. VI Kult had the task of investigating all possibilities which the home territory offered in its various facts, and to offer to specialists departments, persons or organisations already prepared (economics was reserved for VI Wi (Wirtschaft)). The department had a liaison office in each ministry which was also responsible for passing relevant information to the ministry. At the same time, VI Kult could collect striking intelligence in the home territory and pass it on to its own specialist departments. There was a special arrangement with the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). In this respect, additional assignment were allotted.

VI AR: Legal questions, supply questions, agents, contacts, questions of damages, questions of administration, were dealt with.

In the two personnel departments, the personnel documents of all officers, SS Führer; soldiers and employees were maintained, and all related tasks (promotions, transfer, punishments, commendations, etc.) carried out. The administration (Verwaltung) was primarily responsible for material matters (supplies, equipment in general); matters of personnel were dealt with by Amt II.

[Abteilung Mil. D.] sf. 52/4/28 (7)

It was the successor of the old Abwehrabteilung II with the old personnel who were replaced in course of time. The Abteilung was directed by an Abteilungschef and permanent deputy. The Brandenburg regiment Z.B.V. 800 had already been removed from the Abteilung some time before and was under direct command of the Wehrmacht. (It had in the mean time expanded to the strength of a division and was employed operationally by JODL. Later people with special knowledge of countries and languages were taken out after the best had fallen and were allotted to the SS. Jagdverbände.) After the influence of SKORZENY became apparent as responsible Abteilungschef an uncontrollable redistribution of personnel and re-organisation began.

Abteilung Mil. D.

It was the successor of the old Abwehrabteilung II with the old personnel who were replaced in course of time (*im Laufe der Zeit*). The Abteilung was directed by an Abteilungschef and permanent deputy (*Stellvertreter*). The Brandenburg Regiment z.b.V. 800 had already been removed from the Abteilung some time before and was under direct command of the Wehrmacht. (AOB, *quite logical, because the Brandenburgers had to fulfil secret operational matters, which were mainly purely of military nature*) (It had in the meantime expanded to the strength of a division and was employed operationally by Jodl. Later people with special knowledge of countries and languages were taken out after the best had fallen and were allotted to the SS Jagdverbände). After the influence of Skorzeny became apparent as responsible Abteilungschef an uncontrollable redistribution of personnel of personnel and reorganisation began.

KV 2/96-2, page 22 + 23

Mil. D. had become in course of time an instrument serving almost exclusively the requirements of Frontaufklärung. On this account, after Frontaufklärung was taken over by the Mil. Amt, serious disputes arose between SKORZENY and Oberst. BUNTROCK. BUNTROCK was in the right. Mil. issued instructions to Leitstellen II of Frontaufklärung.

Mil. D. became in course of time an instrument serving almost exclusively the requirements of Frontaufklärung. In this account, after Frontaufklärung was taken over by Mil. Amt, serious disputes arose between Skorzeny and Obst. Buntrock. Buntrock was in the right. (*stand im Recht*). Mil. issued instructions to Leitstellen II of Frontaufklärung.

Signals Regiment 506 (under the command of Major PORETSCHKIN). Provided all required personnel for the wireless communications of the Kommando Meldegebiete at home and abroad, wireless by agents and instructors.

Signals Regiment 506 (under the command of Major Poretshkin). Provided all required personnel for the wireless communications of the Kommando Meldegebiete at home and abroad, wireless by agents and instructors.

There was at the front the following division:

I, II and III Frontaufklärungsleitstellen, West, East and South East, with subordinate Kommandos and troops. Leitstellen had their H.Q. with the army groups.
West I: Oberstl. HERRLITZ, II, Hpt. MEMMERS, III
East I (Wally I) Oberstl. BAUN, II (Wally II) Hpt. KERN (?)
III (Wally III) Oberstl. SCHMALSCHLAEGER.

There was at the front the following division:

I (*intelligence*), II (*Sabotage*), III (*counter-intelligence*) Frontaufklärungsleitstellen, West, East and South East, with subordinate Kommandos and Trupps. Leitstellen had their H.Q. with the Army Groups.

West I: Obstlt. Herrlitz, II, Hptm. Hellmers, III East I (Wally I)(near to Warsaw) Obstlt. (Major?) Baun, II (Wally II) Hptm. Kirn (?) III Wally III) Obstlt. Schmalschläger.

KV 2/96-3, page 4

KRAEMER, in Sweden, was looked after by an Oberleutnant BERG in the Mil Amt.

Kraemer, in Sweden, was looked after by a Oblt. Berg in the Mil. Amt.

KV 2/96-3, page 23

To: W.R.C.3. (Mr. Ferguson).

TOP SEC "U"

PA file 600561
Hec

Reference the cover names in the SCHELLENBERG report. Pair confirms the use by Schellenberg of the cover names SENIOR and SCHENKENDORF. The cover names KAPELLE and JESUS appear in Pair and could conceivably be SCHELLENBERG, though they had not previously been linked with him. There is no trace of VERBACH or any likely trace of RODRIGO. LIGA appears in Pair but is clearly used as a cover name for Switzerland. It may, of course, have been used by SCHELLENBERG as well without our knowing it. It is perhaps worth noting the following cover names which are known from Pair to have been used by SCHELLENBERG, and which were not mentioned by him:- ENZER, ENSBERG, JUERGENS, JUERGENSSON and 7075.

There is no evidence of the cover name KALTINGER being used by KALTENBRUNNER, but there is a Pair reference to "C" which could fit with KALTENBRUNNER.

As for the rest, the cover names JOSEPHINE for KRAEMER and OSTROW for FIDRMUC are confirmed. The cover names ALFONSO and RODRIGO appear in Pair, but it is impossible to tie them up satisfactorily. SENNER appears once in Pair, but cannot be identified. EISBERG is well known from the KRAEMER report; ATLAS and ARABEL were cover names of Allied-controlled double agents. KAUTERS is presumably an error for KLAUDERS which is the cover name of Richard KLATT, who operated at Sofia and who is extremely well known from Pair and other sources. MAX was the cover name of his principal sub-source who reported on Russia.

W.R.F.
30.7.45.

✓
81


To: W.R.C.3. (Mr. Ferguson)

Reference the cover names in the Schellenberg report. Pair confirms the use by Schellenberg of the cover names Senior and Schenkendorf, The cover names Kapelle and Jesus appear in Pair and could conceivably be Schellenberg, though they had no trace of Verbach or any likely trace of Rodrigo. Liga appears in Pair but is clearly used as a cover name for Switzerland. It may, of course, have been used by Schellenberg as well without knowing it. It is perhaps worth noting the following cover names which are known from Pair to have been used by Schellenberg, and which were not mentioned by him:- Enzer, Ensberg, Juergens, Juergensson and 7075.

There is no evidence of the cover name Kaltinger being used by Kaltenbrunner, but there is a Pair reference to "C" which could fit with Kaltenbrunner.

As for the rest, the cover names Josephine for Kraemer (**nonsense, Josephine only indicated Kraemer's type of transferred message and its related source of information**) (<http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm>) and Ostro~~re~~ for Fidrmuc are confirmed. The cover names Alfonso and Rodrigo appear in Pair, but it is impossible to tie them up satisfactorily. Senner appears once in Pair, but cannot be identified, Eisberg (= **I remember Finland**)(Josephine: Powerpoint Klatt-Ostro-Josephine: slide 91: Josephine Strategical, technical and political (incl.) economic informations). Iceberg is well known from Kraemer's report; Atlas and Arabel were cover names of Allied-controlled double agents. Kauters is presumably an error Klauders (**wrong! Richard Klatt's real name was Richard Kauder**), who operated at Sofia (**until July 1943, thereafter he had to move to Budapest!**) And who had extremely well known from Pair and other sources. Max was the cover name of his principle sub-source who reported from on Russia. (**Not true! Max was the designation of the area where a kind of information was derived from**)

KV 2/96-3, page 30



V.F. (for V.F.20).

We spoke.

There is no objection to disclosing to the Foreign Office and to the official Swedish Police contact that Dankwort (German diplomat) is an Amt VI agent, as revealed by Schellenberg.

W.R.C.3a (**W.R. likely stood for War Room**)

28.7.45

↓

SCHELLENBERG

120a

Please refer to my minute of today's date on German espionage activities in India. It would be appreciated if a similar interrogation could be carried out on the subject of espionage activities in Persia and Palestine, with special reference to the following questions.

- A. (1) Names and last known location of Amt VI officers who dealt with Arab affairs (Amt VI c 13), in particular those officers who could give details of the 1944 parachute expeditions to Palestine.
- (2) Who in Amt VI acted as liaison officer with the Grand Mufti?
- B (1) Names and last known location of Amt VI officers dealing with Persia.
- (2) Can SCHELLENBERG say anything about Ramon GAMOTTA and his work?
- (3) Was GAMOTTA ever suspected of being in Russian pay?
- (4) Where is GAMOTTA now?
- (5) What parachute expeditions to Persia were planned or executed since the beginning of 1943?
- (6) Did Mil Amt take over I.M. interests in Persia or were these transferred to Amt VI?
- (7) Does SCHELLENBERG know what happened to the Abwehr officer Berchtold SCHULZE after his return to Germany from Persia early in 1945 as the result of an exchange scheme?

W.R.C.3a.
27.7.45.

Note: see minute from Mr. Brock,
B.l.b. of 26.7.45. in SCHELLENBERG's
file.

(AOB, these queries being linked with Franz Mayr's being in Persia, between November 1940 and his arrest on 15 August 1943 in Teheran. Gamotta was his (Mayr's) companion, who returned to Germany. Berchthold Schulze, was in contrast to Mayr who was considered an SD agent, whereas Schulze was a real Abwehr agent, albeit that his dropped associates were mainly of SD origin) (<http://www.cdvandt.org/mayr-case.htm>) Berchthold Schulze was in January 1945 exchanged for a British S.I.S. agent. He arrived safely back home. But at the end of hostilities he was brought in connection with Klatt and spend a long time in US captivity)

SCHELLENBERG PPG 00 561
KALTENBRUNNER

We have been asked by the Dutch authorities to enquire into the activities of a certain Alois MIEDL.

MIEDL was in 1935 director of the Schantung Handels-Aktiengesellschaft in Munich, and had close connections with the Nazi Party. He spent a long period of residence in Holland before the war, and we are anxious to establish whether he was used by the Germans for espionage purposes under cover of his business.

MIEDL is a well known character, and it is possible that either SCHELLENBERG or KALTENBRUNNER could give some information about him. This query is not of course urgent, and it is left entirely to your discretion at what point of the interrogation his name can be brought up.

W.R.C.3a.
26.7.45.

Note: the original papers relating to MIEDL are filed in PF .602,490 for ZEIDLER.

Schellenberg
Kaltenbrunner.

We have been asked by the Dutch authorities to enquire into the activities of a certain Alois Miedl. (he lived since the 1920s up to mid 1944 in Holland)

Miedl was in 1935 director of the Schantung Handels-Aktiengesellschaft in Munich, and had close connections with the Nazi Party. He spent a long period of residence in Holland (in and around Amsterdam) before the war, (which he did up to mid 1944, when he escaped with his valuable art collection to Spain; among it he took Rembrandts and comparable, medieval treasures; by the way - he was married to a Jewish wife; but his business contacts with Goering, who pointed: "Wer Jude ist bestimme Ich", cleared all legal objections) and we are anxious to establish whether he was used by the Germans for espionage purposes under cover of his business. (AOB, he possessed also the: Buitenlandsche Bankvereniging, where he hid Jewish males, originating from Germany. I always wonder - what happened with these poor people after he had left for Spain in mid 1944?)

Miedl is a well known character, and it is possible that either Schellenberg or Kaltenbrunner could give some information about him. This query is not of course urgent, and it is left entirely to your discretion at what point of the interrogation his name can be brought up.

W.R.C.3a 26.7.45

Note: the original papers relating to Miedl are filed in PF 602490 (no longer existing) for Zeidler.

SCHELLENBERG & KALTENBRUNNER

The first Progress Reports on SCHELLENBERG and KALTENBRUNNER have been read with interest. KALTENBRUNNER's account of the Gestapo Amt is inaccurate both in his account of Referate, and in his account of personalities. His account, for instance, IV N is quite unsatisfactory.

All the evidence goes to show that Amt IV N was a highly secret part of Amt IV. Its Leiter is certainly and irrefutably Krim. Inspektor Leonhard HALMENSEGER, and not GOTTHALMSEDER, as KALTENBRUNNER tries to insist. Documents show that IV N is most probably a development of the dd IV C 4 which was in 1940 described as the Nachrichtensammelstelle, and was at that time also under HALMENSEGER.

As already indicated in a previous minute, his reference to IV A 2 b is quite wrong. Incidentally KOPKOW of IV A 2 b is at present under arrest at 21 Army Group. No interrogation report has yet been received, but it may provide material for the further interrogation of KALTENBRUNNER.

Generally speaking, therefore, KALTENBRUNNER must know more of Amt IV than he professes in this report, and this is amply borne out by the statement of SCHELLENBERG in his First Progress Report. It is hardly necessary to point out the inconsistencies that exist between these two statements, but a typical instance is that KALTENBRUNNER speaks of EICHMANN in rather distant terms, professing not to know his family connections or christian name, etc.; whereas SCHELLENBERG quite definitely states that KALTENBRUNNER was very friendly with EICHMANN, with whom he was frequently in company.

KALTENBRUNNER's statement at Appendix I and II has aroused considerable interest with the War Criminal Commission, and a request has been made that the original statement should be preserved for KALTENBRUNNER's eventual trial as a war criminal. No doubt this point will be borne in mind.

Schellenberg & Kaltenbrunner.

The first Progress Reports on Schellenberg and Kaltenbrunner have been read with interest. Kaltenbrunner's account of the Gestapo ([Stapo](#)) Amt is inaccurate both in his account of Referate, and in his account of personalities. His account, for instance, IV N is quite unsatisfactory.

All the evidence goes to show that Amt IV N was a highly secret part of Amt IV. Its Leiter is certainly and irrefutably Kriminal Inspektor Leonhard Halmenseger, and not

Gotthalmseder, as the evidence tries to insist. Documents show that IV N is most probably a development of the dd. IV C which was in 1940 described as the Nachrichtensammelstelle, and was at that time also under Halmenseger.

As already indicated in a previous minute, his reference to IV A 2b is quite wrong. Incidentally Kopkow of IV A 2b is at present under arrest at the 21st Army Group. No interrogation report has yet been received, but it may provide material for the further interrogation of Kaltenbrunner. (AOB, Kopkow's file summary: <http://www.cdvandt.org/rote-kapelle-20-july'44.htm>)

Generally speaking, therefore, Kaltenbrunner must know more of Amt IV than he professes in this report, and this is amply borne out by the statement of Schellenberg in his First Progress Report. It is hardly necessary to point out the inconsistencies that exist between these two statements, but a typical instance is that Kaltenbrunner speaks of Eichmann in rather distant terms professing not to know his family connections or Christian name, etc. whereas Schellenberg quite definitely states that Kaltenbrunner was very friendly with Eichmann, with whom he was frequently in company.

Kaltenbrunner's statement at Appendix I and II has aroused considerable interest with the War Crimes Commission, and a request has been made that the original statement should be preserved for Kaltenbrunner's eventual (Nürnberg) trial as a war criminal. No doubt this point will be borne in mind.

W.R.C.3a 21.7.45

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

<http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm> Please consider Chapter III of this presentation.

Question 1: Did Amt VI have warning from any source of the British airborne landing at Arnhem?

Answer:

Yes, but the message itself, which was sent by teleprinter (Blitzfernschreiben) from KRAEMER in Stockholm was held up at the Attaché's office in Berlin, owing to a technical hitch, so that no real, that is to say, effective warning reached the General Staff. Nevertheless importance was attached to the message in spite of the delay. It was never established who was responsible for delaying the transmission of the message.

Question 1: Did Amt VI have warning from any source of the British airborne landing of Arnhem?

Answer: Yes, but the message itself, which was sent by teleprinter (Blitzfernschreiben) from Kraemer in Stockholm was held up at the Attaché's office in Berlin, (AOB, Kraemer was, for practical reasons, legally a Luft Attaché since Autumn 1942, and thus a diplomat. Diplomats do communicate with their Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). From this institute the message must be re-addressed; which took some time. To what I know - it arrived on time at Amt VI, but someone sabotaged its handling. Though who did it is an open question, not unlikely it had been Major Busch, with whom Lt. Dr. Kraemer had a poor understanding. Actually, this person not long hereafter initiated an investigation which went up to the highest circles against Kraemer's expenditure. But Kraemer won the raw ultimately) (<http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm>)

KV 2/97-2, page 14

criminal Himmler became very restless, almost uncontrolled, and said "Schellenberg, now don't you start too, Hitler has been furious for days that Buchenwald and Bergen-Belzen were not evacuated a hundred per cent". To that I said, for the first time to Himmler: "But in that case his Parkinson's disease must have developed very far". Himmler accepted this without comment, but our conversation became more official and he immediately asked Berger to join in. At the same moment Fegelein telephoned with the information that Hitler and Goebbels were furious that Berger had not stayed in Berlin. The latter was required on account of the sentence against Gruppenführer Professor Dr. Brandt, Hitler's previous physician-in-ordinary, who had been condemned to death in the last few days because he had knowingly let his wife fall into American hands in Thuringia. I was able to gather from the conversation

When I described that above as criminal Himmler became very restless, almost uncontrolled, and said "Schellenberg, now don't you start too, Hitler has become furious for days that Buchenwald and Bergen-Belzen were not evacuated a hundred percent To that I said, for the first time to Himmler: "But in that case his Parkinson's disease must have developed further ... (AOB, a German TV documentary some years ago, presented it as if recent discoveries have found the reason why Hitler kept one hand at his back at the last days of the war, as it was Parkinson. Typical, as already in August 1945 Schellenberg noticed this very fact!)

AOB, I would like to go into an intriguing episode starting on 1st May 1945.

It started within: <http://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm>

A member of my Amt, Sturmbannführer Dr. Wirsing seemingly expresses some distance between Schellenberg and Wirsing; though they had a rather close mutual friendship.

Germany had been split in a Northern and Southern part, it was Dr. Sandberger who ordered Dr. Wirsing to hand over a letter to Schellenberg in the north. Whether this letter was truly the reason, isn't clear; the fact remains he had to travel with great difficulties to Lübeck, first.

KV 2/2/97-2, page 21

1 May 1945.

In Flensburg I met a member of my Amt, Stubaf Dr. Wirsing, who had flown in a night fighter from Muenchen to Flensburg, as representing my closest associates, to inform me that Kaltenbrunner had relieved me of all my appointments and had replaced me in the political section by O'Stubaf Waneck, and in the military section by O'Stubaf Skorzeny. I took Dr. Wirsing immediately with me to introduce him to Himmler, so that he could return to the Southern Sector (Suedraum) armed with the necessary orders from Himmler.

On the stretch from Luebeck to Kalkhorst we ran into the most difficult traffic congestions, as retreating troops from the entire Mecklenburg district and more particularly from Schwerin were blocking the way and it took us $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours to do 40 km. During this time we were only once attacked by divebombers, otherwise it would have been impossible for me to have reached my destination. I walked many long stretches of this journey as I could walk faster than our car could go.

I arrived in Kalkhorst at 0800 hours. Himmler had not gone to bed till 0300 hours. I contacted Dr. Brandt who immediately informed me that Hitler's successor was not Himmler but Grossadmiral Doenitz, and that during this very night the first meeting between Doenitz and Himmler

1 May 1945.

In Flensburg I met a member of my Amt, Sturmbannführer Dr. Wirsing (AOB, I suppose it was not Flensburg but in the vicinity of Lübeck), who had flown in a night fighter (Ju 88) from München (east of München) to Flensburg (Lübeck), as representing my closest associates, to inform me that Kaltenbrunner had relieved me of all my appointments and replaced me in the political section of Obersturmbannführer Waneck, and in the military section by Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny (unnoticed: he also replaced Himmler!) I took Dr. Wirsing immediately with me to introduce him to Himmler, so that he could return to the Southern Sector (Südraum) armed with the necessary orders from Himmler.

On the stretch from Lübeck (this confirms my notice that Wirsing landed at Lübeck instead of Flensburg) to Kalkhorst we ran into the most difficult traffic congestions, as retreating troops from the entire Mecklenburg district and more particularly from Schwerin were blocking the way and it took us $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours to do 40 km. During this time we were only once attacked by dive-bombers, otherwise it would have been impossible for me to have reached my destination. I walked many long stretches of this journey as I could walk faster than our car could go.

I arrived Kalkhorst at 0800 hours. Himmler had not gone to bed till 0300 hours. I contacted Dr. Brandt who immediately informed me that Hitler's successor was not Himmler but Grossadmiral Doenitz, and that during that very night the first meeting between Doenitz, and Himmler had taken place at Ploen, →

↓

had taken place in Ploen, that Himmler on the strength of my original suggestion had managed to get Doenitz, as his first order, to depose Ribbentrop and put in Graf Schwerin von Krosigk as Foreign Minister. Himmler was obviously in a bad mood, as in the Grossadmiral's purely military circles Himmler's political step with the Western Powers was not understood. Himmler was toying with the idea of having to resign, of committing suicide. He wanted to discuss all these points with me once more.

After half an hour's rest I received a message from Himmler telling me to have breakfast with him at 0900 hours to tell him of my conversation with Herr von Post, Best and the Count. Himmler was very nervous and distraught and told me that he was no longer up to dealing with these matters. He had only accomplished one thing more, and that was to suggest Schwerin von Krosigk to Grossadmiral Doenitz as Foreign Minister, which after dismissing Ribbentrop he had done. Himmler wanted to take me straight away to Doenitz so that I should, so to speak, be installed as von Krosigk's immediate assistant on foreign policy. It would be a good thing if I expounded my ideas on the question of Norway and Denmark to the Government immediately. Himmler considered that I should remain permanently with von Krosigk and Doenitz and get someone else sent to Sweden, should it be possible for me to persuade the Reichs Government to abandon the Northern Sector without fighting.

After a longish discussion on the general situation we left Kalkhorst at 1100 hours for Ploen through Luebeck to meet Doenitz. After a difficult drive through refugees, military columns, dive-bomber attacks we reached Ploen at 1400 hours, where I contacted von Krosigk immediately. I also greeted Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl who were all taken up with the immediate daily military problems. One could feel the intense excitement among the staff.

In the afternoon alone with Himmler it was again possible for me to convince him of the importance of the political problem, that is, of the surrender of the Northern Sector without fighting. We agreed that von Krosigk was of the same opinion, whereas Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl were under no circumstances at this time prepared to surrender Norway without fighting. On the other hand I had promised von Post to return to Copenhagen with a decision. A lengthy delay in Ploen would mean so much loss of time that my, so to speak, option to negotiate with the Swedish Government would lapse. I was able to persuade Himmler to get in touch with von Krosigk over the solution of the Northern Sector on the lines presented by me, and first of all to send me to Copenhagen to explain the changed general situation to von Post and, despite this, to explain our agreement in principle. Generaloberst Boehme, Reichskommissar Terboven, Generaloberst Lindemann and Reichsbevollmaechtigter Dr. Best were, in the meantime, ordered to meet the Grossadmiral on the 2nd May in view of my proposal for the Northern Sector which Himmler had put before him. Himmler and I were agreed that I would in any case not receive any definite decision from the Grossadmiral before this conference had taken place, and I therefore wanted to use this day, the 2nd May, to inform Herr von Post in Copenhagen of the new situation.

I left Ploen at 1500 hours and arrived in Flensburg at 1900 hours, where I spent 3 hours with Dr. Wirsing and worked out a draft I wanted to present to von Krosigk as my, so to speak, first task as his Mitarbeiter. The primary intention was to show that any pretence at political bargaining would depend on the internal political measures adopted by the new Government. I suggested for this reason to von Krosigk, that Doenitz should first dissolve the Party, secondly the Gestapo and the SD, and to announce this on the radio. Dr. Wirsing worked these things out in the night and left them for me, as I wanted to rest

Had taken place in Ploen (Plön), that Himmler on the strength of my original suggestion had managed to get Doenitz, as his first order, to dispose Ribbentrop and put in Graf Schwerin von Krosigk as Foreign Minister. Himmler was obviously in a bad mood, as in the Grossadmiral's purely military circles Himmler's political step with the Western Powers was not understood. Himmler was toying (spielte) with the idea of having to resign, of committing suicide. He wanted to discuss all these points with me once more.

After half an hour's rest I received a message from Himmler telling me to have a breakfast with him at 0900 hours to tell him of the conversation with Herr von Post, Best (the former Gestapo Chief and since Civil Commander of Denmark (Reichsbevollmächtigter)) and Count Bernadotte. Himmler was very nervous and distraught and told me that he was no longer up to dealing with these matters. He only accomplished one thing more, and that was to suggest Schwerin von Krosigk to Grossadmiral Doenitz as Foreign Minister, which after dismissing Ribbentrop he had done. Himmler wanted to take me straight away to Doenitz so that I should, so to speak, (so zu Sagen) be installed as von Krosigk's immediate assistant on foreign policy. It would be a good thing (eine gute Sache) if I expounded my ideas on the question of Norway and Denmark to the Government immediately, Himmler considered that I should remain permanently with von Krosigk and Doenitz and get someone sent to Sweden, should it be possible for me to persuade the Reichs Government (Reichsregierung) to abandon the Northern Sector without fighting.

After a longish discussion of the general situation we left Kalkhorst at 1100 hours for Ploen (Plön) through Lübeck to meet Doenitz. After a difficult drive through refugees, military columns, dive-bomber attack, we reached Ploen at 1400 hours, where I contacted von Krosigk immediately. I also greeted Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl who were all taken up with the immediate daily military problems. One could feel the intense excitement among the staff.

In the afternoon alone with Himmler it was again possible for me to convince him of the importance of the political problem, that is, of the surrender of the Northern Sector without fighting. We agreed that von Krosigk was of the same opinion, whereas Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl were under no circumstances at this time prepared to surrender Norway without fighting. On the other hand I had promised von Post to return to Copenhagen with a decision. A lengthy delay in Ploen would mean so much loss of time that my, so to speak, option to persuade Himmler to get in touch with Krosigk over the solution of the Northern Sector on the lines presented by me, and first of all to send me to Copenhagen to explain the changed general situation to von Post and despite this, to explain our agreement in principle. Generaloberst Boehme, Reichskommissar Terboven (Norway), Generaloberst Lindemann and Reichsbevollmächtigter Dr. Best (once, the creator of the Gestapo) were, in the meantime, ordered to meet the Grossadmiral on the 2nd May in view of my proposal for the Northern Sector which Himmler had put before him. Himmler and I were agreed that I would in any case not receive any definite decision from the Grossadmiral before this conference had taken place, and I therefore wanted to use this day, the 2nd May, to inform Herr von Post in Copenhagen of the new situation. (AOB, comparing Wirsing's story: that Wirsing's aeroplane (Ju 88) was waiting for him at Flensburg and that he drove within Schellenberg's car to Flensburg where he was dropped, that Schellenberg must at least have had two aims – to convey (the) messages for the Germans in Copenhagen and, to go to Graf Bernadotte in Sweden; bear in mind: Hamburg was already captured by British troops, thus Lübeck in serious danger)

I left Ploen at 1500 hours and arrived in Flensburg at 1900 hours, where I spent 3 hours with Dr. Wirsing and worked out a draft I wanted to present to von Krosigk as my, so to speak, first task as his Mitarbeiter. The primary intention was to show that any pretence at political bargaining would depend on the international measures adopted by the new Government. I suggested for this reason to von Krosigk, that Doenitz should first dissolve the (Nazi) Party, secondly the Gestapo and the SD, and to announce this on the radio. Dr. Wirsing worked these things out in the night and left them for me as I wanted to rest for a few hours before my drive to Copenhagen, as I was unable to fight against the desire to sleep.

for a few hours before my drive to Copenhagen, as I was quite unable to fight against the desire to sleep.

Dr. Wirsing wanted to fly back to the Southern Sector, on the next night as Himmler did not consider Kaltenbrunner's dismissal order very important, perhaps because of the general situation, and that he should outwardly bow to higher authority, but inwardly he should remain true and loyal to me as my closest Mitarbeiter. I drove during the night to Froeslev from where I telephoned to Dr. Best, who wanted to meet me on his way to the Grossadmiral at about 7 o'clock on the 2nd May, for me to tell him about the latest situation.

2nd May 1945.

I left Froeslev at 0430 hours for Niburg - I want at this stage to mention that Count Bernadotte put his personal Red-Cross car at my disposal whilst I was in Denmark - from Padborg on - which was of the greatest help to me at all military control posts, etc. and excellent cover. I felt uneasy only when I was at times too much feted as a Swede and, without being able to speak a word, was even giving autographs to school-children and grown-ups.

The proposed meeting with Dr. Best did not take place as we had both mistaken the times of the ferry, I did not take the ferry from Korsør on which Dr. Best was crossing but took one which left Niborg at the same time, so that we passed each other on the water. I arrived in Copenhagen at 1300 hours, and telephoned to Herr Minister von Dardel, to be told that I could meet Herr von Post and Herr Ostroem, whom he included, at 1600 hours. I described once more the general situation, the altered Government situation and mentioned that for the present Grossadmiral had taken over the military and civil command of Denmark and Norway, but that I had good grounds in believing that the execution of my plan had the support of the Foreign Minister, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, and Himmler and was still possible. Herr von Post was still interested in the whole problem and stressed that Sweden naturally was greatly interested in a bloodless settlement in the Northern Sector, but he did not think that he could any longer undertake anything binding as the general situation had altered so much, owing to both the change of Government and the passage of time, that one had to reckon with a total capitulation within the next few days. In which case any partial solution in Denmark and Norway was no longer of interest for Sweden. Nonetheless he suggested pursuing the old plan and as soon as time and circumstances allowed, to hand him a definite proposal. We were agreed that it was all a matter of time, that I should return as quickly as possible, or, if possible, give a provisional report by telephone. We arranged the following telephonic code words:

"I should be glad to see the gentlemen again"

meaning:- German Government's definite proposal for Norway.

And if the above sentence included:-

" and please tell them this"

it meant:- the offer is extended to Denmark.

Herr von Post and Herr Ostroem stressed the fact that they were not able to remain in Denmark any longer for reasons of secrecy. I can at this point stress that the discussions in Copenhagen were conducted in the strictest secrecy.

3 May 1945.

That night I experienced by first dive-bomber attack in Denmark and

For a few hours before my drive to Copenhagen, as I was quite unable to fight against the desire to sleep.

Dr. Wirsing wanted to fly back to the Southern Sector ([Teil](#)), on the next night as Himmler did not consider Kaltenbrunner's dismissal order very important, perhaps because of the general situation, and that he should outwardly bow to higher authority, but inwardly he should remain true and loyal to me and my closest Mitarbeiter ([Wirsing](#)). I drove during the night to Froeslev ([Denmark](#)) from where I telephoned to Dr. Best, who wanted to meet me on his way to the Grossadmiral ([Doenitz](#)) at about 7 o'clock on the 2nd May, for me to tell him about the latest situation.

2nd May 1945.

I left Foeslev at 0430 hours for Niburg – I wanted at this stage to mention that Count Bernadotte put his personal Red-Cross car at my disposal whilst I was in Denmark – from Padborg on – which was of the greatest help to me at all military control posts, etc. and excellent cover. I felt uneasy only when I was at times too much fettered as a Swede and, without being able to speak a word, was even giving autographs to school-children and grown-ups.

The proposed meeting with Dr. Best did not take place as we had both mistaken the times of the ferry, I did not take the ferry from Korsør on which Dr. Best was crossing but took one which left Niborg at the same time, so that we passed each other on the water. I arrived in Copenhagen at 1300 hours, and telephoned to Herr Minister von Dardel, to be told that I could meet Herr von Post and Herr Ostroem, whom he included at 1600 hours. I described once more the general situation, the altered Government situation and mentioned that for the present Grossadmiral had taken over the military and civil command of Denmark and Norway, but that I had good ground ([gute Gründe](#)) in believing that the execution of my plan had the support of the Foreign Minister, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, and Himmler and was still possible. Herr von Post was still interested in the whole problem and stressed that Sweden naturally was greatly interested in a bloodless settlement in the Northern Sector, but did not think that he could any longer undertake anything binding as the general situation had altered so much, owing to both the change of ([German](#)) Government and the passage of time, that one had to reckon with a total capitulation within the next few days. In which case any partial solution in Denmark and Norway was no longer of interest for Sweden. Nonetheless he suggested pursuing the old plan and as soon as time and circumstances allowed, to hand him a definite proposal. We were agreed that it was all a matter of time, that I should return as quickly as possible, or, if possible, give a provisional report by telephone. We arranged the following telephonic code words:

“I should be glad to see the gentlemen again”

Meaning:- German Government's definite proposal for Norway.

And if the above sentence included:-

“and please tell him this”

it meant:- the offer is extended to Denmark.

Herr von Post and Herr Ostroem stressed the fact that they were not able to remain in Denmark any longer for reasons of secrecy. I can at this point stress that the discussions in Copenhagen were conducted in the strictest secrecy.

3 May 1945.

That night I experienced my first dive-bomber attack in Denmark and only arrived at Padborg at 0400 hours.



only arrived at Padburg at 0400 hours. After two hours delay I continued my journey to Flensburg, collected Dr. Wirsing's draft and drove on to Ploen to talk about the whole affair to the Reichs Government.

The journey to Ploen turned out to be one of the most difficult and dangerous, that I have experienced. There were, over a comparatively short stretch of 90 km, over a dozen dive-bomb attacks on roads jammed with retreating columns of troops hung-up partly on account of petrol shortage and through damage. Burnt out lorries, streets strewn with corpses, exploding tanks and munition trucks, we fought our way through with difficulty to Ploen, having ourselves lain prone by the roadside and in fields during machine-gun fire.

In Ploen we were told by the Staff-guard that the Government had removed itself to the Marineschule Muerwick. As this affair did not permit even an hour's delay, I had to make the same journey back again and met with the same difficulties. I may be permitted to state here, without exaggeration, that thinking back on it, it was a wonder that I managed to get through with my car on the same day, arriving at Muerwick at 1700 hours to present myself to the Reichs Foreign Minister and Himmler. The frontier police at Kupfermuehle by Flensburg had been informed of the removal of the Government, but I was not told of it, when I crossed, and there were three Search Parties looking for me on the Ploen road. One feared the worst.

In my report I once again stressed the basic political importance of the whole Northern Sector, and we were agreed within a comparatively short time, that, in spite of the unfavourable course of events, it was important under all circumstances, and if possible by bringing Sweden into it, to give up Denmark and Norway without a fight.

I then had a long discussion with von Krosigk alone. He was very glad to have someone for consultation and told me that he would be glad if I could remain with him and he make me his first "Mitarbeiter". On the other hand he considered it important that I should go to Sweden to clear up the question of the Northern Sector, as discussed, with the Swedish Government. We both agreed that this action was only a thing of the moment and would not delay the pending total capitulation.

The idea of a declaration of total capitulation came to nothing at that time because of this situation on the Boemisch-Maehrischen Sector, where the Heeresgruppen of Generalfeldmarschall Schroener and of Generaloberst Rendulic - about a million men, equipped with munition and provisions for another 7 weeks, were still intact and on the whole more than holding their own on this part of the Eastern front.

Apart from my mission for the Northern Sector, which was primarily concerned with Norway, but also embodied proposals for Denmark, I had to endeavour under all circumstances to arrange a meeting with General Eisenhower for myself or a representative of the Government, whether through the Swedish Government or through the Swedish Red Cross. Von Krosigk and the Government were of the opinion that I should be allowed to do all I could to alleviate the difficult position of the Reich and the distress still to come, through open negotiations with the Swedish Government, while still continuing to try to prise open General Eisenhower's firmly shut door. Then I discussed with von Krosigk and Staatsminister Frank from Prag the Czech problem. I was not able to hear Doenitz's decision on this, so I do not know how it developed.

With regard to Denmark, von Krosigk thought it would be wiser to include Denmark immediately in the negotiations being carried on by Admiral Friedeburg with Montgomery over North-Western Germany. He asked me to include this problem in my discussion with Grossadmiral

Only arrived at Padburg at 0400 hours. After two hours delay continued my journey to Flensburg, collected Dr. Wirsing's draft and drove on to Ploen to talk about the whole affair to the Reichs Government. (Reichsregierung)

The journey to Ploen turned out to be one of the most difficult and dangerous, that I have experienced. There were over, over a comparatively short stretch of 90 km, over a dozen dive-bomb attacks on roads jammed with retreating columns of troops hung-up partly on account of petrol shortage and through damage. Burnt out lorries, street strewn with corpses, exploding tanks and munition trucks, we fought our way through with difficulty to Ploen, having ourselves lain prone by the roadside and in fields during machine-gun fire.

In Ploen were told by the Staff-guard that the Government had moved itself to the Marine Schule in Flensburg Mürwick. As the affair did not permit even an hour longer delay, I had to make the same journey back again and met with the same difficulties. I may be permitted to state here, without exaggeration (ohne Übertreibung), that thinking back on it, it was a wonder that I managed to get through with my car on the same day, arriving in Mürwick at 1700hours to present myself to the Reichs Foreign Minister and Himmler. The frontier police at Kupfermühle by Flensburg had been informed of the removal of the Government, but was not told of it, when I crossed, and there were three Search Parties looking for me on the Ploen road. One feared the worst.

In my report I once again stressed the basic political importance of the whole Northern Sector, and we were agreed within a comparatively short time, that, in spite of the unfavourable course of events, it was important under all circumstances, and if possible by bringing Sweden into it, to give up Denmark and Norway without fight.

I then had a long discussion with von Krosigk alone. He was very glad to have someone for consultation and told me that he would be glad if I could remain with him and he make me his first "Mitarbeiter". On the other hand he considered it important that I should go to Sweden to clear up the question of the Northern Sector, as discussed, with the Swedish Government. We both agreed that this action was only a thing of the moment and would not delay the pending total capitulation.

The idea of a declaration of total capitulation came to nothing at that time because of the situation on the Bömisch-Mährischen Sector (say Czechoslovakia), where the Heeresgruppe of General Schroener and of Generaloberst Rendulic – about a million men, equipped with ammunition and provisions for another 7 weeks, were still intact and on the whole more than holding their own on this part of the (South) Eastern front.

Apart from my mission for the Northern Sector, which was primarily concerned with Norway, but also embodied proposals for Denmark, I had to endeavour under all circumstances to arrange a meeting with general Eisenhower for myself or a representative of the Government, whether through Swedish Government or through the Swedish Red-Cross. Von Krosigk and the Government were of the opinion that I should be allowed to do all I could to alleviate the difficult position of the Reich and the distress still to come, through open negotiations with the Swedish Government, while still continuing try to prise open General Eisenhower's firmly shut door. Then I discussed with Krosigk and Staatsminister (Hans) Frank from Prag the Czech problem/ I was not able to hear Doenitz's decision on this, so I do not know how it developed.

With regard to Denmark, von Krosigk thought it would be wiser to include Denmark immediately in the negotiations being carried on by Admiral Friedeburg with Montgomery (Lüneburgerheide) over Northern-West Germany. He asked me to include this problem in my discussion with Grossadmiral Doenitz,

Doenitz, as the military were absolutely without understanding of the political aspect of the Northern Sector within the sphere of the whole German situation.

At 2000 hours I began my report to Grossadmiral Doenitz, who at first would not hear of abandoning Norway and interning German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. Obviously his military advisors had pointed out not only the in itself good strategic position of the army, particularly that of Generaloberst Boehme, but also of the Navy. After I had managed to prove the political significance of a surrender without combat, that in fact the enlistment of Sweden would be a political gain, the Grossadmiral enquired just what sort of an immediate gain this would be for Germany. With many explanations I had to point out to him that under the present circumstances I could naturally not prove any immediate gain, but by taking a long view, this gain would be in saving the "biological substance" of the German people and of what remained of the reputation of the Reich. Added to that when it came to the political game of the Powers in the near future, Sweden was the only neutral for whom even a broken Germany was of no little importance. Finally I said that after what I had witnessed of the collapse in the Reich, the continuation of the war in Denmark and Norway had no moral or traditional justification, since it would be devoid of any political or other value.

The meeting was then adjourned. Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl and I went off for supper together at which these questions were, of course, further discussed. Keitel and Jodl were both against my going to Stockholm and wanted me, as the best experienced in Foreign affairs (sic!) to remain beside von Krosigk and so within their reach. I again pointed out the importance of the Northern question and, I think, succeeded in getting Jodl to understand this.

I discussed once more with von Krosigk, Dr. Wirsing's draft and advised him to get the Grossadmiral to carry out the suggestion contained therein, of dissolving the Party, the Staatspolizei and the SD. Further the question was discussed in what capacity I should be sent to Stockholm. Von Krosigk left it to me to advise him as to whether he should appoint me 'Botschafter' (envoy), 'Sonderbevollmaechtigter' (Plenipotentiary Extraordinary), 'Beauftrafter' (Representative) or anything else. I asked him to name me 'Gesandter', the one word which, in view of my mission, would suit me best. State Secretaries von Steengracht and Henke were called to the Foreign Minister in the night to prepare the plenary powers and form of appointment as 'Gesandter'. Then we both talked to the Grossadmiral again. He again procrastinated and delayed a final decision until the next morning, saying he must sleep on it once again.

I reported to Himmler once more and had a short but significant talk with him, the essence of which was: "If only I had listened to you sooner" and "perhaps you are the first German to be permitted to do something positive for his poor 'Vaterland' again".

4 May 1945.

The next morning at 1000 hours I reported to von Krosigk. My appointment as 'Gesandter' and the plenary powers to negotiate with the Swedish Government were signed by Doenitz at 0930 hours. I took leave of von Krosigk and left for Copenhagen at noon.

On the stretch to Hadersleben in Denmark, I ran into a heavy dive-bomb attack, which entailed a delay of three hours in the "Great Belt", and arrived in Copenhagen at 1800 hours. I endeavoured to contact Dr. Best to inform him of my mission and corresponding instructions regarding

Doenitz, as the military were absolutely without understanding of the political aspect of the Northern Sector with sphere of the whole German situation.

At 2000 hours I began my report to Grossadmiral Doenitz, who at first would not hear of abandoning Norway and interning German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. Obviously his military advisors had pointed out not only the in itself good strategic position of the army, particularly that of Generaloberst Boehme, but also of the Navy. After I had managed to prove the political significance of a surrender without combat, that in fact the enlistment? Of Sweden would be a political gain, be for Germany. With many explanations I had to point out to him that under the present circumstances I could naturally not prove any immediate “gain”, but by talking a long view, this gain would be in saving the “biological substance” of the German people and of what remained of the reputation of the Reich. Added to that when it came to a political game of the Powers in the near future, Sweden was the only neutral for whom even a broken Germany was of no little importance. Finally I said that after what I had witnessed of the collapse of the Reich, the continuation of the war in Denmark and Norway had no moral or traditional justification, since it would devoid of any political or other value.

The meeting was then adjourned. Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl and I went off for super together at which these questions were, of course, further discussed. Keitel and Jodl were both against my going to Stockholm and wanted me, as the best experienced in Foreign affairs to remain beside von Krosigk and so with within their reach ([Bereich](#)). I again pointed out the importance of the Northern question and, I think, succeeded in getting Jodl to understand this.

I discussed one more with von Krosigk, Dr. Wirsing's draft ([Wirsing had returned in the Ju 88 night fighter back to Southern Germany; due to the progressing war, he could not land at Salzburg anymore and had to land at Prague, from where he drove by car westwards. He did so, up to about 30 km from Bad Tölz, which he reached on foot](#)) and advised him to get the Grossadmiral to carry out the suggestion contained therein, of dissolving the ([Nazi](#)) Party, the Staatspolizei ([Stapo](#)) and the SD. Further the question was discussed in what capacity I ([Schellenberg](#)) should be sent to Stockholm. Von Krosigk left it to me to advise him as to whether he should appoint me ‘Botschafter’ (envoy), ‘Sonderbevollmächtiger’ (Plenipotentiary Extraordinary), ‘Beauftragter’ (Representative) or anything else. I asked him to name me ‘Gesandter’, the one word which, in view of my mission, would suit me best. State Secretaries von Steengracht and Henke were called to the Foreign Minister in the night to prepare the plenary powers and form of appointment as ‘Gesandter’. Then we both talked to the Grossadmiral ([Doenitz](#)) again.

I reported to Himmler once more and had a short but significant talk with him, the essence of which was: “If only I ([Himmler](#)) had listened to you sooner” and “perhaps you are the first German to be permitted to do something positive for this poor ‘Vaterland’ again”.

4 May 1945.

The next morning at 1000 hours I reported to von Krosigk. My appointment as ‘Gesandter’ and the plenary powers to negotiate with the Swedish Government were signed by Doenitz at 0930 hours. I took leave of von Krosigk and left for Copenhagen at noon.

On the stretch to Hadersleben in Denmark, I ran into a heavy dive-bomb attack, which entailed a delay of three hours in the “great Belt”, and arrived in Copenhagen at 1800 hours. I endeavoured to contact Dr. Best to inform him of my mission and corresponding instructions regarding Denmark, which concerned him.

Denmark, which concerned him. Whilst I was still waiting for him in Dagmarhaus in order to go with him to the Swedish Minister von Dardel, an enormous crowd gathered on the Rathausplatz in expectation of the imminent capitulation of Germany. Shots were fired, armoured cars, ambulances, and the crowds grew to tenthousands. Owing to this upheaval in the whole town, Dr. Best was unable to make it, but I could not afford to lose any time either and had to reach the Swedish Legation at all costs, as the pre-arranged telephone communication had evidently not reached Stockholm through Herr von Dardel. I had driven through the night specially from Muerwick to Padburg to request Dr. Best to communicate this code message to Herr von Dardel. After a lot of argument with the SS-guard at the Dagmarhaus, I was whisked away in Count Bernadotte's car through a clearing made in the wire entanglement on the Rathaus side. The driver was ordered to go round and avoid the crowded streets, but apparently he did not know his way too well, and in a second we found ourselves in the thick of the crowd, who recognised Count Bernadotte's car and it was only a matter of minutes before the car, surrounded, pushed and half carried by the enthusiastic crowd, could get no further. With great presence of mind I managed to lock the doors and shut the windows, so that the people were unable to drag us out. I ordered the driver to step on it, and metre by metre we managed to push our way through the crowd. Those who were nearest yelled because they were being hurt and those further away were pushing towards the car gesticulating wildly. Finally the car was swamped by about 30 people, on the running board, on the roof and on the radiator, and it was only thanks to the driver's persistence that after $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours we arrived at the Swedish Legation, looking as though we had come out of a Turkish bath. With much nodding, friendly gesticulations, doffing my hat and saying 'Tak-tak', we had managed to get rid of the wild demonstrators.

I was immediately received by Herrn von Dardel, after I had met the lady of the house, and whilst we were still in the preliminary stages of the conference, the crowds had evidently moved to the Swedish Legation and there began to sing the Danish and Swedish national anthems. The noise of singing and shouting and shooting was such that one could hardly hear oneself speak. But in the quiet rooms of the Legation one felt safe. Herr Berkholtz had kindly undertaken to arrange all details for my journey, I went to the Hotel d'Angleterre to rest for two hours. The crowd had in the meantime dispersed and only here and there shots could be heard. Before the hotel I was held up by a wild 'Soldateska' of partisans but on recognising the Swedish car and a word from the driver that I was a Swede, I was allowed to pass unmolested.

5 May 1945.

On the morning of the 5th May at 0700 hours having got through all the controls put on by the Partisans, and the last German airport control, I left Copenhagen in Count Bernadotte's Danish Red Cross 'plane. At 0715 hours we arrived safely in Malmoe, where I was courteously received by the airport Commandant. 10 minutes later the Commandant informed me that a Swedish military 'plane was there to take me to Stockholm. After a brief introduction to the pilot, I was given oxygen apparatus and strapped into a parachute, and after a two hour flight we arrived safely in Broma. Here I was fetched by Herr Ostroem from the Foreign Office and who escorted me to Count Bernadotte's home, where immediately upon my arrival discussions commenced with von Post and Staatssekretaer Bohemann.

Having presented my credentials and the written authority to negotiate with the Swedish Government, I described my special mission to von Post and Bohemann, and the request, embodying the view of the German Government. After exhaustive discussion the two gentlemen decided first of all to discuss the whole affair with the representatives

Denmark, which concerned him. Whilst I was still waiting for him in Dagmarhaus in order to go with him to the Swedish Minister von Dardel, an enormous crowd gathered on the Rathausplatz in expectation of the imminent capitulation of Germany. Shots were fired, armoured cars, ambulances, and the crowds grew ten thousands. Owing to this upheaval in the whole town, Dr. Best was unable to make it, but could not afford costs, as the pre-arranged telephone communication had evidently not reached Stockholm through Herr von Dardel. I had driven through the night specially from (Flensburg-) Mürwick (were the “interim German Government” was located) to Padborg (Padburg) to request Dr. Best to communicate this code message to Herr von Dardel. After a lot of arguments with the SS-guard at the Dagmarhaus, I was whisked away in Bernadotte’s car through the clearing made in the wire (Drahtzaun) entanglement on the Rathaus side. The driver was ordered to go around and avoid the crowded streets, but apparently he did not know his way too well, and in a second we found ourselves in the thick crowd, who recognised Count Bernadotte’s car and it was only a matter of minutes before the car. Surrounded, pushed and half carried by the enthusiastic crowd, could get no further. With great presence of mind I managed to lock the doors and shut the windows, so that the people were unable to drag us out. I ordered the driver to step on it, and metre by metre we managed to push our way through the crowd. Those who were nearest yelled because they were being hurt and those further away were pushing towards the car gesticulating wildly. Finally the car was swamped by about 30 people, on the running board, on the roof and on the radiator, and it was only thanks to the driver’s persistence that after 1½ hours we arrived the Swedish Legation, looking as though we come out of a Turkish bath. With much nodding, friendly gesticulations, doffing my hat and saying ‘Tak-tak’, we had managed to get rid of the wild demonstrators.

I was immediately received by Herrn von Dardel, after I had met the lady of the house, and whilst we were still in the preliminary stages of the conference, the crowds had evidently moved to the Swedish Legation and there began to sing the Danish and Swedish national anthems. The noise of singing and shouting and shooting was such that one could hardly hear oneself speak. But in the quiet rooms of the Legation one felt safe. Herr Berkholtz had kindly undertaken to arrange all details for my journey, I went to the Hotel d’Angleterre to rest for two hours. The crowd had in the meantime dispersed and only here and there shots could be heard,. Before the Hotel I was held up by a wild ‘Soldateska’ of partisans but on recognising the Swedish car and a word from the driver that I was a Swede, I was allowed to pass unmolested.

5 May 1945.

On the morning of the 5th May at 0700 hours having got through all the controls put on by Partisans, and the last German airport control, I left Copenhagen in Count Bernadotte’s Danish Red Cross ‘plane. At 0715 hours we arrived safely in Malø, where I was continuously received by the airport Commandant. 10 minutes later the Commandant informed me that the Swedish military ‘plane was there to take me to Stockholm. After a brief introduction to the pilot, I was given oxygen apparatus and strapped into a parachute, and after a two hour flight we arrived safely in Bromma (The airport of Stockholm). Here I was fetched by Herr Osteroom from the Foreign Office and who escorted me to Count Bernadottes’s home, where immediately upon arrival discussions commenced with von Post and Staatssekretär Bohemann.

Having presented my credentials and the written authority to negotiate with the Swedish Government, I described my special mission to von Post and Bohemann, and the request, embodying the view of the German Government. After exhaustive discussion the two gentlemen decided first of all to discuss the whole affair with the representatives of the Western Powers, present in Stockholm, as events in Germany had gone so far

of the Western Powers, present in Stockholm, as events in Germany had gone so far.

As a provisional reply the Swedish Government received the information that in certain circumstances a special commission, set up by General Eisenhower, could be sent to Stockholm to discuss the existing problems.

6 May 1945.

Sunday 6th May brought no change in the Swedish attitude. The question of demonstrating my pleins pouvoirs by obtaining from Generaloberst Boehme an undertaking to implement the results of my negotiations with the Swedish Government, seemed of importance to us all.

In order not to lose any time, I decided to send Gesandten Thomsen - after I had explained my mission to him and General Utmann, the Military Attache - to the Norwegian frontier, to discuss with Generaloberst Boehme or Hoelter the surrender in Norway and the internment of German troops in Sweden. Gesandter Thomsen flew in a Swedish bomber to..... on the morning of the 6th May and met the First General Staff Officer of Generaloberst Boehme on the frontier.

At lunch time Thomsen telephoned a preliminary report to Stockholm and explained to me that only the First Officer of the General Staff had come, in himself an intelligent man, but whose attitude was different from what we expected. Thomsen pointed out that he could not discuss the matter in detail over the telephone and said he intended to be in Stockholm between 1700 and 1800 hours, to continue the discussion with me personally.

Gesandter Rieckert, Herr von Post, Count Bernadotte and I conferred over these further developments. Gesandter Rieckert suggested that we should under all circumstances get in touch with Grossadmiral Doenitz and inform him that Generaloberst Boehme had not yet been notified of my plenary powers. My suggestion of sending Doenitz a long telegraphic message was turned down after a general discussion. It had to be as Gesandter Rieckert suggested: through General Utmann's kind offices, telephone communication with the Grossadmiral was in fact established via Oslo, but owing to technical difficulties was hardly understandable. A second contact was made and I was able to talk to Graf Schwerin von Krosigk myself. He told me that things had moved very rapidly over night and that Germany had declared total capitulation. Negotiations, however, were still under way and I should therefore take care not to annoy the other side - Anglo-American - as the Norwegian question had been included. He added that should the Swedish Government on their part still have an interest in the matter, they should contact the Western Allies immediately.

The Swedish Gentlemen declared that under the circumstances there was no longer any possibility of doing anything - quite evidently the Norwegian problem as well as the Danish one had become part of the total capitulation negotiations. One could only wait and see if the Western Allies intended to approach the Swedish Government at all, say over the question of internment of the German fighting forces. All the same I did at the request of British Military Attache, Sutton Bratt, transmit through Herrn von Post and General Utmann, a notification from the Western Allies to Generaloberst Boehme that he could get into direct touch with England on short-wave. This showed then that the Western Powers, especially England, did not wish to use the medium of the Swedish Government in this matter, but instead to carry out capitulation negotiations regarding Norway direct with the German Government. In that way the further plan of requesting the Swedish Government officially to arrange a meeting for me or Schwerin von Krosigk with General Eisenhower fell through.

Of the Western Powers, present in Stockholm, as events in Germany had gone so far.

As a provisional reply the Swedish Government received the information on that in certain circumstances a special commission, set up by General Eisenhower, could be sent to Stockholm too discuss the existing problems,

6 May 1945.

Sunday 6th May brought no change in the Swedish attitude. The question of demonstrating my *pleins pouvoirs* by obtaining from Generaloberst Boehne and undertaking to implement the results of my negotiations with the Swedish Government, seemed of importance to us all.

In order not to lose any time, I decided to send Gesandten Thomsen my mission to him and General Utmann, the Military Attaché – to the Norwegian frontier, to discuss with Generaloberst Boehme or Hoelter the surrender in Norway and the internment of the German troops in Sweden. Gesandter Thomsen (AOB, [I suppose he was the German Gesandter in Stockholm who apparently was still there](#)) flew in a Swedish bomber to ... on the morning of the 6th May and met the first General Staff Officer of Generaloberst Boehme on the frontier.

At lunch time Thomsen telephoned a preliminary report to Stockholm and explained to me that only the First Officer of the General Staff had come, in himself an intelligent man, but whose attitude was different from what we expected. Thomsen pointed out that he could not discuss the matter in detail over the telephone and said he intended to be in Stockholm between 1700 and 1800 hours. To continue the discussion with me personally.

Gesandter Rieckert, Herr von Post, Count Bernadotte and I conferred over these further developments. Gesandter Rieckert suggested that we should under all circumstances get in touch with Grossadmiral Doenitz and inform him that Generaloberst Boehne had not yet been notified of my plenary powers. My suggestion of sending Doenitz a long telegraphic message was turned down after a general discussion. (AOB, [since 19 April 1945 the German Embassy in Stockholm did not possess their own telex \(Fernschreib\) link with Germany](#)) It had to be as Gesandter Rieckert suggested; though General Utmann's kind offices, telephone communication with Grossadmiral was in fact established via Oslo, but owing to technical difficulties was hardly understandable. A second contact was made and I was able to talk to Graf Schwerin von Krosigk myself. He told me that things had moved very rapidly over night and that Germany had declared total capitulation. Negotiations, however, were still under way and I should therefore take care not to annoy the other side – Anglo-American – as the Norwegian question had been included. He added that should the Swedish Government on their part still have an interest in the matter, they should contact the Western Allies immediately.

The Swedish Gentlemen declared that under the circumstances there was no longer any possibility of doing anything – quite evidently the Norwegian problem as well as the Danish one had come part of the total capitulation negotiations. One could only wait and see if the Western Allies intended to approach the Swedish Government at all, say over the question of internment of the German fighting forces. All the same I did at the request of the British Military Attaché, Sutton Bratt, transmit through Herr von Post and General Utmann, a notification from the Western Allies to Generaloberst Boehme that he could get into direct touch with England, did not wish to use the medium of the Swedish Government in this matter, but instead to carry out capitulation negotiations regarding Norway direct with the German Government. In that way the further plan of requesting the Swedish Government officially to arrange a meeting for me or Schwerin von Krosigk with General Eisenhower fell through.

(AOB, [I suppose to break off this chapter here. The relevance of the forgoing, is, in my perception, the circumstances in the 'virtual vacuum' between 29 April, Hitler's suicide and, say, 6th of May 1945. Holland was *de facto* free on the 5th albeit, that the Germans still possessed legal powers until the Canadians replaced them, which took a few days; with some exceptions longer](#))

Termination of Part II on 27 May 2019