Kriegsfunkgenehmigungen, list of call-signs found in DASD-CQ (as far as available here)

Date of active call-signs according DASD-CQ of the year 1944 (black = November)

I started working on issue 11 (November) first and continued then from April upwards, thus what I have marked black was also valid for previous months

I found a total number of 86 active radio hams in the year 1944. This figure may well have been higher, as we only could consider April - June/July - August - September and November

That these late DASD-CQ issues were for their members only (Nur für Mitglieder), is quite understandable, as there existed a considerable contradiction between what common citizens was allowed to do and that of what radio amateurs was permitted! Their chairman Ernst Sachs was a high ranked person in the SS hierarchy (Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant a.D.) and was chief of Heinrich Himmler's communications (Chef des Fernmeldewesens). Regard, also Sacks' letter addressed to Himmler

D3ank mentioned in 1941,  OM Georg Brockmann

D3ayv April 1944

D3cdk April 1944

D3dmc April 1944

D3jaf April 1944

D3jgf April 1944

D3jhf April 1944

D3jis April 1944

D3jjs April 1944

D3jls April 1944

D3jms April 1944

D3jns April 1944

D3jyp April 1944

D4akk April 1944

D4amd April 1944

D4arr June/July 1944   OM Hannes Bauer

D4avf April 1944

D4bgf April 1944

D4dba April 1944

D4fbc April 1944

D4fmf April 1944

D4ioh April 1944

D4jis April 1944

D4kaf April 1944

D4lkm April 1944     OM Georg Zumpe

D4nlo April 1944

D4oul June/July 1944

D4pdt April 1944

D4pgf April 1944

D4rul April 1944

D4uud April 1944

D4vco April 1944

D4vjv April 1944

D4vum June/July 1944

D4wyf September 1944   OM Dipl.-Ing. Herbert Salzbrunn

D4xld April 1944

D4xvf April 1944   OM Felix Cremers

D4ynf April 1944

D4zhg April 1944

D4zuf April 1944

D4zvb June/July 1944

D4zxf June/July 1944

When we regard that about 530 radio hams got their licence before say September 1939, it is likely that 120^#* held a so-called "Kriegsfunkgenehmigung" , in the last months of 1944, these figures include 30 hams who got an special license for 10 metre band only. (officially all were designated: Funkliebhabersender)^#. Sources dealing with German wartime ham activities sometimes estimate a maximum of 30 especially licensed hams. We can, however, compare these rather objective figures shown above with the fairytales told by some self-called historians. Again, in this respect my good old friend Helmut Liebich DL1OY has it right with his estimation that far more than 50 hams had obtained such a wartime license! #Very below is stated that this figure was actually 120! (22 % of all pre-war stations).  #*I came recently across new information, in which is stated that 170 hams possessed on 1.1.1944 a so-called KFSGen!

Read, for instance, the first page of issue 7/8 of 1941, on clandestine radio (Schwarzsenden), however, also on the fact that German hams got Kriegsfunkgenehmigungen (for its full version, activate the hyperlink shown in the upper section of this page) 

Dick Rollema did send me, after noticing my preliminary concept, additional information on this subject. I made a transcript of: The short wave magazine, June 1981, volume XXXIX, page 189

G7FH DE D3FBA - GM OM ES TNX FER REPORT - UR SIGS 569 - NAME WALDEMAR ES QTH NR BERLIN - TX 15 WATTS ES ANT DIPOLE - NW QRU 73 -

At the outbreak of the war, G stations went off the air and all transmitters were impounded by the Post Office. The same action was taken in Germany on 1^ST September (1939, AOB) but three operators were allowed to keep their equipment. The most well known of these was D4BIH whose contacts with American stations caused a great deal of interest throughout the world. The object of the exercise was propaganda. The authorities wanted to persuade outsiders that life in Germany was continuing normally despite the minor inconvenience of a war. Gradually more licenses were issued until there were some 150 stations on the air, most of them on 80 and 40 metre bands.

It does seem strange that radio amateurs should be permitted to operate transmitters from their homes in a country where people were not even allowed to listen to foreign broadcasts. This, and the fact that from May 1940, the president of the National Society, the DASD, was an SS General, gave rise to the suspicion that anyone with a KFSG must be a confirmed Party member. However, this was not at all the case. The licenses were issued during the war by the German Army High Command (OKW) entirely without regard to the recipient’s political leanings. Some of the licence holders must have been members of the NSDAP or similar organisations; others may have held full-time jobs in the Abwehr communications intelligence service. All had to be trusted, but no more so than any other soldier or civilian engaged in sensitive work. Neither in their political allegiances nor in their professional capacities can any common ground be established. They were not involved in any kind of monitoring duties similar to those performed by British amateurs in the wartime RSS organisation. Although the motive for putting them on the air - "propaganda by their very presence" - is hardly compatible with the true spirit of Amateur Radio, there was nothing at all sinister about the operators or the QSO’s which passed between them. ...... In 1942, licences were issued to a few operators in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. To stimulate activity on 10 metres, some fifty other German operators were given licences for exclusive operations on this band. Although some experimental telephony transmissions were made, CW was used for the vast majority of all contacts. The QSL bureau functioned throughout the war and a communications receiver with plug-in coils similar to the HRO was available through the DASD (this type was called KST and was produced by Körting Radio. The tuning-dial and attached capacitors were originally made by National in the US , the mother company of HRO (as was the receiver concept, be it employing German valves and components). These parts were imported via Portugal. I was told, that the German Army rejected KST as being not good enough for military deployment. The Abwehr used them and a bulk was given to DASD for further usage. When many amateurs can use the same type of receiver, reports given can be much better compared against each other. See also my paper on German Abwehr wireless, AOB)

With military approval, beacon stations D4WYF 2/3/4/5 operated during the war on the 80, 40, 20 and 10 metre bands; the 80 and 10 metre beacons were located at the Ludwigsfeld military base near Berlin where the Germans monitored foreign broadcasts. This unit - the German equivalent of Caversham - was known at the "Giftküche" or "poison kitchen" and passed on foreign propaganda to the High Command. The operators included several amateurs who all held special permits signed by Keitel himself authorising them to listen to foreign news broadcastings. ...... A number of licenced German amateurs also operated from outside the Reich. Stations were on the air with D calls from France, Greece, North Africa and even from Spain. Contacts were made with stations at home and a certain amount of the third party traffic was passed. D4XYN (DL1DX today) operated from the German embassy in Madrid.. (this was DL1IX not DL1DX was Hannes Bauer!, in post war days, DL1IX's letter is also partially available on this website, AOB) .......  Interesting for me is, that Mr Ockenden did not mention the (a) so very obvious reason why ham operations were encouraged by German authorities, be it actively and/or passively. This was - that amateurs (hams and SWLs) had to support (supply) regularly data on wireless propagation, simply by listening into netting communications!

Mr Ernst Sachs was a high ranked SS officer, but given the circumstances, he might have been the best person having decisive power to resist decisions that could bring German amateurs becoming involved in Nazi propaganda. He resisted successfully Goebbels endeavour in this direction. After a personal talk with Goebbels, it was agreed that the fact that German amateurs were showing-up their presence on amateur bands was enough propaganda. However, all war licenses had to be approved by the German military High Command (OKW). The only objective was, like in comparable cases, that no real thread could be opposed. It is thus to be said: that a membership of any Nazi party related organisation, was not at all being asked for!

Mr Koerner expressed it:

Ohne starken Steuermann war der DASD verloren ... Die Ereignisse überstürzten sich jedoch in einer Weise, die all, um den Bestand des Verbandes bangenden OMs in Erstaunen versetzte. Bereits am 15. Mai (1940, AOB) wurde bekannt, daß das Ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda eines SS-Gruppenführer mit Namen Ernst Sachs zum neuen Präsidenten des DASD ernannt hätte. (Die öffentliche Bekanntmachung gelangte diese Nachricht mit Windeseile in alle Landesverbände). Bestürzung in DASD-Kreisen war die erste Reaktion hierauf; man fühle sich an die SS verkauft. ..... Ernst Sachs, Berufsoffizier des Heeres, hatte sich schon zu Beginn seiner Laufbahn dem Funkdienst und der entstehenden Nachrichtentruppe verschrieben. Als junger Leutnant war er bereits 1909 einer der ersten Hörer bei Prof. Slaby .... Dort beeindruckte ihn besonders das energische Eintreten der Amerikaner für die Belange des Amateurfunks. Sein Werk war der Aufbau der Heeresnachrichtenschule in Halle. ... Fast 5000 (DASD, known as: RUE-Funk-Aktion, AOB) Bogen gingen hinaus. Hauptfragen: Wo bist Du eingesetzt? Was ist Deine Tätigkeit? Entspricht diese Tätigkeit Deinem Können und Deinem Fähigkeiten? Über 3500 Antworten kamen zurück, präzise ausgefüllt, handfestes Material. Die Auswertung begann ohne Verzug und schon bald darauf gelang etwas unglaubliches: Sehr viele OMs konnten in der Folgezeit aus allen Fronten herausgezogen werden. Leicht war das nicht, den mancher Truppenteil stellte sich energisch gegen Abzug von Soldaten. Aus in solchen Fällen wußte Sachs Abhilfe zu schaffen. ...

... Aus diesen geht hervor, daß Sachs schon bald nach seinem Amtsantritt die politische Beurteilung der Sendelizenzanwärter abschaffte. In gerichtlich anhängigen Fällen von Schwarzsenderei gelang es ihm sehr oft helfend einzugreifen, falls es sich um eine rein funksportliche Verletzung des berüchtigten Schwarzsendergesetzes handelte. Etwa 60 Funkamateure kamen während des Krieges wegen Schwarzsendens vor die Gerichte des Dritten Reiches, denen heute wohl niemand vorwirft, sie seien zu milde gewesen. Alle diese Angeklagten betrieben ausschließlich Amateurfunk, also verbotenes Senden als ideellen Selbstzweck. Nicht einer kam ins Zuchthaus einige Monate Gefängnis waren die Regel. Zwar mußten alle Lizenzen vom OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) bewilligt werden. Da der Verband aber dem Propagandaministerium unterstand würde man ihm in solcher Art die schuldige Reverenz erweisen, daß man es evtl. doch vor den eigenen Karren spannen konnte. ... Das Wohlwollen des Ministeriums war gesichert, ohne den Amateurfunk zu gefährden oder mißbrauchen zu müssen. .... Das Bestreben der DASD-Leitung, mehr Lizenzen für ihre OMs bewilligt zu bekommen, hatte von Versuch zu Versuch Erfolg. Da die ersten Kriegslizenzen hauptsächlich im Raume Berlin erteilt wurden, bemühte man sich, den Kreis so auszuweiten, daß ein Netz von Stationen das gesamt Reichsgebiet überzog. Noch ca. 120 Lizenzen*** konnten erwirkt werden. Darunter waren auch die ca. 30 Zehn-Meter-Kriegsfunksendegenehmigungen, mit denen die ganz zum Schluß zugelassenen Amateurstationen bedacht wurden. Alle erteilten Lizenzen waren gebührenfrei, für die Empfänger entfiel auch die übliche Rundfunkgebühr. ... Jeder Lizenzinhaber war sogar berechtigt, seinen Sender auch außerhalb seines ständigen Wohnorts zu betreiben. Der jeweilige Standort mußte lediglich dem DASD bekanntgegeben werden. ....  Transcript of some parts, pp. 162-173 *** According to another source it were 170 Kriegsfunksendegenehmigungen!