Englandspiel-Nordpol-affair

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AOB: short notice; please read in all cases for FAK or FAT: Frontaufklärungskommando instead of Front~~abwehr~~kommando as well as: Frontaufklärungstrupp instead of Front~~Abwehr~~trupp.

What makes it all so intriguing, is, the fact that it lasted for nearly two years!

as > 50 persons had been involved and with a very few exceptions, they lost their lives ultimately.

On 11 February 2019, I received from Kees Neisingh the following E-mail:

My query to him was, whether he knew the dates that Himmler visited Holland. Quote: Op 2 juni 1940 was Himmler al bij Seyss-Inquart. Op 14 mei 1942 was Himmler op bezoek en vond het vermaard gesprek op Clingendael (AOB, Seyss-Inquart lived there) plaats, met Jordaan en Boelaard. Himmler is nog vaker geweest, zo inspecteerde hij op 1 februari 1944 de “vordere Wasserstellung”, bij Gouda.

This message is confirming my repeated notices, that a letter existed in which Himmler himself has granted a freedom of prosecution in the Nordpol and Englandspiel affairs.

Thus, this must have been related to the meeting up between Himmler and two captured S.O.E. agents in Holland, on 14 May 1942, when they did meet up in Seyss-Inquart's house or quarter.

You will be confronted with genuine British document sections, which are being selected by my choice out of the bulk of paper materials available.

Before starting our Survey, I would like to point at the fact, that I previously (before 7 February 2019), I did suppose that the famous telegram once sent to S.O.E. on 1st April 1944, could only have been addressed on behalf of Schreieder, but he, in his post-war book : Englandspiel, on page 281, he quotes:

in Dutch language: De vijand brak het spel niet af; daarom moesten wij het wel doen. Giskes stuurde dan ook op 1 April een radiogram, dat als volgt luidde:

Wij zijn ons ervan bewust, dat u sedert enige tijd zonder onze hulp in Nederland zaken doet. Daar wij gedurende ruime tijd uw vertegenwoordiger zijn geweest, vinden wij dit heel onbillijk. Maar dat sluit niet uit, dat, als u mocht besluiten, ons op grote schaal te komen bezoeken, wij u de zelfde gastvrije ontvangst zullen bereiden, als uw agenten.”*

Equally can be found in Guy Liddell's war-time diaries 1942-1945; on page 251

Therefore. I would like to stress, that when otherwise being noticed, you should understand the foregoing text lines. Thus: that it was Giskes who arranged this telegram (radiogram)

Before hand: Britain gained upmost from wireless (W/T) intercepts, but just this aspect might have been the braking point; as in Holland, the Germans possessed an excellent telephone network and almost all crucial communications went through wires instead of wireless!

This may be considered as the main reason why these events have been so disastrous!

Not foreseeable, was the fact that it would cover too many pages at once, and I have therefore decided, to divide this file into two chapters.

The next file is the second part of the previous document. In some respect it gives to me the impression, that everything around has been collected in a box and ultimately made it a file. But, it also contains some unexpected aspects. His file is most interesting as he dealt with it at a practical level, but still operating in between Giskes' circles and the daily operational practice.

Considering, for example, a Dutch dissertation on Nordpol and Englandspiel (2003)(J.P.M.H. Wolters), its scope is rather narrow, albeit that when going into details it is done solid; but just outside it, it provides hardly anything! Therefore providing all the efforts, a quite meagre understanding of what happened in the Netherlands on the same time.

Huntemann, although he was an Uffz. (N.C.O.) in the quite small organisation of III F, he did almost the daily operational work on behalf of its Leiter Major/Obstlt. Giskes. He therefore is an excellent source of information; because he really dealt with most people concerned.

However, the latter contribution covers only the file sections 1 - 3. In my perception, the most intriguing section is number 4 (to be covered within Part II, as it considers the names of all those Huntemann could add what he knew about a person. Maybe for historians the most fruitful source of information.

I went through Huntemann's which after all proved to be a bit different than was expected. I have therefore considered only what really matters.

In my perception, he should be considered as the most relevant person of the Nordpol Affairs and the Englandspiel, on the German side.

Schreieder, Kriminaldirektor of the SD, and Hermann Joseph Giskes on behalf of the Abwehr (military Intelligence).

The Englandspiel and Nordpol affairs, was on the German side unprecedented successful, mainly due to their mutual understanding.

In contrast to what often was practiced, Schreieder was against violence versus those being captured.

In my perception, please remember: what have played a major role, in contrast elsewhere, was the existence in Holland of a wide, and good functioning, telephone system; preventing the application of wireless communications.

Otherwise, the course of history concerning Nordpol affairs and Englandspiel would have had a short operational life, but it lasted from about 12 March 1942 until, at least, autumn 1943.

We should not forget: that about 50 men have been murdered in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp!

But Schreieder had to take care of her after all; and she had luck, because she survived.

In contrast to foregoing interrogation reports, I have considered more facets of Schreieder's file, because his details are so rare.

After the war, the "Dutch Parliamentary Enquête Commission 1940-1945" dealt with this complex rather comprehensively, but it is, of course, genuinely issued in Dutch language.

However, my comment is, that he could have dealt with this complex in a wider way, but he might have been limited due to his uncertain status (future); and, likely, by the British narrow scope on this real S.O.E. disaster.

Without the implications of the Funkabwehr and its Police related counter-part the Orpo, we cannot imagine what organisation structures, once had been involved.

Holland, and Paris including its vicinity, (neglecting some other implied areas) were mainly handled by the Orpo organisation; the latter stood for: Ordnungspolizei, thus an organisation, directed by the R.S.H.A. Rivalry, of course, existed, but what can be learned from the next report, combined with my foregoing file surveys, is, that, at least in my perception, this organisation was quite well capable handling their tasks as was expected. Albeit, that they operated in more restricted areas, and consequently it was a smaller organisation. Compared with the Wehrmacht, the general personnel ranking of those concerned within the Orpo was of a higher level than that of most of the Wehrmacht Funkabwehr personnel. Maybe because they (Orpo) were professionals (civil servants); and their organisation was not directly depending upon conscripts. When we consider the names involved, in particular in regard to the 'Heer / GAF' Funkabwehr, we see that the same names repeatedly are turning up in various areas, what might imply that quite many were moved frequently allover the occupied European continent.

Another, a bit chaotic, apparently not well understood chapter, is:- on the implementation of radio amateurs. The Nazi ruled state, maybe even before this era, radio amateurism was not greatly supported by the Administrations. The numbers of HAM licences was about 475, and restrict to that number. Simply, one had to wait until someone handed-in his Ham licence. Albeit, that in wartime days, the policy was lifted a bit, and the wartime (Kriegsfunk) licences could seemingly be obtained easier than was in the 1930s. However, on the other hand, there existed a quite greater numbers of so-called 'DE' 'licences' these were (listening) radio-amateurs who were allowed to possess (and constructing) short-wave receivers and operating them privately (even throughout the war); who passed an exam controlled by the D.A.S.D. For it they were tested on basic knowledge, but in particular on their ability in handling CW (W/T) message traffics. It was just this source of well motivated, often young men, which was the 'pond' in which in particular the Abwehr derived their W/T related personnel from. When you want to know more about it, please look at our D.A.S.D related subject series on our index-page.

They wonder about the frequent application of international HAM (Q- and other) codes, which seems to have been unlikely in British W/T practice. My friend Rudolf Staritz (97) (DL3CS) told me, that just the existence of these fellow 'radio-amateurs' around, made his life bearable throughout this bleak period in life; like ever, radio-amateurs is a special specimen, with a world-wide mutual understanding (call it friendship), also in our days.

What we should, however, never forget, is, the superb British R.S.S. service, which intercepted almost all Abwehr related communication, and likely also most other wireless traffic. This service, should be considered as 'War Deciding'; as by this means an unprecedented (overwhelming) knowledge of what happened in German ruled War-effort, existed! The 'HW' series show, among other NA series, to what extent they have penetrated into German wireless communications. These efforts would not have been possible without: name it "Bletchley Park" and "GC & HQ's" superb services!